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Executive summary 
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, usually referred to as al-Shabaab (“the youth”), is mostly 
known as a Somali terrorist group. But since the end of 2008 it has functioned as a state 
power in large parts of Southern and Central Somalia. In this study I sketch out the structure 
and function of the legal system of the group. Over the last three years they have developed 
an administrative structure and a legal system which is unprecedented in the Somali conflict, 
which has lasted for more than 20 years. In order to establish law and order in their territories 
al-Shabaab has applied their own version of sharī’a and issued strict religiously inspired 
decrees. The present study is based on information acquired through interviews with Somali 
refugees in Nairobi who have direct experiences with al-Shabaab’s judicial practice. It reveals 
that al-Shabaab’s application of criminal law follows the inherent logic of classical Islamic 
legal doctrines on several points. However, the al-Shabaab courts tend to overlook many of 
the strict requirements regarding evidence and procedure which was outlined by the medieval 
Muslim scholars in order to humanize Islamic law. This is especially evident in cases of the 
so-called ḥadd (pl. ḥudūd) crimes, i.e. offences where the punishments (e.g. stoning, lashing 
and amputation) are described in the Qu’rān and the haḍīth-literature. Therefore, the legal 
reality under al-Shabaab’s regime is far more brutal than under most other Islamic inspired 
regimes in the contemporary Muslim world.  
 Al-Shabaab’s practice of Islamic criminal law is not only a means to exercise control 
through fear but may also be seen as an effective way of filling the vacuum of insecurity and 
instability after twenty years of violence and absence of state institutions in its territories. In 
order to understand Al-Shabaab’s current practice of criminal law, I argue, one has to take 
into consideration the group’s Jihadi-Salafi affiliation. According to Salafi notions sharī’a is 
not only a means to an end, but an end in itself. As such sharī’a, i.e. God’s divine law, is the 
visual symbol of an Islamic state. Consequently, the application of Islamic criminal law, 
especially the ḥudūd punishments, provides al-Shabaab with religious and political 
legitimazy. The fact that corporal punishments and executions are frequently enforced in 
public is in many respects more important than whether the criminal proceedings are in 
accordance with the strict requirements outlined in classical legal doctrines.     
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Part 1: Context  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
For decades, the rights of the Muslims have been lost in either man-made or tribal laws, or bribes, 
sources, or favoritism. These rights which were lost were inherited by successive generations as 
mountains of disputes which have filled people with hate, taking a toll on peace and security. This 
was of course until the sun of the Shariah rose and did away with the darkness of oppression.
1  
 
This statement by the general command of Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (“The 
Mujahideen Youth Movement”) was released on an Islamist web page as a part of a general 
outline of the movement’s ideology. This movement, often referred to as al-Shabaab (“the 
youth”) has for the last three years dominated most parts of the war-torn Southern and Central 
Somalia. Although it is currently under massive military pressure al-Shabbab has developed a 
relatively centralized “state” administration which through the application of sharī’a2 has 
provided a certain degree of law and order. However, it has had its price. Al-Shabaab’s 
interpretation and brutal application of sharī’a has caused and still causes fear and insecurity 
among the population. The main question which I pursue in this study is al-Shabab's relation 
to Islam, notably its use of sharī’a as a means of gaining religio-political legitimacy. The 
thesis consists of two parts: Part 1 provides the necessary background, the theoretical 
framework and methodological reflections, and Part 2 consists of the analysis of my material.  
 Part 1 consists of four chapters: chapter 1 gives a short introduction to general 
theoretical considerations and the two research questions which inform my thesis. In chapter 2 
I describe and reflect on important aspects and challenges regarding my fieldwork which was 
conducted in the Somalian district in Nairobi, Kenya, during October 2010. During this stay, I 
gathered important material through interviews with refugees from al-Shabaab controlled 
territories. Also, the field trip was necessary in order to establish a network among Somalis in 
Nairobi, which, in the course of the following months, would provide essential information 
from newly arrived refugees. 
                                                          
1
 Global Islamic Media Front, The forgotten Obligation: A Call to the Most Important Obligation After Iman, 29. 
April, 2010, p. 6, http://forgottenobligation.wordpress.com/2010/04/29/mujahideen-youth-movement-al-
shabaab-%E2%80%9Cand-on-that-day-the-believers-will-rejoice%E2%80%9D/, [14.06.2010] (URL not longer 
available). 
2
 I apply diacritical marks on all Arabic terms unless the term is written differently in the source material. Except 
from proper nouns and categories applied in the academic literature, all Arabic and Somali terms in this thesis 
are written in italics.  
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 Chapter 3 focuses on religion, law and traditional clan structures in Somalia. Through 
a historical sketch I emphasize the changing relationship between two important and often 
opposing ideas, namely clan and religion. Within this framework, I give a short outline of the 
emergence of Islamic radicalism in Somalia, with emphasis on al-Shabaab.  
 Chapter 4 is devoted to al-Shabaab and its ideology. This approach rests on Jonathan 
A. C. Brown’s,3 Quintan Wictorowicz’s4 and Bernard Haykel’s5 theoretical perspectives on 
Salafism. I apply their categories in order to place al-Shabaab within a model of contemporary 
Islamic trends and use their categories as a framework for my analysis. By discussing certain 
ideological traits as well as al-Shabaab’s practice, I argue that al-Shabaab in many respects 
could be categorized as a Jihadi-Salafi group. 
 Part 2 consists of the analysis of my material. In order to throw light on the salient 
features, the functioning and the logic of al-Shabaab’s legal system and judicial practice, I 
systematically compare my material with classical Islamic legal doctrines, fiqh.
6
 In the last 
chapter I discuss the most notable findings in light of the Jihadi-Salafi model mentioned 
above. It provides a framework for understanding al-Shabaab’s application and enforcement 
of law, notably the frequent use of brutal punishments and executions. I also point out the 
challenges that al-Shabaab faces when trying to establish itself as a legitimate religious-
political regime by using Jihadi-Salafi ideas and symbols. 
   
1.1 Previous research and research questions  
Although there has been some research on al-Shabaab, particularly regarding its link to global 
Islamism and terrorism, little research has been conducted on its legal structure and 
application of law. To my knowledge the only scholarly works which touch briefly upon these 
topics are Roland Marchal’s The Rise of a Jihādi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-
                                                          
3
 Jonathan A. C. Brown, Hadith: Muhammad’s Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World, (Oxford: Oneworld 
Publications, 2009) 
4
 Quintan Wiktorowiz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29, 3, (2006). 
5
 Bernard Haykel, “On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action”, in Roel Meijer (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s 
New Religious Movement, (London: Hurst & Company, 2009). 
6
 “Classical legal doctrines” or “classical fiqh” are collective terms for the comprehensive legal literature 
compiled roughly from the 8
th
 century to 14
th
-15
th
 century AD by Islamic legal scholars. The term “fiqh”, 
meaning “knowledge” or “reason” was already used by the early legal scholars in the 8th century as a term for 
Islamic jurisprudence. While sharī’a was perceived as the God given law by these scholars, fiqh was seen as the 
human interpretation of this law. The hermeneutical tradition developed during this period is still being studied 
and lectured both in the West and in the Muslim world and exerts great influence on contemporary sharī’a 
discourses.  
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Shabaab al-Mujaheddin in Somalia
7
 and Stig J. Hansen’s Report for the Norwegian Defence 
Research Establishment
8
. In addition, several reports by NGOs/GOs concerning human rights 
violations have been issued, which contain valuable eyewitness accounts of al-Shabbab’s 
judicial practice and law-enforcement. However, there has been no systematic study of al-
Shabaab’s legal system and its application and enforcement of law. My intention is that this 
thesis will contribute to the understanding of the structure and function of al-Shabaab’s legal 
system, with a particular focus on judicial practice and enforcement of criminal law. 
Hopefully, this limited study will not only increase the understanding of al-Shabaab’s legal 
system, but also contribute to a better understanding of its role as a national and global 
religious-political actor. I also hope that the study will serve as a starting point for further 
research both on al-Shabaab and application of sharī’a in Somalia. 
 In order to throw light on al-Shabaab's jurisprudence and to contribute to the 
understaning of sharī’a in contemporary Somalia, I focus on two main questions: 
 
1. Al-Shabaab and its relation to the Islamic legal heritage:   
To what extent does al-Shabaab conform to classical fiqh? In order to throw light on this 
question I compare al-Shabaab’s judicial practice with concepts, provisions and requirements 
from classical legal doctrines. 
 
2. Al-Shabaab and Salafism: 
How does al-Shabaab manage to gain legitimazy as a state power? In order to throw light on 
this question I look at the use of symbols and terms from the current Salafi discourse with 
emphasis on sharī’a. 
 
1.2 Studying al-Shabaab and sharī’a: a social constuctionist perspective  
A basic theoretical premise for this thesis is the social constructionist claim that social 
categories, e.g. religion and sharī’a, are not something ahistorical and given, but rather 
historical and socio-cultural constructions. This implies that categories are given meaning 
through social interactions, in contrast to an essentialist view, where categories are understood 
                                                          
7
 Roland Marchal, The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaheddin in 
Somalia, (Paris: SciencesPo, March 2011), http://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/ressource/shabaab.pdf, 
[19.08.2011]. 
8
 Stig J. Hansen, Report for the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, (2011, forthcoming). 
4 
 
as statical entities and considered separately from context.
9
 Social interactions, or discourses, 
are, as Foucault puts it: “practices which form the object of which they speak”.10 In a 
constructivist perspective, religious categories like sacred law, moral conduct and just 
punishment etc. are continually defined or redefined. Epistemologically, this suggests that one 
cannot have knowledge of the world outside what is, in a certain historical and cultural 
context, created in the discursive interactions. As S. Hall summarizes:  
 
Discourse, Foucault argues, constructs the topic. It defines and produces the objects of our knowledge. 
It governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about. It also influences 
how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate the conduct of others.
11
    
 
Central to the social constructionist perspective is the question of power, in the sense 
that every truth claim or discourse is constantly under threat from other discourses which 
offer alternative versions of  “the truth”.12 What is to be understood as true or truthful is 
contingent on the relative authority or power of the actors who make the utterance.
13
 Thus, for 
instance in a trial conducted in al-Shabaab dominated areas, the judge (qāḍī), the complainant 
and the defendant all participate in the discourse where al-Shabaab’s world view (their ideas, 
norms and values) and its version of sharī’a is constructed as normal. 
What are the implications of a constructionist perspective for the approach to al-
Shabaab and sharī’a? Firstly, the meaning of the term sharī’a cannot be isolated from its 
concrete representation and those who enforce it. In the al-Shabaab areas this means that 
sharī’a is nothing more than its continuous reconstructions through authoritative statements 
and application by the courts. Since a “valid” application of sharī’a relies on the authority of 
those who enforces it the question of authority is crucial but also very problematic for al-
Shabaab. The group gained territorial power through the use of violence and is now trying to 
establish itself as a legitimate political force and as a guarantee of justice, stability and order. 
In order for al-Shabaab’s sharī’a practice to be counted as valid, normal and truthful it cannot 
deviate too radically from preestablished conceptions of sharī’a, justice and law. However, 
jurisprudence in Somalia is not only restricted to sharī’a but also includes customary law, 
                                                          
9
 Torjer A. Olsen, “Diskursanalyse i religionsvitenskapen”, in Siv Ellen Kraft and Richard J. Natvig (eds.), 
Metode i religionsvitenskapen, (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 2006), pp. 55-56.  
10
 Foucault quoted in Vivien Burr, Social Constructionism, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 64.  
11
 S. Hall quoted in Burr, Social Constructionism, p. 65.  
12
 Anne Eriksen and Anne Stensvold, Maria-kult og helgendyrkelse i moderne katolisisme, (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 
2002).  
13
 Iver B. Neuman, Mening, materialitet, makt: En innføring I diskursanalyse, 2nd ed., (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 
2002), pp. 166-172; Burr, Social Constructionism, pp. 67-80. 
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which has been increasingly important in the absence of Somali state institutions during the 
last twenty years. Al-Shabaab’s application of sharī’a is therefore, to a certain extent, 
restrained by history and tradition, making it difficult for al-Shabaab to gain legitimazy if 
their practices are too radical.  
 
Chapter 2: Method 
When I started working with this thesis, my primary interest was to acquire knowledge about 
the legal system of al-Shabaab with focus on its judicial practice of criminal law. This I 
intended to do by gathering as much relevant information as possible from internet sources, 
e.g. media reports, reports from NGOs and GOs, and al-Shabaab statements and propaganda 
material found on Islamist web pages, as well as through fieldwork. However, there were two 
major challenges: Firstly, most of the reports found on the Internet focused primarily on 
application of the brutal ḥudūd punishments14 and other human rights violations, such as 
beheading of alleged spies. Moreover, few of these reports, or the numerous propaganda 
pampleths found on the net, could provide much information about what actually happens 
during court proceedings. Secondly, already from the outset of my project, the al-Shabaab 
dominated Southern and Central Somalia were ravaged by fighting between the forces of al-
Shabaab on the one side, and the TFG
15
, AMISOM
16
 and other groups on the other. Al-
Shabaab’s hostile attitude towards Western organizations, journalists and others, which 
occasionally had led to expulsion and even to killings, made it difficult or even impossible for 
me to conduct fieldwork in the areas they control. These practical difficulties limited my 
access to relevant source material since I could not observe first-hand al-Shabaab’s judicial 
practice, and to my knowledge there were no records of court cases accessible.  
 
2.1 The quest for information – initial stages  
As direct observation of court cases and interviews with qāḍīs and other al-Shabaab 
functionaries in Somalia was out of the question, I had to consider other, though less 
adequate, methods in order to acquire relevant information. Through one of my supervisors, 
Stig Jarle Hansen’s extensive network of Somalis in Scandinavia and the Horn of Africa, I 
                                                          
14
 Ḥudūd punishments are described later. 
15
 TFG, the Transitional Federal Government, is the internationally recognized government of Central and 
Southern Somalia which was established in November 2004. 
16
 AMISOM, the African Union Mission in Somalia, is a regional peace keeping operation headed by the African 
Union. It was established in January 2007 and is based in the Somali capital Mogadishu. 
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initiated a preliminary survey in order to find out whether it would be possible to acquire 
information about judicial practices through local Somali contacts. I prepared a questionnaire, 
sent this to two Somalis living in Kismayo and Baidoa, hoping that they would be able to find 
relevant answers by questioning litigants, qāḍīs, eyewitnesses or others. However, this soon 
turned out to be far too risky for the two fieldworkers: As soon as the one in Kismayo started 
to ask questions, he was brought to the police station and asked what he was doing. When he 
told about the project, he was ordered by the the Ḥisbah, al-Shabaab’s equivalent to police, 
not to ask any questions again, or face imprisonment. The other fieldworker, conducting 
research in Baidoa, managed to speak with some litigants and eyewitnesses, and sent a couple 
of valuable reports about court cases in the area. Sadly, he was soon after arrested by al-
Shabaab, although for other reasons than helping me with my research. He was imprisoned 
for several months, facing torture, but luckily, managed to escape and flee the country. 
Anyway, this made it clear that it was out of the question to rely on local fieldworkers as this 
obviously was far too risky for them, and thus could not be justified ethically. Therefore, it 
was obvious that I had to meet and interview litigants from criminal cases myself.   
 One of the best and easiest accessible location where to find witnesses that I could 
interview was Nairobi, Kenya. In addition to being the major rallying ground for Somali 
governmental and non-governmental organizations outside Mogadishu, this city contains the 
urban district of Eastleigh, called “Little Mogadishu”, which hosts a large Somali population. 
Many of the Somalis there have close ties to relatives living in Somalia, and Eastleigh is a 
place which continuously attracts new refugees fleeing from al-Shabaab. My aim with the 
field work was to interview Somalis with direct experience with al-Shabaab’s court system 
and the police, either as litigants or witnesses in court cases, or at public punishments. I also 
aimed to meet other people with valuable knowledge about how al-Shabaab is organized and 
how it operates. To find such people in this busy metropolis would naturally be a challenge, 
as I had no prior knowledge of the city or the Somali network there. However, this turned out 
to be easier than I could have hoped for. Due to the network of Stig Jarle Hansen, I managed 
to establish some contacts before my arrival in Kenya. Moreover, I got the opportunity to 
travel together with and work alongside Mohammed Gaas, a Norwegian-Somali researcher 
who was working on projects regarding the conflict in Somalia. He had much experience from 
the city due to prior research projects, and had an extensive network within the Somali 
community there. He introduced me to his network, which immediately accepted me, thereby 
allowing me to conduct interviews already the day after my arrival in the middle of October 
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2010. This network helped me to find suitable interpreters, two Kenyan-Somalis, Mohamed 
and Abdow, who also came to function as research assistants. Due to their local knowledge 
and family connections, they became decisive in finding relevant interviewees, especially 
newly arrived refugees with direct experience from criminal cases, which would otherwise 
have been inaccessible.  
 Despite the fact that the interpreters tried to assure the potential informants that I could 
be trusted, several were too scared and refused to meet me. This was not surprising taken into 
consideration that many had terrible experiences with al-Shabab in Somalia and still were 
worried about facing assaults from them, as al-Shabaab were believed to have a relatively 
strong presence and a lot of sympathizers in Eastleigh. In addition, several stayed there 
without having a residence permit, and were thus afraid of being noticed by the Kenyan 
authorities.  Several of the informants who decided to meet me were evidently still suspicious 
about my intentions with the interview, despite the fact that Mohamed and Abdow had given 
them some information about the project in advance. However, after having thoroughly 
explained about my intentions and goals for the project, and assured them that they would be 
anonymized and that any sensitive personal information would be omitted from the thesis, the 
informants became more relaxed and seemed to be quite comfortable with the setting. It also 
should be noted that the presence of the interpreters during the interview was crucial in 
establishing trust between me and the informant, and that without them being guarantees of 
trust, several of the informants would not have been there in the first place.    
 
2.2 The quest for information – finding interviewees 
2.2.1 Security concerns – where to conduct interviews  
Due to the security concern of the informants, and the fact that many of them were most 
comfortable with keeping a low profile, we arranged interviews in places that didn’t draw a 
lot of attention, either in hotel rooms in Eastleigh or in the city center. This was also favorable 
for my own security concerns for several reasons: Firstly, Nairobi in general, Eastleigh being 
no exception, is often labeled as one of the most insecure cities in Africa, with frequent petty 
thefts, armed robberies and killings. Thus, for me to hold frequent meetings in public places 
or cafés in Eastleigh, where there were few white Westerners, would have drawn a lot of 
attention, and could have increased the risk of facing assaults from criminals. Secondly, 
questions regarding al-Shabaab were perceived as a sensitive subject by many Somalis. Thus, 
for me, as a white foreigner, to ask questions about al-Shabaab openly in Eastleigh would be 
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noticed, and as a worst case scenario, I could have met with a response from al-Shabaab 
members or sympathizers. Both of these aspects concerned my Norwegian-Somali travel 
partner, Mohamed Gaas, as well as the two interpreters, as they all felt responsible for my 
security. Therefore, in order to minimize these risks, the modus operandi was that I spent time 
at my hotel room in one of the mid-level international hotels in the city center which 
seemingly had a good security standard, while the research assistants went around in 
Eastleigh and used their network to find potential informants. When they found one, we made 
an assessment of whether he could be trusted or not. If so, they brought him or her to my hotel 
room where I conducted the interview. If they had little knowledge about the background of 
the potential interviewee, or were doubtful about his affiliations, we went together to 
Eastleigh and conducted the interview in a room in one of the hotels there deemed to be fairly 
secure. Although this way of working seemed quite secure, it simultaneously meant that I lost 
control of where to hold the interview as well as who to interview, which resulted in a couple 
of interviews that didn’t give me as much relevant information as expected. However, as the 
research assistants after some days gained more knowledge and understanding about my 
project, this was resolved and resulted in valuable interviews. Moreover, for them to have me 
with them when they were working in Eastleigh, being a foreigner, white and not speaking 
Somali, would obviously not have been a good idea anyhow since this only would have made 
their job more difficult. 
 
2.2.2 Ethical reflections – paying for information 
As mentioned above, I told my informants about the purpose of my project and how the 
information they gave me would be used and treated afterwards. I did not do this only in order 
to create a relationship of trust during the interview, but also because informed consent as 
such is a basic tenet in research ethics. This means that the informants must be informed about 
the project and its purpose in order to be able to consent to being interviewed. It also implies 
that the informant participates voluntarily, without any kind of coercion or promises of 
benefits or generous compensation.
17
   
 Before leaving for Nairobi I had consulted Stig Jarle Hansen and Mohamed Gaas, who 
both had prior experiences from conducting research in the area, about giving money for 
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 Knut Aukrust, “Det informerte samtykke og andre kategoriske imperative: Om feltarbeidets etikk”, in Anders 
Gustavsson (ed.), Kulturvitenskap i felt: Metodiske og pedagogiske erfaringer”, (Kristiansand: Høyskoleforlaget 
AS, 2005), pp. 231-233. 
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information. Thus, I was not surprised when the assistants and others pointed out that it was 
reasonable to give the informant a small sum of money (“lunch money”) after the interview. 
However, I was more surprised when one of the potential informants demanded 100 USD in 
advance for answering my questions. Similarly, I felt concerned when the research assistants 
came to me after a few meetings with a potential informant and informed me that they had 
just paid for (which meant that I was financially responsible for this, as I covered the 
assistants’ expenses during the time they worked for me) his visit at the hospital, as well as 
antibiotics, and informed me that I could interview the informant as soon as he got better! 
Obviously, clear guidelines for our work had to be established in order to secure that it 
remained an ethically justifiable research. After discussing the matter further with Mohamed 
Gaas and my assistants, we agreed not to give any promise about money or services prior to 
the interview. However, I could not deny the fact that to give a small sum of money after an 
interview would be, though not demanded, perceived as a polite gesture, and a sign of 
gratitude. Thus, I decided to give a small sum of money after each interview, and 
simultaneously told the informant that this was a small gift as a sign of gratitude, since he had 
given me of his time and told me his story. However, none of the respondents were told they 
would receive money in advance, and, of course, I refused to interview the man who 
demanded 100 USD. By handling it this way, I felt that my research conformed to the ethical 
requirements while simultaneously taking into consideration prevailing expectations.  
  In fact, I have to admit that after hearing the traumatic stories of several of my 
informants, and becoming aware of the difficult situation many of them still had to face as 
illegal immigrants without work, I felt that it was right to give them a small contribution for 
helping me. Why should they give me something if they got nothing in return? Although I 
first considered it ethically problematic to give money to informants, I soon found myself 
feeling it was wrong not to give them something, especially considering their prior 
experiences and current situation.  
 Another aspect of my fieldwork that concerned me a lot during my stay in Nairobi, 
and still does, is the security of my research assistants. The objective of my project can of 
course under no circumstances justify ethically any act that could put them at risk. 
Particularly, I feared during my fieldwork that, since I paid a sum of money every day for 
their services, they would push themselves too far in order to make sure that I got “good value 
for my money”. They could, for example, attrackt the attention of Kenyan security services, 
which after the al-Shabaab bombing in Kampala in August 2010, lead to increased 
10 
 
surveillance of Somalis. Even though this probably would not have been problematic in the 
long run, as their work could easily have been linked to my project, it could at least have 
resulted in unpleasant interrogations or even worse, imprisonment. They could also risk 
meeting al-Shabaab affiliates who might respond unfavorably to their questioning. However, I 
felt that hiring them could be defended to some extent ethically taking into consideration that 
they had experience from similar work, and that to hire local assistants had been usual for 
researchers, journalists and others in order to get access to relevant sources. In addition, my 
assistants possessed great local knowledge and benifitted from huge family and clan 
networks, which might help them in making the right decisions regarding their own security. 
Moreover, they seemed to exercise, as far as I could assess, a reasonable degree of 
cautiousness. It should also be noted that the seemingly increased Kenyan surveillance 
activity after August 2010 may have reduced the freedom of operation of al-Shabaab affiliates 
in Easteligh and reduced the risk for my assistants. Anyway, I frequently told them to be 
careful; that security had priority and that if they had a bad gut feeling about a person, they 
should not follow up the contact even though he might have valuable information. 
 
2.3 The quest for information – final stages  
Initially, I planned to stay in Nairobi for about four weeks. However, for practical reasons I 
decided to stay for two and a half weeks, and go back if needed a second time at a later date.
18
 
However, when the field trip drew to a close, I decided not to return. Firstly, this was due to 
the fact that I had conducted far more interviews than I had hoped for. The field work had 
given me a fairly good general overview of how the courts and the police of al-Shabaab 
operated, not in the least due to many eyewitness testimonies. However, I needed further 
information about actual court practice, especially regarding the criminal proceedings of the 
courts.  In practice this meant that I would have to interview refugees who had direct 
experience with criminal cases. Since I had already experienced that such persons kept a low 
profile and that my assistants used a lot of time to localize them, I decided that it would be 
more productive to allow the assistants to work for a longer period on their own, rather than 
for me to conduct a small number of interviews in the course of two additional weeks. 
Another important aspect in this regard was the expenses. My costs for bed and board as well 
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 I am a father of two small children, and the youngest one was only eight months at the time of my field trip. 
My wife and I therefore agreed to split the fieldwork into two short trips instead of one long, in order to make it 
easier for her. We hoped that I would manage to get sufficient data on the first trip, so that I would not have to 
make another one. 
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as the costs for interpreters/assistants, taxis, different hotel rooms for interviews etc., made the 
field work an expensive experience.
19
 In sum, these factors made me decide to rely on the 
assistants for future interviews. They could conduct interviews on my behalf as they now had 
acquired great insight into what kind of information I was searching for, as well my methods 
and the intention and goal of the overall project. Before I left, I made a concise question 
manual which we talked through together, and I once more explained the concept of informed 
consent and other ethical questions.       
 
2.4 Methodological reflections 
The interviews that I conducted during my fieldwork diverge from standard qualitative 
interviews by asking for what, where, when and how, rather than why. Qualitative research 
interviews may be described as a process in which one learns to know a human being: one 
gets access to the person’s thoughts, attitudes, knowledge, experiences, feelings and hopes.20 
During my interviews, I paid little attention to the informant’s opinions or feelings about the 
“object” of study. Rather, I was first and foremost interested in collecting information and 
receive as detailed descriptions as possible of the informant’s experiences and knowledge 
about actual judicial practices and the structure of the legal system. Although I strive for 
“objective” descriptions of the object of study, I acknowledge the constructivist character of 
knowledge. This does not mean that the information is created in the sense that it is fictive or 
entirely subjective, it only emphasizes that it has to be understood within the framework in 
which it has been produced.  As such, the interviews are created as a result of an interaction 
between the interviewer and the informant. The theoretical perspective applied and the kind of 
questions asked by the researcher is decisive for the information that emerges from the 
interview. Likewise, the relationship between researcher and informant, as well as the overall 
dynamic of the interview situation, is substantial for the outcome. 
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 Staying at mid-level hotels in the city center was particularly expensive. However, I was adviced to do this by 
Mohamed Gaas as well as the research assistants for two reasons. Firstly, this gave me enough flexibility in 
meeting with the interviewees on short notice. If I had stayed outside of the city, it would have been almost 
impossible to work as dynamical as we had done, and I would probably have lost the opportunity to meet with 
important interviewees. Secondly, the level of security at these hotels made me and the assistants feel safe, and 
also gave me the possibility to be able to offer a quiet and safe place outside Eastleigh where the interviewees 
could relax.   
20
 Trude A. Fonneland, “Kvalitative metodar: Intervju og observasjon”, in Siv Ellen Kraft and Richard J. Natvig 
(eds.), Metode i religionsvitenskap, (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 2006), p. 223.  
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2.5 The material  
2.5.1 Informants and anonymity 
The primary material for this thesis constitutes 18 in-depth semi structured intervews that I 
conducted during my fieldwork in Nairobi, one in-depth semi structured interview conducted 
in Norway, 39 structured interviews conducted by my research assistants in Nairobi, and three 
additional reports from other local Somali assistants. Additionally, I have made use of reports 
from local journalists, human rights organizations and governmental organizations which 
either quote eyewitness testimonies or statements of al-Shabaab officials, and I have as well, 
to some extent, made use of al-Shabaab affiliated propaganda and statements released on the 
Internet.    
 Out of the 18 informants whom I interviewed in Nairobi – each interview lasting for 
one to three hours - 17 were either recently arrived refugees from al-Shabaab controlled areas, 
mostly Kismayo and Mogadishu, or were still living in Somalia close to the al-Shabaab areas. 
14 of these could either give eyewitness testimonies about incidents directly related to the 
work of the courts and the actions of the police or by virtue of their position possessed 
considerable knowledge of such. Three of the informants had been directly involved in 
criminal court cases. 
 The 39 interviews made by the research assistants have been conducted over a period 
of one year, the first reports arriving in November 2010 and the last one in November 2011. 
Except in one case, all informants are refugees from al-Shabaab dominated areas, most having 
been directly involved in criminal court cases tried by one of the al-Shabaab courts, the 
majority having been sentenced by the courts and punished accordingly. In contrast to the 
informants that I interviewed in October 2010, many of these informants come from other 
areas than Kismayo and Mogadishu, e.g. Baidoa, Merka, Afgooye and Baladwayne. 
 Of the three additional reports received, two describe court cases and judicial practice 
from the Baidoa area in the Bay province. The third report gives valuable information 
regarding local al-Shabaab administration. All reports are produced by local Somali 
respondents.  
 In order to maintain a satisfactory level of anonymity for the informants, no names or 
sensitive personal information has been used in this thesis. Also, I have omitted the dates of 
the court cases in order to make it more difficult to trace the informants.
21
 Although this could 
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 An exception in this regard is the case of “Roble” where the date is included in the description of the trial and 
execution. This is due to the fact that I compliment the information from the interview with eyewitness reports 
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reduce the value of the material for further research, the informants’ security and the security 
of close relatives who in many instances still live in al-Shabaab controlled areas, has naturally 
been of more importance.  
 
2.5.2 Reliability 
To the extent possible, in order to enhance the reliability of the material collected, I have used 
source triangulation, i. e. comparing information gathered from different sources in order to 
look for convergence of the material.
22
 Firstly, I have compared the material fram all the 
informants and tried to identify any contradictions or other inconsistencies in the material. 
Secondly, I have compared this material with the different reports found on the Internet, as 
well as with statements and propaganda material related to al-Shabaab. In many cases there 
has been consistency between what informants tell, reports released by media or NGOs/GOs 
and al-Shabaab propaganda releases, especially when it comes to spectacular events such as 
public stonings and amputations. However, in many instances I have not succeeded in 
verifying the information from one source with other sources, and have had to rely on single 
source information. When the information comes from informants who have been 
eyewitnesses to the incidents described, as has often been the case, I have nevertheless 
regarded the information as being quite credible.   
 When it comes to Internet sources, I have as far as possible tried to use reports from 
acknowledged actors, i.e. news agencies such as BBC or Shabelle Media Network, NGOs like 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch and GOs like the U.S. State Department. 
However, in some cases I have relied on information from web pages previously unknown to 
me. This is not least the case with al-Shabaab affiliated propaganda material and press 
releases which to a large extent are released on Islamist sympathetic web pages. As some of 
the information from these pages has been hard to verify with other sources, the conclusions 
based on it should be treated with caution. 
 Regarding the reliability of the information received through interviews, there is little 
doubt that to master the language of those one is studying, is an advantage. But, as I do not 
speak Somali, and the level of English of my informants was highly variable, I was dependent 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
from the media which contain the dates for the trial and the execution. However, “Roble” explicitely stated that I 
could use all personal information about him as he now feels safe in Norway and his closest family has managed 
to escape from al-Shabaab areas. Anyway, I have chosen to omit any sensitive information except from the 
dates.  
22
 John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitive, Quantitive, and Mixed Methods Approaches, 3rd ed. (Los 
Angeles: Sage Publications, 2009), p. 191. 
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on an interpreter. Therefore, it was essential for the outcome of my fieldwork to find a good 
interpreter who mastered both Somali and English. However, I soon realized, as already 
described above, that it was of equal importance to have a person that could help me to find 
relevant informants, as well as being a person sensitive to security concerns. Also, it was very 
important for me to choose someone I could trust and who had experience from similar work, 
in addition to good local knowledge. I therefore ended up with a Kenyan-Somali who had 
valuable experience, good contacts in the local community, focus on safety, but rather limited 
English skills. We coped with this by taking with us his cousin, who lacked some of the 
aforementioned skills, but in return spoke reasonably well English.  
An obvious weakness of using interpreters with limited language skills was that there 
could be misunderstandings or vital information could be lost during the interview. However, 
most of my questions were quite simple and specific, in the sense that they asked about things 
I expected them to know something about. For example: How many judges were there? What 
kind of punishment was being inflicted? Which Qu’rān verse was read? There were few 
questions that required an advanced vocabulary, and I felt that I received answers that were in 
accordance with what I could expect. In addition, during the interviews, I had on several 
occasions other English speaking Somalis present, who approved the translation that had been 
given by the two interpreters. In sum, I therefore felt that the situation could be deemed 
satisfactory, even though I sometimes had to ask additional questions in order to be sure that I 
really had understood what the informant had meant.  
 Another point to discuss is the question of giving money for information. Not only is 
this ethically questionable, it could also be said to reduce the reliability of the information. 
One can easily imagine that an informant who is paid to provide information, would like to 
make a good impression and might give the answers that he or she thinks I am expecting, and 
in that sense might adjust some of the answers to justify the fact that he or she actually is 
getting paid. One could also imagine informants fabricating stories in order to earn some 
money, especially, taken into consideration that several informants in the area were without a 
job. However, by refusing to meet those who demanded money for information, and by only 
giving a small sum of money as a sign of gratitude after the interview was conducted, I am 
reasonably sure that I avoided such unwanted situations as described above. Of course, it is 
not totally unlikely that informants could have talked to each other, and in light of the 
certainty of payment, could have agreed to meet for an interview. That being said, the sums 
received by the various informants were relatively small, even in their eyes.   
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 Another factor that might have negatively influenced the information gathered during 
the interviews was the fact that several of the informants were skeptical to the use of a tape 
recorder. I started every interview by telling about the project, and also explaining that I used 
the recorder in order to remember what was being said during the interview, but that it was up 
to the informant to agree to this. As several informants were afraid that their voice could be 
recognized, I had to conduct interviews by taking notes of what was being said. In order to 
remember as much as possible, the interpreters and I decided that all of us should take notes, 
so that I could be more confident in grasping the most important information. Another factor 
that made me feel comfortable about the situation was the fact that after every question I 
posed, the interpreters had to translate the question into Somali, and then listen to the answer 
in Somali, before translating it into English. Thus, there were continuously small breaks in the 
interview in which I had time to finish the notes from the last question, before it was time to 
pose a new one.    
 A last point that should be mentioned regarding the reliability of interview data was 
that all informants, with one exception, were explicitly critical of al-Shabaab and their judicial 
practice. This is no surprise, as many of the informants had either escaped from Somalia after 
having experienced infringement by al-Shabab in one way or another, or had positions linked 
to political groups that were currently fighting al-Shabaab.
23
 Thus, I discovered, during 
several of the interviews, that it was useless to ask general questions about the work, 
operation and practice of the al-Shabab judicial and police system. Rather, when asking 
precise questions about specific issues, especially descriptions about their own experiences, or 
where a certain incident actually took place, I felt that I got correct information that limited 
the effect of their bias. However, it is quite obvious that I, as a researcher, could not escape 
being colored by the many stories. When informants, with tears in their eyes, told me about 
wives, mothers, sons, brothers or neighbours that had been killed by al-Shabaab, or about 
sisters that had been forcibly married to foreign al-Shabaab fighters, I found it next to 
impossible not to be somewhat affected and to develop a  negative bias towards al-Shabaab. 
 
2.5.3 Generalizability  
On basis of the limited number of interviews and reports made use of in this thesis, there 
could naturally not be drawn any clear conclusions when it comes to the nature of the legal 
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Somali Sufi group.  
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system of al-Shabaab. For example, based only on some court cases from a certain court or 
area, spread out in time, it would not be possible to reveal any distinct differences between the 
judicial practice of the different regions, or to expose clear changes in judicial practice during 
the period in question, i. e. from the end of 2008 to the first half of 2011. The forthcoming 
analysis will therefore primarily suggest rough trends and features from the al-Shabaab 
dominated areas as a whole during the last two and a half years.  
 
Chapter 3: Religion, tradition and law in Somalia – a historical sketch24 
Somali speaking peoples
25
 have been Sunni Muslims since the early days of Islam when close 
contact with the Arabian Peninsula and Arabian traders who settled along the Somali coastline 
brought Islam to the Horn of Africa. As a modern expression of the Somali’s close connection 
with the Arabs, the Republic of Somalia was granted membership of the Arab League as the 
first non-Arab country in 1974.
26
 Like other peoples in the region, the Somali speaking 
peoples have been influenced religiously and ideologically by the Middle East. In the wake of 
Islamic revivalism in the 1970s Somali branches of the Muslim brotherhood, non-violent 
Salafi groups, as well as radical Jihadi-Salafi groups, of which al-Shabaab is an example, have 
had much success. Despite the impacts of external Islamist ideas, religious practices in 
Somalia are part of local traditions and do not change so fast. When discussing Somali 
religion and the role and function of sharī’a, it is necessary to have knowledge about the basic 
traditional structures of the Somali society, namely kinship, customary law (xeer) and 
traditional juridico-political entities. In this chapter, I first explore traditional Somali 
structures and then I give an outline of the interrelationship of traditional law and sharī’a. 
Lastly, I indicate how the political context of the last decades has given sharī’a a status and a 
role that finds no precedence in Somali history.     
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educated who spoke and wrote Arabic. The Republic of Somalia did not develop its own written language before 
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26
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3.1 Kinship, xeer and traditional authority 
According to the anthropologist Ioan M. Lewis, 
who still represents an authority within Somali 
studies, the Somali kinship structure is based on a 
vertically oriented agnatic segmentary lineage 
system, which could be separated into categories of 
clan-family, clan, sub-clan, primary lineage and 
diya-paying group (see figure). These kinship 
groups constitute the basic political units in the 
Somali society and are decisive for the position of 
an individual and for his relation to others. By reference to his genealogy, traced through the 
male line, the Somali gets his exact place within the social hierarchy.
27
 
 Lewis identifies six major clan-families into which most of the Somalis as a whole are 
divided. The members of the first four: Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye and Darood,
28
 are mainly pastoral 
nomads, while the members of Digil and Rahanweyn are mostly agriculturalists. However, in 
practice, the clan-families are often not politically important entities as they are consisting of 
too many people. For example, the Darood clan-family is consisting of more than a million 
members. Nevertheless, in cases of animosity between groups belonging to different clan-
families, the strong clan identities come to the fore and define the overriding conflict lines. In 
contrast, the clan, i.e. the category into which the clan-family is subdivided according to 
Lewis’ model, frequently acts as a corporate political unit, and tends to have some territorial 
exclusiveness. The next two levels of Lewis’ model, the sub-clan and primary lineage group, 
are important when it comes to group identity and questions regarding marriage. However, the 
most basic and functional lineage unit is the diya-paying groups, or mag-paying groups,
29
 
counting from four to eight generations, thus numbering from a few hundreds to a few 
thousand men. Every member of a diya-paying group is obliged to support each other in 
political and legal issues, e.g. the payment and receipt of diya, i. e. compensation. If a member 
of one group kills a member of another, the members of the group of the perpetrator as a 
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 Ioan M. Lewis, A pastoral democracy: A study of pastoralism and politics among the Northern Somali of the 
Horn of Africa / I.M. Lewis; new introduction by Said Samatar and new afterword by I.M. Lewis, (Oxford: LIT 
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 Lewis treats Isaq as an idependent clan-family, although many Somalis regard them as belonging to the Dir 
clan-family. 
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 Diya is the Arabic word for blood compensation, and mag is its Somali equivalence. I will use the term diya, 
as this is the word used in the classical fiqh literature.  
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general rule has to pay 100 camels collectively, the standard amount for a man’s life (the full 
compensation for a woman is 50 camels).
30
  
 Somali customary law, or xeer, meaning “contract” or “bilateral agreement”, is a body 
of explicitly formulated, though unwritten obligations, rights and duties, passed down from 
one generation to the next. These sets of codes, which are agreed upon among agnatic 
kinsmen, both regulate internal interactions within the kinship group, as well as external 
relations with non-related groups.
31
 When for example two diya-paying groups of a clan 
regulate their interactions by an agreement (either entered into by them, or accepted as a 
legacy from their ancestors), they are said to be of the same xeer.
32
 
 Traditionally xeer has been guarded and implemented by respected elders, who could 
interpret precedence relatively freely. If a case has had no applicable precedent the elders 
would base their decisions on their reasoning, but there has nevertheless been some generally 
accepted principles of xeer, which would only be applied with minor variations. These 
principles have, fore example, been the welfare of guests, protection of the weak and 
vulnerable, such as elderly women and children during war, and the sharing of natural 
resourses like grazing pastures and water.
33
  
 In general, when an issue has been raised, a jury of selected elders from both afflicted 
parties of the dispute with great knowledge of xeer is gathered in order to discuss and make a 
final decision. Traditionally Somalis have normally tried to solve disputes at the lowest 
genealogical level as possible. If, however, a dispute arises between clan groups which are not 
bound by a mutual contract of xeer, a settlement will be dependent upon the readiness of the 
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 Xeer has traditionally been divided into two broad categories, namely xeer gaar, i.e. norms that regulate 
traditional economic matters such as pastoral issues, fishing, frankincense harvesting and other economic 
activities, and xeer guud which refers to the settlement of disputes at different levels of the lineage segments, 
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Dharbaxo, The predicament of the ‘Oday’: The role and structures in security, rights, law and development in 
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disputants to make peace, and on the ability of the arbitrators in obtaining an acceptable 
compromise.
34
 
 Xeer, which also may be translated as community regulations, has traditionally not 
been a rigid legal system but characterized by flexibility and pragmatism. It may be described 
as the principle social regulations of Pastoral Somalia, a traditional society where family ties 
and community life have been important and where the elders have played a key role. 
Whenever there has been a major inter-clan conflict, new xeer regulations could be decided, 
and other important issues could be discussed by the elders during an all-clan council called 
shir, traditionally the most fundamental institution of governance in the Somali Pastoral 
society. In contrast to shir, which only has taken place at certain times or in relation to 
specific circumstances, the elder’s guurti, i. e the permanent governing body of the family, the 
clan and the community, has governed everyday issues. The elders of the guurti have been the 
heads of the nomadic encampment, the nominating delegates for conflict mediations, the 
maintainers of Islamic and cultural values, and the ones who have policed public resources, 
infrastructure, pasture and other matters of common concern.
35
 
 
3.2 Islam and the limitations of sharī’a 
In addition to clan membership, Islam has traditionally been an important identity marker for 
the Somalis. While the kinship structure has divided the society along lineage lines Islam has 
to some extent transcended such fault lines. The overall esteem for Islam is particularily 
visible in the common mythological pattern of clan-families which each claim direct lineal 
descent from the Qurayshitic line of the Prophet Muhammad.
36
 
Although no date can be set for the arrival of Islam among the Somalis, the proximity 
to Arabia, in addition to constant travel and trade between the peninsula and the Horn of 
Africa, it is probable that Islam was introduced already a short time after the Hijra in 622 AC. 
Islam soon became rooted in the Muslim commercial colonies that emerged along the Somali 
coast. However, mass conversions among the majority of the Somalis do not seem to have 
taken place until the 11th to the 13th centuries. In the course of these centuries a particular 
form of Somali religiousity emerged. The most salient influences came from Sunni orthodox 
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theology and legal philosophy, notably the school of Imam al-Shāfi’ī37, which merged with 
elements of indigenous practices that predate Islam. In addition, Somalis came to be deeply 
influenced by Sufism, and Sufi brotherhoods gained a prominent role in everyday life, 
especially in the course of the 19
th
 century.
38
   
 Each Sufi brotherhood, tarīqa (“path”), consisted of several congregations or 
communities of adherents, known as jama’a (“congregation”). The head of a jama’a, called a 
sheikh, was usually a man, whose personal genealogy could be traced to the Prophet’s 
Qurayshitic lineage, thus giving him religious prestige and some of the Prophet’s grace or 
baraka (“blessing”). The different Sufi congregations were distributed throughout the country 
cutting right across clan-familiy lines, and either formed a loose organization or established a 
permanent autonomous settlement of cultivators. The latter was particularly the case among 
the agricultural communities along the Shabelle and Jubba rivers in the south. Either way, the 
congregations functioned as training centers for the local men of religion, the wadaads, 
usually described as “bush teachers” or “bush preachers”, who traveled around and visited 
different camps and villages to preach and teach about the Qu’rān and Islamic theology. 
Wadaads also had an important social and legal function by acting as unofficial qāḍīs 
(“judges”) and administering sharī’a to the extent that his competence was recognized. This 
usually meant adjudicating in cases within the area of Islamic family law, for example in 
matrimonial affairs, divorce and inheritance, as well as in cases within contract law and 
mortgage. In addition, a wadaad could be asked to assess the proper compensation, diya 
(“blood money”), for injuries, and he would function as a mediator and gvie advice in 
questions of communal importance.
39
 Al-Shabaab has to a large extent reduced the role of 
these traditional wadaads, especially in the urban centres, and those who have dared to raise 
critical voices against al-Shabaab’s political and legal project have in some cases as Roland 
Marchal points out been killed.
40
 The traditional functions of the wadaads have instead been 
replaced by the al-Shabaab’s new political and legal administration, which often include 
clerics and qāḍīs who are not known among the local population. Moreover, the wadaads’ 
                                                          
37
Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Idris al- Shāfi’ī (d. 820), often only referred to as Imam al-Shāfi’ī, is the 
perceived founder of the Shāfi’ī legal school.  
38
 Lewis, Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in a Clan-Bases Society, pp. 8-17, 22-24; Mohamed Diriye 
Abdullahi, Culture and Customs of Somalia, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001), pp. 55-57; Hussein M. Adam, 
“Islam and Politics in Somalia”, Journal of Islamic Studies 6, 2, (1995), pp. 189-190. 
39
 Lewis, Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in a Clan-Bases Society, pp. 8-14; Abdullahi, Culture and Customs 
of Somalia, pp. 58-61. 
40
 Marchal, The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaheddin in Somalia, 
p. 70.  
21 
 
close link to Sufism has also made them vulnerable to al-Shabaab who perceives Sufi 
practices as un-Islamic. Al-Shabaab’s distase for local Sufi practices as well as its 
administrative structure and function will be discussed further in subsequent chapter. 
 Although the wadaads functioned as qāḍīs within the traditional Somali society, their 
jurisdiction was in many respects influenced and restricted by customary law, xeer.
41
 For 
example the wadaad could be asked for advice about the amount of compensation to be payed 
for injuries and homicide, but it was the odayaal, i.e. the traditional elders, applying prevalent 
xeer, who had the power to adjudicate. Lewis and other experts on Somali history argue that 
classical fiqh provisions were subordinate to xeer, particularily in matters where collective 
responsibility took precedence over personal liability, for example in cases of homicide and 
bodily harm. In a traditional Somali context, homicide as well as bodily harm would generally 
result in the paying of compensation by the perpetrators in a diya-paying group, rather than 
retaliation against the perpetrator in person. As such, xeer does not recognize criminal law in 
the modern sense, i.e. where the perpetrator is personally punished for his offences, but 
emphasizes restitution and compensation. For example, when theft occurs, the offender has to 
give back the object stolen. If this is not possible the object has to be replaced by a similar 
one, or compensated. Likewise, in cases of rape and adultery, violations that may be punished 
harshly according to classical fiqh-doctrines (stoning or lashing), xeer prescribes 
compensation although sometimes it may be that the perpetrator is forced to marry the girl.
42
 
Lewis describes the waddad as having a double role, combining sharī’a practice and 
traditional xeer, but maintains that the wadaad traditionally tended to apply xeer regulations 
rather than classical Shāfi’ī doctrine. For example, in certain divorce cases where the wife had 
failed in her role as a well serving wife, the wadaads would overlook the Shāfi’ī provisions 
and dissolute the marriage without forcing the husband to pay the wife’s rightful dower, 
mahr.
43
 Lewis’ claims regarding the wadaads are strengthened by other studies, e.g. J. N. D. 
Anderson’s who points out that in matters of custody of children the Somali wadaads often 
would allot the child to its father at the time of weaning or at the age of two, contrary to 
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classical Shāfi’ī prescriptions which gives the mother the prerogative to keep the child until 
the age of discrimination (e.g. seven years).
44
    
 According to Lewis, the relatively weak status of the sharī’a within the pastoral 
Somali society should be seen in relation to the social-political origin of sharī’a, which 
emerged in a theocracy that had transcended the bonds of tribalism.
45
 Lewis asserts that 
sharī’a elaborates a corpus of private and public law based upon the concept of citizenship, 
which to a large extent would not be applicable in a stateless, clan-based society. However, he 
claims, sharī’a provisions regarding ritual and religious observance apply easily to Somali 
society because they deal with the believers’ relations to God and do not challenge the tribal 
structures.
46
 
 For similar reasons, Lewis asserts, Sufi mysticism, which concentrates on the 
personal relationship between man and God, was very suitable to the traditional Somali 
society.
47
 An important factor in this regard, again according to Lewis, is assimilation of Sufi 
mysticism and pre-Islamic Somali belief: for example, the traditional saar dance ritual where 
possessed people are purged of spirits was assimilated into the Sufi ḏikr (“rememberance” or 
“reminder”) ritual, i.e private or collective prayer rituals where one typically recite the names 
of God or verses of the Qu’rān or haḍīth texts.  Likewise, veneration of Muslim saints through 
prayer and sacrifice has, according to Lewis, become a substitute for pre-Islamic deities. The 
previous pre-Islamic shrines have been taken over by Muslim saints whose baraka, or 
blessing, has replaced the powers of the old deities. The veneration of the (Sufi) saints also 
has an additional function, Lewis asserts: since the genealogy of the Somali clans were 
assimilated with the genealogy of the Sufi orders, a Sufi saint is also identified as one of the 
eponymous ancestors of the clans. Therefore, to venerate a saint at a local shrine 
simultaneously meant to promote canonization of a clan ancestor and emphasize clan identity 
among Somalis.
48
         
 
3.3 From colonialism to dictatorship  
When the European colonial powers arrived in the Somali territories and established in the 
northern part the British Somaliland Protectorate in 1886 and the Italian colonial 
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administration in the southern territories in 1893, xeer, inspired by sharī’a in certain domains, 
was the only system of justice and public order. But soon both the British and the Italians 
imposed their own legal systems in their respective areas. In the area which today constitutes 
South Central Somalia, the Italian administration adopted the Italian civil and penal codes but, 
however, allowed disputes between Somalis to be settled through xeer, at least when there 
was no threat to public order. In this manner the Italians managed to regulate, but not to 
replace, the continued practice of xeer. The Italians also recognized sharī’a within some areas 
and actually integrated it as part of the formal judicial system. They institutionalized a qāḍī 
court of first-instance and appeal with jurisdiction in family matters and minor civil disputes. 
However, wadaads continued to apply their traditional sharī’a outside the reach of the formal 
system.
49
 
 When Somalia became an independent state in 1960, the new Somali government tried 
to form a single coherent judicial system. This was not an easy task, considering the multitude 
of legal systems that were inherited from the colonial powers: British Common Law, Italian 
Continental Law, sharī’a and customary law which had had a more formal role within the so 
called subordinate courts in British Somaliland. Anyway, due to lack of qualified jurists and 
lawyers, the state’s legal system was seldom applied outside urban areas.50  
 After the military coup in 1969 which brought General Siyad Barre to power, there 
followed a period referred to as a Scientific Socialism experiment which was supported by the 
Soviet Union. One of the aims of the Barre government was to replace clan identity with a 
pan-Somali identity. This led, not surprisingly, to reforms of the legal system. In 1973 the 
regime introduced a new civil code which in many respects curtailed both sharī’a provisions 
and xeer regulations, in particular provisions pertaining to inheritance, personal contracts and 
water grazing rights. In addition, the new code radically changed the system of diya for death 
and injury, making homicide punishable with death, and compensation for injuries payable 
only to close relatives. This stood in contrast to the traditional system, in which the whole 
diya-paying group was responsible, as described above. However, in contrast to his strategy in 
combating clanism, Barre respected Islam, and allowed sharī’a courts to function as before as 
long as they didn’t contradict the political and economic directives. Nevertheless, there came 
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to clerical and public protests in 1975 when the regime introduced a new family law that 
recognized the legal and economic equality for women.
51
 
 
3.4 Anarchy, reemergence of traditional elders and sharī’a courts  
Although xeer had been suppressed during the authoritarian rule of Siyad Barre, the 
government never succeeded fully in its policy. For example, attempts to outlaw collective 
responsibility failed due to strong public resistance and weak application in nomadic areas. 
The biggest blow to the traditional system was the reduction of the authority of the traditional 
elders, a process which started already during colonial rule.
52
 Andre LeSage asserts that a 
major reason for the elders’ loss of authority was that since colonial times, the various 
governments tried to manipulate them and pay them to secure their loyalty in order to 
maintain public order, and thus were perceived as corrupt by fellow Somalis.
53
 
 Despite this, the traditional elders reemerged as a stabilizing factor during the anarchy 
that followed the fall of Siyad Barre in January 1991 when warlords and military factions 
from different clans and sub-clans fought each other. During these chaotic and violent times 
without a functioning government and a formal legal system, “grassroots” governance began 
to emerge, bringing traditional legal structures to the fore. And in the course of the next 
decade, xeer was again the most prominent judicial system
54
.
55
     
 However, despite the fact that traditional xeer and the role of the elders were 
revitalized after the collapse of the Somali state, there is, as Joakim Gundel concludes in his 
report about xeer in 2005, a paradox here: although the traditional order was the glue that 
prevented a total anarchy, it is also a system in crisis: The authority of the elders has gradually 
been undermined as many of them have been actively involved in fights between factions and 
have misused their authority to furter their own interests. Also, there has been a proliferation 
of elders, making people confused about who is in charge. Another problem is the fact that the 
traditional system is stretched to its limits due to lack of power, respect and resources to cope 
with a precarious situation. For example, how is one to solve the huge number of killings 
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committed by clan-factions, which would amount to an enormous level of diya that no one 
could afford? Morevoer, the elders have strived to adapt to the changing times and new 
challenges, such as youths involved in drug abuse, premarital sex, just to mention some issues 
lacking xeer precedents.
56
   
 Another factor that has limited the role of xeer in post-Barre Somalia is the increasing 
importance of sharī’a. In contrast to the traditional authorities that was viewed with suspicion 
already from the colonial times, the sheikhs were not paid as they often used to be from 
wealthy families, and thus not dependent on external sources of income. Due to this they were 
perceived as more impartial and having a higher moral standard. In addition to the traditional 
respect which has surrounded religious authorities in the Somali society, there are also 
political factors which have contributed to the positive image of religious law and prominent 
religious figures: during Siyad Barre’s totalitarian regime, Islam, represented by the sheikhs, 
became an important source of anti-government resistance, especially in urban areas. In 
addition, the religious charities that operated during the chaotic period that followed the fall of 
Barre contributed to a positive image of Islam, and so did the pious persons who were trusted 
to handle matters of security and justice, as they were believed to respect the Qu’rān and 
condemn destructive actions such as theft and rape. The moral integrity of Muslim scholars, 
combined with hopes that the sharī’a courts could prevent conflicts with neighboring clan 
communities, made sharī’a courts a viable alternative to traditional xeer as a means to 
improve social security.
57
 
 Already in 1991 the first sharī’a court was established in Mogadishu, though, only 
surviving a month. However, other similar courts were established throughout the city and 
soon also in other regions, such as Hiiran and Middle Shabelle. In general these experiments 
were supported by a combination of leaders of militia-factions, businessmen, clan elders and 
religious leaders, mostly affiliated with the Sufi brotherhoods, and to some extent Islamist 
groups. The sharī’a court experiments lasted until 2000, when most of the court apparatus 
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were integrated into the newly established Transitional National Government, the TNG, and 
many of the court leaders became members of the new parliament.
58
 
 The sharī’a courts were simple structures consisting of some qāḍīs and a small militia 
which functioned as a police force. Its role was to implement the decisions of the qāḍī, 
intervene in community disputes and arrest suspected criminals. According to LeSage most 
decisions were made by the qāḍīs based on their own legal reasoning with no consistent 
following of a specific madhhab
59
. Although some of the qāḍīs were educated in Sudan, 
Egypt and Saudi-Arabia, they are mostly believed to have been poorly trained. Despite 
questioning the litigants and bringing witnesses to testify in front of the court when this was 
deemed necessary by the qāḍīs, the court rulings, according to LeSage, tended to be quite 
arbitrary. While Le Sage ascribes this to the qāḍīs’ lack of formal training and poor 
knowledge of existing rules of evidence, he also points to another factor that made the 
application of law unpredictable, namely clan interest. According to LeSage several of the 
qāḍīs of the sharī’a courts asserted that there was no conflict between sharī’a and xeer, and 
when making adjudication they combined sharī’a, xeer and relevant state laws in order to find 
a workable “win-win” resolution to a court case that all parties would accept.60  
 This pragmatic approach by the qāḍīs must be seen in light of the relatively weak 
position of the sharī’a courts which were financially, politically and militarily dependent on 
the clan or sub-clan of the area of which it operated. If a sharī’a court challenged the interests 
of the clan, the clan elders could simply withraw their support of the court and just recall the 
clan’s militia which often constituted the main military asset of the court, thus leaving the 
court unoperational. In 1997 the North Mogadishu court (also called the Ali Dhere or Karar 
court) which was perceived by the dominating clan leaders in the area to have become too 
politically ambitious was even attacked and shut down. Due to this dependency on the clan 
the sharī’a courts had a very limited role in mediating inter-clan disputes, which would still 
be the prerogative of the clan elders. The courts were also hesitant to get involved in political 
issues and large-scale security problems, and instaed directed their efforts to civil matters, 
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such as marriage and divorce, inheritance and the settling of business disputes. Criminal cases 
were also dealt with, but corporal and capital punishment were seldom applied unless 
intentional murder could be proven. An exception to this practice was found at some of the 
Mogadishu courts, in particular the abovementioned Northern Mogadishu court, which even 
applied the ḥudūd punishments.61 But, as noted, this court was perceived as too ambitious and 
thus shut down. As such the sharī’a courts seemed to be in a quite similar situation as the 
traditional wadaads of the colonial times, both having to limit their application of sharī’a in 
order to conform to clan interests.  
 The integration of the sharī’a courts into the bodies of the TNG in 2000, the influence 
of the courts almost disappeared (discussed below). However, some opponents of the TNG 
and earlier court members who soon decided to leave the TNG, enabled some sharī’a courts 
to survive, although with little power to enforce their rulings. Not until 2004, when several 
courts manged to establish a joint courts administration, the Supreme Council of Islamic 
Courts (SCIC), and as well a considerable court militia, they regained strength, and new 
courts spread throughout Mogadishu.
62
  
 SCIC, headed by persons with different religious affiliation, such as Hassan Dahir 
Aweis, the former leader of the militant Islamist group Al-Ittiḥād al-islāmiyya (“The Islamic 
Union”), and Sheikh Sharif, who is associated with the Sufi group called Ahlu Sunna wal 
Jama’a, was initially dominated by Hawiye sub-clans but slowly managed to gain support 
from several clan groups. They formed a council, or shūrā, with representatives from 
religious groups, clan elders, and businessmen, headed by an executive committee and 
furnished with a non-clan based militia. Seldom seen in the Somali civil war, this new union 
of Islamic courts, to be known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), contained fighters that 
were religiously motivated to the extent that they saw Paradise as the ultimate victory 
regardless of the outcome of the battle itself. A hard core of fighters, consisting mostly of 
young men recruited from madrasas (religious schools) fought with unprecedented discipline. 
They were often referred to as al-shabaab (“the youth”). So, when ICU clashed with local 
warlords over an economical issue in January 2006, and then confronted the Alliance for 
Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT), an alliance of warlords supported by 
Ethiopia and the US, the ICU soon gained the upper hand. In the months to follow, the ICU 
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won considerable influence and soon controlled huge parts of South Central Somalia. 
However, after the Ethiopian invasion in December 2006, ICU rapidly fell apart and many of 
its leaders fled the country.
63
 They left behind an almost shattered organization but with a 
core of young, dedicated fighters: al-Shabaab. 
   
3.5 Al-Shabaab and the emergence of radical Islamism in Somalia 
In the first sharī’a court experiments which lasted until 2000, radical Islamists had minor 
influence although they were overrepresented in the militias that enforced the decisions of the 
courts. During 2004 and 2005 the situation was reversed. In order to understand the 
underlying factors, it is necessary to take a closer look at the radical Islamist trajectory in 
Somalia. 
 Al-Ittiḥād al-islāmiyya, a radical Islamist group that got an influential position later, 
was established in the Somali universities in the early 1980s. The group was generously 
funded by Somali migrants established in the Gulf. Although this increased the Salafi 
influence on the group, it also encompassed members with other ideological beliefs. When the 
Barre regime fell in 1991, Al-Ittiḥād established its own military wing and tried to compete 
with clan-based militia. However, the group experienced several defeats, and had to 
reconsider its strategy. Instead of continuing its violent jihād, it embraced da’wah, i.e 
propagation of political and religious work among the public. This decision was contested, 
and some members, still striving for a military solution, left the organization and started 
working for Islamic businessmen and Islamic NGOs. During this period, Somali Islamists in 
general were increasingly in contact with foreign Islamists who propagated Salafi ideology 
and provided support, mostly, in the form of aid facilitated by Islamic NGOs e.g. by giving 
contracts to Somali businessmen who funded Somali Islamists. Young Somali men were also 
recruited for military training outside or inside Somalia.
64
  
Although the Islamists were active in various court militias that emerged during the 
1990s, initially led by the former head of Al-Ittiḥād, Hassan Dahir Aweys, they had limited 
power because of the courts’ strong link to specific clan groups, as already pointed out. In 
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addition, their power was restricted by local businessmen who funded the military equipment 
used by the court militia. When most of the court members joined the ranks of the TNG in 
2000, some Islamists under the leadership of Aweys started a project which addressed the 
limitations that they experienced through the 1990s. Firstly, they set up a training camp for 
court militia in order to reduce clan allegiances. Secondly, they sought to find ways to acquire 
their own equipment in order to avoid dependency on the businessmen. The newly established 
militia
65
 from this camp came to pave the way for Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaahideen (al-
Shabaab) which,
66
 according to Ali Abdirahman, was officially established in 2003 after a 
major conference of Somali Salafis. Abdiraham asserts that during this conference, which was 
set up to de-militarize the Salafi movement and to forge a post-9/11 strategy, a group of 
battle-hardened, Afghan-trained men greatly disagreed with leading figures at the conference, 
who propagated what they perceived as “a capitulation to the US and its Christian infidels” 
and the abandoning of the cause of jihād. Some days later a parallel conference was held by 
these men, and Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen was established.
67
  
In the years to follow there were several external factors that made the situation 
favorable for the Islamists in general. Firstly, neither TNG nor its successor, the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG), established in November 2004, had much success. Secondly, 
after 9/11, the US government added a number of key Somali Islamists and Islamist 
organizations, like Al-Ittiḥād, to their terrorist list. Somali hit squads created at the initiative 
from US and Ethiopian Security Services started to assassinate and kidnapp assumed Jihadi-
Islamists. However, there was considerable collateral damage which made the Somali public 
quickly to side with the militant Islamist, even though they otherwise had little in common. In 
this context the new sharī’a courts emerged, this time also, as noted above, as a common 
project between the business community, clan elders and different religious actors. However, 
in addition to the Islamists, there were now also others who wished for a joint court system 
that would transcend clan structures in order to enforce law and order. For the Islamists, who 
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now faced wider support and had a stronger base than ever before, the new courts suited their 
political objectives.
68
    
 As noted above, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) which was established in 2004, 
recruited and trained its own militia which soon gained the upper hand against local warlords. 
The militants of al-Shabaab stood out as an elite force among the court militia. Their success 
was not least due to being self-supplied with military equipment and having an effective 
organization. Also, the leadership of al-Shabaab managed to maneuver itself into positions of 
the ICU executive council. However, despite their relative strength, al-Shabaab and the rest of 
the ICU forces were easily defeated by the Ethiopian forces that invaded in December 2006 at 
the request of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).
69
 
 The TFG militia and and the Ethiopian forces soon became unpopular among the 
population in Mogadishu. They failed to normalize the situation, and in early 2007 al-Shabaab 
had established itself as the most notorious insurgency group. The US-backed invasion of 
Ethiopian forces also fuelled the Jihadi-Salafi propaganda, which depicted al-Shabaab as the 
most effective resistance group and secured international support from other Islamists as well 
as the Somali diaspora. Due to foreign economic support, and also considerable funding by 
local businesses, al-Shabaab managed to pay relatively good wages for those who joined their 
ranks. This made al-Shabaab especially attractive for many youths, who could obtain relative 
economic stability by joining the group. When the Ethiopian forces left Somalia in January 
2009, the TFG and several earlier Islamists from the UIC failed to establish a broad alliance 
and left the road open for al-Shabaab to take control of most of South and Central Somalia 
and to introduce their version of sharī’a.70     
 
3.6 Al-Shabaab’s state and province administration  
Analysts agree that al-Shabaab is not a fully homogenous organization. Michael Taarnby and 
Lars Hallundbaek for instance claim that by late 2009 the movement consisted of 12 different 
groups ranging from hardcore Jihadis to less religious and more opportunistic affiliates.
71
 Although this might be true, al-Shabaab’s territories function today, according to Stig 
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J. Hansen, more or less as a state in South Central Somalia, with central administrative bodies 
which control taxation, application and enforcement of law as well as recruitment and 
organization of military personnel.
72
 In order to get an idea of the administrative structures of 
the al-Shabaab “state”, I have systemized information from Stig J. Hansen73 and Roland 
Marchal
74
 as well as from own informants. It must, however, be noted that lack of reliable 
data makes such an outline only a tentative sketch. 
 The highest decision-making body of the al-Shabaab organization is the executive 
shūrā (“consultation”), headed by Ahmed Abdi Godane alias Sheikh Abu Zubeyr, whose title 
is amīr (“commander” or “prince”). In 2009 this shūrā consisted, according to Hansen, of 8 to 
10 members. In addition there is a larger shūrā of up to maybe 45 persons75 who are 
summoned when needed.
76
 The role of the larger shūrā is according to Marchal to discuss all 
important matters concerning the organization, notably questions regarding ideological, 
political and military issues, and he assumes that the shūrā’s decisions are based on a 
principle of consensus.
77
 
 Linked to these shūrās are different bodies or ministries called maktabas (“offices”), 
each headed by a prominent al-Shabaab member from the shūrās, often refered to as amīrs. 
According to Marchal the ministries are as follows: Maktabatu Da’wah, the ministry of 
Religious Affairs and Orientations; Makatabatu  Difaa’, the ministry of Defense; Maktabatu 
Amniyaat, the ministry of Intelligence and Internal Security; Maktabatu I’laam, the ministry 
of Information; Maktabatu Ḥasba or Ḥisbah; the ministry of the Religious Police; Maktabatu 
Maaliya, the ministry of Finance; Maktabatu Siyaasada iyo Gobolada, the ministry of Internal 
Affairs, focusing on local administration, politics and social issues.
78
 
 The territory being controlled or partly controlled by al-Shabaab is divided into nine
79
 
provinces, termed wilaayah (“province”) which correspond to the former Somali provinces 
(see figure). Each wilaayah is governed by a regional administration, but, as Hansen points 
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out, the strength and efficiency of these regional administrations vary.
80
 According to 
“Hassan-nor”, a Somali informant, the Hiiraan, Middle Shabelle, Lower Shabelle, Lower 
Jubba, Bay, Bakool and parts of Galgadud have been the most stable and administratively 
advanced.
81
 But even there, Hansen claims, the administrations primarily exercise control 
over the urban centers, al-Shabaab’s control being very limited or entirely absent in rural 
areas.
82
      
      
                
 Every province or wilaayah is headed by a walī (“governor”) who take orders from the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs,
83
 or according to “Hassan-nor”, directly from the Amīr Abu 
Zubeyr himself.
84
 Like the Ministries or Maktabas of the extended shūrā, there are equivalent 
offices linked to the central provincial administration, each office headed by a senior leader or 
commander, an amīr.85 The exact organization of the provincial administration is not certain, 
but according to Hansen, there is, in theory at least, an Office of Social Affairs, an Office of 
Tiqtisadi/Finance, an Office of the Qudhaa/Justice and an Office of the Ḥasba (or 
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Ḥesbah/Ḥisbah).86 According to “Hassan-nor”, the wilaayah administration is also 
coordinating construction and maintenance work, charity works, teaching of sharī’a in the 
mosques and organizing of religious-political seminars termed uluumul Muslim ummah 
(“teaching of the Muslim Ummah”) which are held in the towns of the province in order to 
create awarenesss of al-Shabaab’s policy and ideology. Additionally, the provincial 
administrations, “Hassan-nor” claims, run religious-legal courses for qāḍīs and imāms.87  
 Outside of the civil wilaayah structure, there is a military structure governed by the 
top commanders of al-Shabaab, such as the grand amīr, Abu Zubeyr, Abu Muqhtar Robow 
and Sheikh Fu’ad Mohamed Khalaif Shangole. Somali soldiers are recruited locally and 
trained in the many military training facilities that are scattered throughout South Central 
Somalia. The al-Shabaab army, the Jaysh al-‘Ushrah (“Army of Hardship”),88 deals with 
internal as well as external matters: minor clashes in the wilayaahs, as well as major 
offensives against AMISOM and TFG forces in Mogadishu.
89
 In addition to the proper 
combat units there are also, according to several of my Somali informants, mobile military 
tribunals or courts that move along with the armed forces wherever they operate.   
 
Chapter 4: Al-Shabaab and Salafism  
On basis of its violent actions, e.g. use of suicide bombers and assassination of political 
opponents, as well as its utilization of global Jihadi rhetoric, al-Shabaab is immedeatly 
perceived as a radical Islamists group. However, as Hansen points out, in order to get a grip 
on al-Shabaab’s ideological stand one must to take into consideration that the group does not 
constitute a homogenous movement. According to Hansen this became especially evident 
after the group’s takeover of relatively huge territories in 2008-2009 when the movemnt 
attracted a wide array of people, such as bandits, affiliates from rivalling Islamist 
organizations, as well as non-Somali Jihadis. Hansen also adds that al-Shabaab had to recruit 
persons with little awareness of Islamist ideology in order to fill the many administrative 
posts in the rapidly expanding administration. Some of these were, according to Hansen, even 
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reformist-minded and strived first and foremost to achieve justice in the newly controlled 
areas rather than to propagate Islamist ideology.
90
 It should also be noted, as Hansen points 
out, that al-Shabaab never has been a static organization. It has operated within quite different 
contexts: first as a part of the sharī’a court alliance in 2005-2006, then, as an insurgency 
group in 2007-2008, and from 2008 the most powerful political actor in South Central 
Somalia.
91
 Different contexts also recuire different tactical decisions and may also influence 
the group’s ideological approach. What kind of symbols and terms that are applied may be 
contingent on their immediate utility for the group within the prevalent context.  
To make an elaborate analysis of al-Shabaab’s ideological traits from its emergence 
until today is outside the scope of my dissertation.
92
 Instead, I will try to identify, from the 
last three years, an overarching narrative propagated by leading voices within the group, 
which may give meaning to events and provide a framework for the understanding of al-
Shabaab’s actions on the ground. This ideological framework, I will argue, is the Jihadi-Salafi 
discourse, which will be explained below. 
 
4.1 Salafism - resurgence of a pristine Islamic society 
On basis of its ban on all sorts of “un-Islamic” practices, e.g. Western clothes, TV, music and 
cinemas, as well as its struggeling against Sufism, “secularism and modernism” and its praise 
of the righteous Salaf (“ancestors”),93 al-Shabaab shows resemblance to a current trend of 
Islamic thought, namely the Salafi trend. Jonathan A. C. Brown traces the origin of this trend 
to two main events: First, the challenges of modernity, i. e. the economic, technological, 
social and political changes that emerged in Western Europe during the 18
th
 century, which 
soon came to colonize and dominate large parts of the world. By questioning why they, as 
Muslims, were subordinate and powerless to confront the Modern West, many started to 
question contemporary practice of Islam and turned their attention to the foundation of Islam 
and its textual sources. However, even before the impact of modernity, the Muslim world 
witnessed several revivalist Islamic movements in West Africa, India and the central Arabia 
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where the famously militaristic Wahhabi movement
94
 had its origin. These movements 
generally propagated that the Muslim community had lost its moorings in the legacy of the 
Prophet, and felt that it had been led astray by heretical accretions in theology and worship as 
well as excessive loyalty to the orthodox legal schools.
95
      
 The current Salafi trend has inherited the notion of a world in decay. To cope with 
this, Salafis seek to reconstruct Islam’s original purity based on the model of the first Muslim 
generations or the al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ (“the pious ancestors”).96 By purging away what they 
perceive as superstitions, notably popular Sufi practices, blind loyalty to tradition and cultural 
influence from Greek logic as well as Persian mysticism, they hope to recreate the true Islam 
as propagated by the Prophet and the early Muslims. One of the means to do so is to revive 
the traditional usage of haḍīth and use these texts as models for right behavior in a modern 
society. Salafi scholars feel entitled to break with an established ruling of the four Sunni 
schools if he assesses it to lack sufficient haḍīth evidence. Moreover, Salafis endorse 
independent legal reasoning, ijtihād, and blame the classical legal schools for misguiding the 
Muslims away from the Sunna. However, such notions and methods are criticized by 
traditionalist scholars as “childish ijtihād” and total ignorance of legal theory in terms of 
following random haḍīths instead of understanding how those haḍīths fit into the process of 
deriving law.
97
 
 
4.2 Tawḥīd, shirk and bid’a 
The Salafi trends embrace theological tenets which are centered on the concept of tawḥīd, the 
oneness of God. According to Quintan Wictotowicz this consept contains three components:
98
 
the first is stated in the testimony of faith, shahāda, namely that the one God is the sole 
creator: “I testify that there is no God except Allāh and that Muhammad is His messenger.” 
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Secondly, God is understood as supreme and entirely unique, and does not share any 
characteristics or powers with humans or any other of His creations. He is also the supreme 
legislator, which makes all humans obliged to follow His commands, i.e. the holy sharī’a in 
its entirety. Rejecting this is to say that humans can legislate, a domain which is reserved for 
God alone. Ideologies or institutions that suggest supremacy of human made laws, like 
secularism or state governed religions are therefore banished by the Salafis. Thirdly, the 
Salafis have the common understanding of the Muslim teaching that God alone has the right 
to be worshipped. To the Salafis this means that any form of shirk, i. e. idolatry, polytheism or 
veneration of other gods, objects or humans, is a grave sin. However, this component of 
tawḥīd is even more profound for the Salafis: grounded on the idea that the Qu’rān and the 
Sunna is God’s provisions for how humans should behave in this world, the Salafis see every 
act in accordance with this God given law as worship. Any act that deviates from this law, 
sharī’a, indicates submission to other things than God. In order to follow these notions, the 
Salafis try to live strictly according to the provisions in the Qu’rān and to emulate the 
behavior of the Prophet, which are given in the haḍīths. Hence they adhere to the guidance of 
the first three “generations” of Muslims, the al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ, because of their first-hand 
experience of the “authentic” message of Islam.99     
 Another central theological concept of Salafi thought related to tawḥīd is bid’a, 
i.e. innovation. This concept implies that any belief or action which is not explicitly approved 
by the Qu’rān, the Prophet or the Salaf (the haḍīths) is an innovation which should be rejected 
because it threatens the oneness of God.
100
 In this concept there lies a potential rejection of 
everything which is not found in the Qu’rān and in the haḍīth stories of the first “generations” 
of Muslims.   
The concepts of tawḥīd, shirk and bid’a are all treated in al-Shabaab affiliated 
propaganda leaflets on the web. For example, in the aforementioned decleration issued by the 
general command of al-Shabaab tawḥīd is established as one of the main goals of the 
movement. Here tawḥīd includes the extermination of:  
(T)he apparent symbols of polytheism and idolatry, such as tombs and domes. Abu Umamah (t) related 
 that the Prophet (r) said: “Indeed Allāh has sent me as a mercy to mankind and has ordered me to wipe 
 all traces of idolatry.” (Ahmed and others). Allāh purified many segments of our society from grave-
 worship, grave pilgrimage, sacrificing animals for the saints buried there, and seeking blessings from 
 them, after they saw with their own eyes that they were merely false deities who can neither benefit nor 
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 harm. They were guided to Tawḥīd, and they cast aside shirk. All praise be to Allāh for the blessing of 
 being able to worship in an atmosphere not polluted with raised domes or over-respected graves. 
101
 
 
 This categorization of popular Somali religious practices such as the veneration of 
saints as a form of polytheism and hence as shirk is a strong indication of al-Shabaab’s Salafi 
inclination. This view finds support from events that have taken place on the ground. Not long 
after al-Shabaab took control of Kismayo town in August 2008 they started to destroy local 
graves of Sufi sheikhs. Sheikh Hassan Yakub, the al-Shabaab spokesman in Kismayo at the 
time, told a local journalist in December 2008 that they “destroyed graves where people used 
to worship dead people”, a practice which is particularily prominent during the Eid-
celebration, but which he deems “un-Islamic.”102  Similar destructions were also executed in 
other places where al-Shabaab has taken control. For example, in the city of Brave in Lower 
Shabelle, graveyard caretakers has been arrested and mosques located near graveyards closed 
because al-Shabaab deemed the prayers conducted there “not to be proper prayers”, and that 
praying there would amount to worshipping the graves themselves.
103
  
 According to an al-Shabaab pamphlet it is not only un-Islamic practices that should be 
shunned but also “innovations” and “the framework of apostasy”- the latter being an indirect 
reference to secularism and modernism associated with the West.
104
 Seen in light of the 
concept of bid’a (innovation), central in Salafi thought, any idea or object not anchored in the 
Qu’rān or the haḍīth is understood as sinful because it may threaten tawḥīd, the unity of God, 
since this would draw attention away from the pure revelation of God. The practical 
implications of this notion could be seen through the many bans issued by al-Shabaab e.g. the 
prohibition of traditional wedding music, dancing and traditional female dress. Likewise, in 
order to purge Western influence al-Shabaab has banned listening to music, watching TV, 
films, going to cinemas and even wearing a bra. “Hassan”, one of my informants who used to 
live in Mogadishu was called a kāfir (“unbeliever”) by al-Shabaab militiamen and punished 
on the spot in the streets of Mogadishu with for lashes for wearing a belt.
105
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4.3 Salafis and politics 
Although the Salafis embrace a common creed there are several prevalent political trajectories 
among them. Wictotowicz sees the different approaches to politics as a result of the inherently 
subjective nature of interpretation. When a Salafi scholar consults the Qu’rān and the haḍīths 
or turns to the opinions of influential scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah and Abd al-Wahhab to find 
answer to a certain issue, he naturally cannot grasp the message of the text without using his 
own reason. Firstly, how he understands a certain issue depends on his understanding of the 
prevalent context. Secondly, how to identify a text that would seem relevant for the issue at 
hand is also contingent on the scholar’s understanding of the text. For example, when the 
Prophet in a haḍīth sanctions the use of a catapult during the siege of the city of Taif, some 
Salafis argue that this is equivalent to modern weapons of mass destruction, and is legitimate 
to use in their struggle today. To assess whether the text is analogue and relevant to the 
current context is thus contingent upon the interpreter, and could result in a radically different 
outcome.
106
 
 Based on interpretation of context and texts, Wiktorowicz divides the Salafis into three 
main categories: Purists, Politicos and Jihadis. The purists are first and foremost eager to 
maintain the purity as propagated by the Qu’rān and the haḍīth.107 Rather than political 
activism, the emphasis is to promote the Salafi doctrine, centered around tawḥīd, and to 
combat deviant practices as an analogy to the Prophet’s struggle against polytheism, human 
desire and human reason. Until the religion is purified, any political action will probably lead 
to corruption and injustice, according to the Purists. Therefore they advice against the 
implementation of sharī’a in a society which is not ready, i.e. that the society lacks the proper 
understanding of the tenets of faith. The proper modes of action for the purists are to 
propagate the right belief (da’wah), to purify the society and to promote religious education. 
Even during times of repression Salafi Purists have abstained from activism, and refrained 
from violence, arguing that the Prophet and his Companions also were repressed during the 
Mecca period, but that they remained peaceful in order to facilitate the spread of Islam. This 
reflects an understanding that actions should not lead to greater evil, such as creating 
problems for Salafi propagation.
108
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 In contrast to these Purists, the Politicos, as the name implies, are more politically 
minded. The Politicos constitute a younger generation of Salafis that are critical to the Purists’ 
stance which they criticize for being naiv and ignorant, and in their view, lacks understanding 
of the current political realities which Muslims face and the need to address their suffering, be 
it in Palestine or in Chechnya. Instead of focusing on how to conduct proper rituals, or how to 
combat the veneration of saints (Sufism), or to offer prayers for the very leaders who 
facilitated the destruction of the Muslim world, the Politicos believe they have a moral 
responsibility to discuss politics and critique un-Islamic rulers and policies.
109
       
 The third category, the Jihadis, like the Politicos, engage in politics, but unlike the 
Politicos they sanction the use of violence and see it as a legitimate mean in order to reach 
their aim which is to establish an Islamic state. Wictorowics traces its emergence to the 
Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s.
110
 Unlike other Salafis and Islamists who 
discussed politics at the universities, not least in Saudi Arabia, the participants in the Afghan 
war received their religious as well as political training on the battlefield. When the war ended 
and many of the now radicalized Muslims returned home at the beginning of the 1990s, they 
met repression, e.g. in Saudi Arabia, which resulted in an increased hostility towards what 
many perceived as un-Islamic regimes. The Jihadi trend that now took form, with Osama Bin 
Laden as one of its most famous representatives, distanced itself from the Purists and 
criticized them for not putting the Salafi doctrine into practice when they failed to address the 
injustices of un-Islamic regimes and their allies, the US and Israel.
111
 
 In view of al-Shabaab’s origin as a revolutionary insurgency group and a protagonist 
in Somalia’s civil war which has not hesitated to use a wide range of violent methods, such as 
suicide bombers, assassinations, road side bombs and conventional attacks in order to reach 
their goal of governing an independent Islamic state, it must be put in the Jihadi-category. 
However, contrary to most Jihadi groups al-Shabaab actually enjoys political and military 
control of a territory and exerts a religio-political program through a relatively stable 
administrative structure, not dissimilar to a modern state. By analyzing al-Shabaab’s handling 
of court cases and its practical use of punishment in the next chapters, I get a privileged look 
into al-Shabaab’s view on sharī’a in its judicial practice as well as an understanding of al-
Shabaab’s attitude to violence as an instrument to create an (ideal) Islamic state. 
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4.4 Jihadi-Salafism and excommunication  
What is characteristic for the Jihadi or Jihadi-Salafi trend is not their aim to establish an 
Islamic state governed in conformity with sharī’a. This goal is also prevalent within other 
Salafi trends. However, they differ from other Salafis by their emphasis on violent jihād 
(“struggle”), i. e. holy war, as a method to reach their goals, and by their extensive targeting 
of fellow Muslims who do not follow their strict rules of conducts. In order to legitimize its 
ideology Jihadi-Salafi ideologues, like the Palestinian-Jordanian Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, 
have turned to the theological-judicial concept of al-walāʾwal-barāʾ, which may roughly be 
translated into “loyalty and disavowal”,112 or in other words “friendship towards those who 
worship Allāh and enmity towards those who adore any other god”.113 
 Although the idea of al-walāʾwal-barāʾ is not a part of orthodox Sunni Islamic 
thought, the idea is found in the works of Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) who uses the concept in 
connection with bid’a (reprehensible innovation). He was concerned about the influence of 
Jewish and Christian religious festivals and customs on Islam, as many contemporary 
Muslims lived close to them. In his view, Muslims should not take part in such events, but 
demonstrate their loyalty only to God by abiding to Islam. Of special concern to Ibn 
Taymiyya were certain popular practices among his contemporary Muslims which he 
describes as bid’a and therefore regards as non-Islamic e.g. visiting of graves of holy men and 
women.
114
     
 During the 18th and 19th centuries scholars, especially followers of the famous 
Ḥanbalī reformer Muhammad ibn ‘Adb al-Wahhab, developed the content of al-walāʾwal-
barāʾ further, making the concept a tool in the fight against unbelief, kufr, by relating it to the 
concept of tawḥīd. They asserted that all Muslims must give their exclusive loyalty to God, or 
else they would be like unbelievers, kuffār. On an even more aggressive note, some Wahhabi 
scholars held that if you, as a Muslim, did not disavow the people of unbelief and declare that 
they were your enemy, you were not adhering to the oneness of God, tawḥīd. It was this 
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perception of the concept of al-walāʾwal-barāʾ which came to be incorporated into the ideas 
of modern day Salafi scholars.
115
     
 However, contemporary Salafi scholars use al-walāʾwal-barāʾ in different ways: For 
example, Saudi state-employed Wahhabi scholars and their followers use it in an apolitical 
way, limiting its province to social matters, such as banning unorthodox religious celebrations 
or to condemn non-Muslim custom when it comes to clothing, using of words and names, or 
practices like hand shaking. However, the same scholars tend to be lenient with the political 
leaders’ deviating behavior. On the other hand there is a branch of contemporary Salafi 
scholars who see al-walāʾwal-barāʾ as applicable in the political sphere, stating that one 
should criticize and act against leaders that are unfit to rule, like the Saudi rulers. The already 
mentioned Salafi scholar al-Maqdisi goes even further, claiming that politics and 
excommunication, takfīr, cannot be separated. He maintains that political obedience and 
willingness to abide by laws when the regime is non-Islamic, is equivalent to showing loyalty 
to other than God. This also means that Muslim politicians who propagate these man-made 
and un-Islamic laws are in fact worshipping someone or something other than God, and as 
such they are guilty of the grave sin of shirk, and should be condemned as kuffār (sg. kāfir). In 
Al-Maqdisi’s extremist view the whole Muslim world is permeated by idolatry and astray by 
un-Islamic leaders who apply man-made laws instead of applying the only valid, Islamic law, 
sharī’a, in full. According to al-Maqdisi all Muslims should denounce such unbelieving 
leaders, and the best way to act against these kuffār is by waging jihād in order to restore 
tawḥīd in legislation, which means in practice to abandon all man-made laws and apply 
sharī’a.116      
 To what extent the al-Shabaab leadership is familiar with this concept is outside my 
knowledge, but al-Shabaab statements are anyhow permeated by an “infidel vs. righteous” 
rhetoric and they frequently use terms such as “apostate” or “kuffār government” when 
referring to the TFG (the Transitional Federal Government). Although the TFG consists of 
Somali Muslims, al-Shabaab puts it in the same category as external enemies, such as the 
AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) forces and the Ethiopians, all being deemed 
unbelievers or infidels.
117
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However, to separate the Muslims in “kuffār” and “righteous” is not only propagated 
through al-Shabaab’s statements but also becomes evident in practice. There are several 
examples which show that Somalis are regarded as kuffār by al-Shabaab and have been 
sentenced to severe punishment or the death penalty in the courts or have faced extra-judicial 
assassination just because they have had linkes to the TFG or any other enemy group or 
organization. For example, “Ghedi”, a Somali informant from Mogadishu, was arrested by al-
Shabaab militiamen in his house in Mogadishu one night in July 2010. He was forced to stand 
up and they tied his hands and legs. Then they dragged him through the streets of Mogadishu 
by a rope tied to the tow bar of a car. According to “Ghedi” this treatment was due to two 
factors: the fact that he had previously been working for the World Food Program, a UN 
organization which had been banned by the al-Shabaab administration, and the fact that he 
used to live in the area dominated by TFG, or the side of “the kufr government” of 
Mogadishu. For these reasons he was deemed by al-Shabaab to be a kāfir, and was punished 
accordingly. Luckily, he had some distant relatives within al-Shabaab who arranged his 
release. However, sadly, his wife, son and mother in-law were all killed by the militia during 
his absence.
118
  
 
4.5 Sharī’a and the legal schools  
Inherent in the concept of tawḥīd is, as mentioned above, the idea that God is the supreme 
being and that He does not share His powers with anyone, neither humans nor other of His 
creations. Because the Qu’rān describes God as the supreme legislator, humans are obliged to 
follow his law, the sharī’a, and only sharī’a. Also, the Jihadi-Salafi reasoning with regard to 
al-walāʾwal-barāʾ (“loyalty and disavowal”) stresses the importance of sharī’a, in the sense 
that lack of application of sharī’a would justify takfīr, i.e. excommunication of Muslims, and 
thus be a legitimate reason for jihād where the goal is to establish sharī’a as the only 
legislation. As such, sharī’a becomes a focal point within the Jihadi-Salafi discourse, and a 
main goal for any Islamic state. As the former official spokesman and leading figures of al-
Shabaab, Sheikh Muqhtar Robow, stated in an interview: “Shabab Al-Mujahideen is an 
Islamist-Salafi movement that wants to implement sharī’a completely – every single element 
of it. That's what the movement stands for.”119  
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 However, while it is one thing to have sharī’a as a utopian goal and a means of 
legitimizing the fight against a corrupt and ungodly regime, it is something else to govern a 
state on basis of it. Although sharī’a is widely discussed within Salafi discourses, there are 
not many concrete explanations on how to use it in practice apart from the references to the 
Qu’ran, the Sunna/haḍīth and the salaf as the sources of godly rule. Nevertheless, as Brown 
points out there is ambivalence in regards to the classical legal tradition of the four legal 
schools among the Salafi trends. While Salafis in general are skeptical to the following 
(taqlīd) of the opinions of the classical legal schools (the madhāhib) and propagate new 
ijtihād (independent legal reasoning), some influential Salafi scholars, like the Albanian-
Syrian Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999), advocate the study of classical books of 
legal theory and makes use of legal principles compiled by this discourse.
120
 Bernard Heykel 
elaborates further on this issue and asserts that the position adopted vis-à-vis the four 
established Sunni madhāhib (Ḥanafị, Māikī, Shāfi’ī and Ḥanbalī) constitutes a major dividing 
line among the Salafi trends.
121
 Heykel applies two categories: firstly, Salafis who follow the 
teachings of the madhāhib. This category I will term the madhhab-minded Salafis (in contrast 
to Heykel’s second category, ijtihād-minded Salafis, described below). Within this category 
he puts the Wahhabi trend who he claims tends to follow the Ḥanbalī school. Neither the 
founding father al-Wahhab nor the 14th century scholar Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), 
who exerted great influence on the Wahhabis, Heykel asserts, argued that ordinary Muslims 
should break with the orthodox madhāhib. However, Ibn Taymiyyah insisted that a person 
with elaborate knowledge in the Islamic sciences, a mujtahid, i.e. a scholar who exercises 
ijtihād, like himself, was expected to follow his own judgments. This means that legal rulings 
could be based both on the opinions of the legal schools as well as ijtihād if the scholar 
possesses sufficient knowledge.
122
  
 In contrast, the ijtihād-minded Salafis fully reject the orthodox schools. They argue 
that even ordinary Muslims should be “liberated” from taqlīd (the following of the opinions 
of the madhāhib). Instead of just following blindly these orthodox opinions, ordinary Muslims 
should, according to the ijtihād-minded Salafis, ask a contemporary scholar of his opinion as 
well as the proof on which he bases his ruling. As such, the ordinary Muslim, according to 
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this perspective, is not engaging in taqlīd, but rather a practice which the Salafis refer to as 
ittibā’ (“following”). This practice increases the awareness of the textual proofs and the “true” 
teachings of the first generation. In their view, the traditional scholarship of the centuries old 
legal schools has not only become a barrier between the believer and God, but also distorted 
the revealed truth as given to the Prophet Mohamad. Like an echo of Martin Luther’s critique 
of unbiblical, Catholic traditions, the ijtihād-minded Salafis denounce the traditional Islamic 
jurisprudence of the madhāhib as a reprehensible innovation, bid’a, which should be purged 
from the true religion of the pious forefathers.
123
 
 To my knowledge, most of al-Shabaab’s Internet statements and propaganda material 
does not state how the group perceives the classical legal tradition and the four Sunni 
madhāhib (Ḥanafī, Māikī, Shāfi’ī and Ḥanbalī). However, there is some al-Shabaab press 
releases published on the Internet that describes activities related to a certain Abdullah Azzam 
Training Center.
124
 In this regard, one statement from May 2010 is interesting. It describes a 
graduation ceremony for 209 preachers who have just finished their four months course and 
shows the course curriculum which consists of Qu’rān exegesis, studies of tawḥīd, the science 
of haḍīth, biographies of the Prophet, Arabic studies and studies of fiqh. The two works 
mentioned in regards to fiqh are al-tahdheeb fi matn al-ghayah wal-taqreeb and nadhm al-
waraqaat.
125
  According to Nora S. Eggen, the former, written by Mustafa al-Bagha, a Syrian 
imam, is a short, modern introduction to fiqh according to the Shāfi’ī school’s tradition. It 
follows the classical form of a fiqh manual with separate chapters discussing different legal 
subjects e.g. ritual aspects (‘ibādāt), family law, contract law and criminal law. The latter 
work, according to Eggen, written by the 11
th
 century Shāfi’ī scholar Abu ‘Abd Allāh al-
Juwayni, is a short collection of definitions and terms used within uṣūl al-fiqh, i. e. a genre of 
the fiqh-literature where the scholars discuss how to derive positive law from the textual 
sources.
126
 Another al-Shabaab statement from January 2011 describes a graduation ceremony 
from the same center where the best students receive religious books as a reward for good 
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results. Most of the ten books mentioned are according to Eggen classical works, such as 
haḍīth collections, haḍīth commentaries, Qu’rān commentaries and biographies about the 
Prophet, of which four of the commentaries are written by Shāfi’ī scholars, one by a 
Ḥanbalī/Wahhabi scholar, and one by a Mauritanian scholar from the classical period who 
probably, according to Eggen, was adhered to the Māikī school.127 Thus it seems that al-
Shabaab at least wants to propagate that it recognizes the classical legal schools, with 
emphasis on the Shāfi’ī school, which has been the most influential madhhab throughout 
Somalia’s Islamic history.  
 It is possible that this adherence to Somali legal tradition is propaganda directed 
towards the Somali population in order to gather support among Somalis who are sceptical to 
religious radicalism. However, among my interviewees from al-Shabbab dominated areas 
there were several who supported the above-mentioned claim that al-Shabaab in general does 
not reject the orthodox schools and classical fiqh. “Abu Mohammed” from Baidoa claims, for 
example, that al-Shabaab’s qāḍīs recognize the Shāfi’ī manuals, but only make use of them in 
some cases, while in other they ignore them. Moreover, “Hassan”, who lives in Mogadishu 
and follows the judicial practice of al-Shabaab qāḍīs closely, asserts that many qāḍīs 
nowadays claim to adhere to the Ḥanbalī school due to increasing Salafi influence. However, 
according to “Hassan”, the legal reality “on the ground” is different: the various al-Shabaab 
qāḍīs apply the legal doctrines they know. As many of the qāḍīs have studied abroad, he 
explains, for example in Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, they have acquired 
knowledge about the legal doctrine that is prevalent in that specific place. Thus, in Somalia 
under al-Shabaab rule, one may encounter qāḍīs who practice law in accordance with the 
Ḥanbalī, the Shāfi’ī, as well as the Māikī and the Ḥanafī school (the four orthodox schools). 
To what extent the al-Shabaab qāḍīs are following the classical fiqh-doctrines of the four 
madhhaib in questions regarding application of criminal law will be addressed in the next 
chapter. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
127
 Global Islamic Media Front, Youth mujahideen movement: The graduation of 130 Islamic preachers in 
banadir province, Al-qimmah Media; Comments by Nora S. Eggen, Senior Research Fellow in Arabic at the 
University of Oslo.   
46 
 
Part 2: Al-Shabaab’s legal system 
Sharī’a as practiced by al-Shabaab is more in accordance with classical Islamic legal 
doctrines than with modern Western legal systems. This is apparent in the overall logic of the 
system where the main categories are the offences and punishments which are explicitely 
described in the Qu’rān and the haḍīth. For example, a murder charge cannot be tried as a 
ḥadd crime (see below) while adultery can. In a case of adultery there is still a possibility to 
treat it as another sort of crime if the evidences are insufficient. For example, if there are four 
women witnessing adultery, the crime cannot in principle be tried as a ḥadd crime, but may be 
tried as ta’zīr case (see below) with other evidence requirements. 
 In the classical fiqh doctrines criminal law is not regarded as a single, unified branch 
of law, but is discussed in three separate chapters. The first chapter contains provisions 
regarding offences against a person, i.e. murder and bodily harm. This category is further 
subdivided into provisions regarding retaliation, qiṣāṣ, and provisions regarding financial 
compensation, diya. The second chapter treats provisions regarding offences which have 
mandatory, fixed punishments outlined in the Qu’rān and/or the haḍīth, i.e. the ḥudūd (sg. 
ḥadd) (“limit” or “restriction”) punishments. These offences, namely theft (sariqa), banditry 
(al-ḥirāba), unlawful sexual intercourse (zinā), unfounded accusations of zinā (qadhf), 
consumption of alcohol (khamr) and apostasy (ridda) are perceived by the classical scholars 
to be violations of the claims of God (ḥuqūq Allāh).128 The third category deals with 
provisions concerning discretionary punishment of sinful and forbidden behavior, and of acts 
which endanger public order or state security (ta’zīr and siyāsa). The first two chapters, i.e. 
murder and bodily harm, and ḥadd crimes, are expounded in the fiqh manuals with great 
precision and detail while the third chapter is a residual category. However, this category is 
the most comprehensive one as most offences would fall into this category.
129
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Chapter 5: Legal actors 
According to classical Islamic theory on government and law,
130
 the head of state
131
 holds 
wide executive and judicial powers and may pass legislations within the limits set by sharī’a. 
In addition to the qāḍī court, which in classical legal literature is described as consisting of a 
single qāḍī who adjudicates in accordance with fiqh, classical theory also recognizes several 
other agencies with jurisdiction in criminal matters, the most prominent being the maẓālim, i. 
e. the private court of the sultan, the shurṭa, i. e. the police, and the muḥtasib, i. e. the market 
inspector. All these institutions operate according to the Islamic jurists within the framework 
of sharī’a. However, they operate in a different manner. The qāḍī whose position is described 
to be of religious-legal nature, must apply the law in accordance with strict rules in regards to 
procedure and evidence as outlined in the fiqh literature. The same procedures characterize to 
some extent the muḥtasib, a kind of municipal supervisor and judge which in principle is a 
religious position bound by fiqh provisions. The maẓālim and the shurṭa, however, are more 
related to the mundane power of the sultan and enjoy much wider latitudes as long as they 
enforce the law according to the “spirit of sharī’a”, i. e. that they do not rule in contradiction 
to sharī’a principles.132   
  
5.1 The structures of al-Shabaab’s legal system133 
At fitrst glance the legal system of al-Shabaab seems to differ from classical theory since 
there are no formal courts equivalent to the maẓālim or the shurṭa (police) court. While the 
Muslim ruler, according to classical theory, enjoys wide jurisdiction when it comes to 
criminal law, even in ḥadd cases,134 all my data indicates that the primary institution dealing 
with major criminal cases in general and ḥadd cases in particular, are the qāḍī courts. 
 The qāḍī court system of al-Shabaab seems to be an integrated part of the wilaayah 
structure, every wilaayah being responsible for a number of courts. According to most of the 
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Somali informants, there are two levels of courts: the provincial court (high court) and the 
residential court (low court). In every wilaayah there seems to be only one provincial court,
135
 
situated in the capital city, while there are several residential courts, some in the capital city 
and some located in other major towns of the wilaayah.
136
 The provincial court seems to 
handle major criminal cases involving murder, robbery, adultery and espionage, i.e. cases 
where the accused may face capital punishment. Additionally, these courts may also hear 
civilian cases. For example, the court at the Bakarra market, the main marked in Mogadishu, 
which is believed by informants from Mogadishu to be a provincial court, is carrying out 
nikahs i.e. the wedding ceremony which involves the wedding contract. On the other hand, 
the residential courts seem mainly to deal with civilian cases, like marriage, divorce and 
inheritance cases, as well as minor criminal cases such as theft and bodily harm. Although 
such cases also may involve serious corporal punishment, e.g. amputation of the right hand 
for theft, none of the cases tried here seem to involve capital punishment. However, in many 
respects it seems that both courts overlap and may try many similar types of cases. The most 
distinct difference seems to be that the provincial court is involved in cases where the convict 
is facing death penalty.   
 According to my Somali informants, court hearings in criminal cases are closed to the 
public, the exception being the serious ḥudūd cases which are often held in front of large 
audiences. However, several of the informants who have faced court trials were allowed to 
bring some relatives and clan elders as witnesses to the trial, while other informants tell how 
they were alone in front of a panel of qāḍīs. None of them were allowed a lawyer of any kind. 
Most of the respondents describe a court panel of three to four persons both in the residential 
as well as in the regional courts. According to some, all of them were qāḍīs, while others said 
that there were one or two scribes/assistants and one, two or three qāḍīs.137 Although the 
number of qāḍīs and court assistants tends to vary, it seems to be a general trend that there is 
one chief qāḍī who leads the court session and has the final say in the sentencing. This is 
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supported in Hansen’s recent report where he claims the Baidoa court to be headed by a 
President qāḍī who is supported by a Deputy President qāḍī and a court cleric.138 
 In addition to the qāḍīs and the court assistants, there may also be others present in the 
court, such as prosecutors and witnesses, as well as militiamen functioning as guards. 
According to “Yusuf Oman”, an informant from Mogadishu, there is a dedicated court militia, 
called Janjawiil, belonging to the courts in Mogadishu.
139
 However, according to Hansen, this 
may not be the case for all courts.
140
 
 
  
 
 Within the al-Shabaab controlled areas there are, in addition to the qāḍī court system, 
also other parallel legal structres. First, there seems to be a system of military courts which 
moves around with the armed forces. However, the information about these courts is limited. 
In my material, the only one who supposedly experienced this was the informant “Dalmar” 
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who was brought before three masked men somewhere in the bush, after being held in 
custody for 8 months due to suspicion of espionage because he had been working for Somali 
and international NGOs. He did not know at that time that this was a military court, but was 
told that this was the case by the local population when he returned. While he was present in 
the assumed military court, he was interrogated by the three masked men. Luckily for him, he 
was told that they had caught the wrong person, and released him.
141
 Although “Dalmar” has 
no more to tell than this, several of the other Somali informants believe these courts to enjoy a 
relatively wide jurisdiction. In their opinion, these courts primarily hear cases of a 
disciplinary/military nature as well as serious criminal cases, in particular charges of 
espionage in connection with foreign NGOs operating within al-Shabaab dominated 
territories. The last claim at least, corresponds with the case of “Dalmar”. 
 A third legal actor is the security services called Amniyaat (“security”) which consists 
of units of security agents. These units are believed by my Somali informants to operate 
clandestinely and to carry out assassinations of dissidents and political opponents - even 
outside the al-Shabaab controlled areas including Nairobi and other parts of Kenya. Although 
these greately feared units cannot be compared to the maẓālim in terms of constituting a court 
or tribunal, they seem to be, like the maẓālim, closely controlled by the mundane leadership, 
i.e the top management of al-Shabaab, or according to some informants, even directly by the 
leading amīr, Abu Zubeyr.  
 A fourth legal actor is the Ḥisbah (“balance” or “verification”), a kind of religious 
police that in many regards is equivalent to an ordinary police force. The Ḥisbah is 
responsible for the enforcement of law and order. It has jurisdiction in minor criminal 
offences, and may sentence and punish perpetrators independently of the qāḍīs court. As such 
it may be resembled to the shurṭa, as both do policing and have some jurisdiction in regards to 
criminal cases. However, while the shurṭa had their own courts independent of the qāḍī court 
and were able to adjudicate serious crimes,
142
 the Ḥisbah may only punish minor offences on 
the spot and cannot conduct independent court hearings. All major criminal cases are tried in 
the qāḍī courts. 
 A fifth legal actor is the Fatwā Council, a central body which seems to be an 
integrated part of the Maktabatu Da’wah. There is little certain information about its 
organization and function, but it seems to constitute a council of scholars who issue decrees 
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on political and religious-legal matters which regulate the social behavior of the citizens. 
These decrees or fatwās, i.e legal opinions on a spesific issue, appear to be followed up by the 
Ḥisbah and implemented in the qāḍī courts.  
 In the following chapters, I shall discuss the judicial practice/function of these five 
institutions (the qāḍīs court, the military court, the Amniyaat, the Ḥisbah and the Fatwā 
Council), however with an emphasis on criminal proceedings of the qāḍī court.  
 
Chapter 6: The qāḍī court 
According to classical doctrine, the qāḍī’s role is passive, in the sense that he is not allowed to 
investigate facts regarding the case. His main task is to make sure that the strict formal 
procedures are followed and to assess the evidence produced by the litigants. In principle, the 
litigants are persons, not institutions, one party acting as the plaintiff and the other acting as 
the defender. The trial has to be initiated by the affected party, for example the victim or his 
close family. As such, classical fiqh as a general rule does not recognize public prosecution, i. 
e. that representatives of the state initiate and prosecute violations of the law on behalf of the 
community. However, the qāḍī may initiate a case under certain specific circumstances on 
behalf of a person who is absent, or on behalf of a group of persons, and, like any other 
Muslims he may initiate a ḥadd case. No lawyers or juridical advisors are recognized.143         
 
6.1 The al-Shabaab qāḍīs and their courts 
When it comes to the role of the qāḍī in the al-Shabaab controlled areas, the court case of 
“Mohamed Ahmed’s” son illustrates the qāḍīs’ role: “Mohamed Ahmad’s” son, an al-
Shabaab militiaman, was brought before the provincial court in Kismayo after having shot 
and wounded an innocent civilian in the thigh. This had happened when he was patrolling the 
city streets with other militiamen. They had stopped a man who was carrying a gun, telling 
the man to hand it over to them. When the man refused, “Mohamed Ahmed’s” son shot and 
wounded the man. As this act ran counter to the standing orders, he was jailed by the Ḥisbah 
(the police) and was then, after a short time in prison, brought before the regional court 
accused of wounding an innocent man. The Ḥisbah brought four witnesses, namely the other 
militiamen who had been present at the time of the shooting. After their testimonies had been 
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heard, the accused admitted to the crime, and was sentenced to pay compensation, diya, of 
five camels to the victim.
144
  
This court case displays a pattern which is found in the majority of the court cases 
reported by my informants. First, the suspect is imprisoned. After some days in prison, often 
exposed to torture, the suspect is brought before the court where he has to defend himself 
against the accusations presented by the Ḥisbah. After having assessed the evidence brought 
before them, the qāḍīs (usually one, two or three) render a verdict. The qāḍīs seem to play a 
quite passive role, recognizable from classical doctrine where they are prescribed to focus 
mainly on procedural rules and the evidence presented to them. The active role, on the other 
hand, is played by the Ḥisbah, who arrest the offender, bring him to the court, act as a 
prosecutor, and present the evidence, either witnesses or other proofs, in order to support their 
accusations. Even though the classical doctrine allows the shurṭa, a pre-modern equivalent to 
the police, to assist the qāḍīs by bringing the accused to court and to execute the sentences 
given by the qāḍī,145 the fact that the Ḥisbah actually functions as a state prosecutor who leads 
the court proceedings, finds no support in classical doctrine.  
There are, however, some cases that derogate from this pattern in the sense that there 
is no public prosecutor, but only a complainant who addresses the qāḍīs directly to deliver his 
complaints. For example, in a case tried in one of the Mogadishu courts, a woman, “Kadra”, 
went to court after having been threatened with a pistol, beaten and raped by a Ḥisbah official. 
Although the neighbors had witnessed the rape and recognized the perpetrator, having been 
made aware of the crime by “Kadra’s” screaming, they did not dare to give testimony in front 
of the qāḍīs because they were afraid of reprisals from al-Shabaab. Hence, as “Kadra” did not 
have any evidence to support her claims, the case was dismissed.
146
 Although this case is 
different from the former because it lacks an official prosecutor, the role of the qāḍīs are quite 
similar in the sense that they are only considering the evidence brought before them, rather 
than initiating additional investigation in order to find out whether or not the claims were true. 
However, there is a third category of cases where the qāḍīs play an active role as prosecutors 
themselves, like they e.g. do in the case of “Hassan”, a radio reporter who was tried in the 
residential court of Kismayo. After having released information, deemed sensitive by al-
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Shabaab, on the local radio station and thus “putting the lives of Muslims in danger”, 
“Hassan” was arrested by the Ḥisbah. After 7 days in prison he was brought before the court. 
Although the Ḥisbah commissioner and an al-Shabab militiaman were present during the 
session, it was the qāḍīs who announced the charge and presented the evidence, which in this 
case was a recording of the accused’s radio news program. Thereafter, the qāḍīs sentenced 
him to banishment, and presented him with an ultimatum: either leave the region within 36 
hours or be killed.
147
 
 
6.2 Classical legal procedures  
In classical Islamic jurisprudence, like in Roman law, the burden of proof lies with the 
plaintiff. In trying to convince the qāḍī about his claims, the plaintiff should present two 
witnesses, either two men, or one man and two women, all of whom must be righteous 
persons. The other main type of evidence is the defendant’s admission of guilt. An admission 
must be made voluntarily and stated in front of the qāḍī in court, or restated if uttered at an 
earlier occasion. However, witness testimonies to an admission made by the defendant outside 
of the court are accepted, as long as the witness is deemed reliable. Interestingly, police 
officers cannot be used as witnesses to a defendant’s admission because the police are 
representatives of the sultan, a relationship which may influence their reliability. However, if 
someone else is present at the moment of confession, for example a caretaker, he may submit 
a testimony.
148
  
A third category of evidence is the oath.
149
 If the plaintiff has brought valid and 
credible witnesses in support of his claims, or a defender has confessed his guilt, the qāḍī will 
ask the plaintiff to swear that he has told the truth. If he does this, the case is closed in his 
favor. However, if one of the litigants fails to bring sufficient evidence, the defendant will be 
asked to take an oath. If he complies, he is free of charge.
150
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6.3 Cases treated in the al-Shabaab qāḍī courts 
6.3.1 Murder and bodily harm – qiṣāṣ and diya 
A criminal case regarding qiṣāṣ (retaliation) and diya (compensation) constitutes a private 
prosecution,
151
 in the sense that the victim, his relatives or a valid representative of the victim 
are the ones who bring the case to the court and act as plaintiffs. As long as the plaintiff 
brings sufficient evidence, it is his prerogative to either demand retaliation or blood money, 
diya, or to pardon the perpetrator.
152
 Retaliation in cases of murder or bodily harm, on the 
other hand, may only be demanded if the offence was proved to be intentional. This is defined 
by both the Shāfi’īt and the Ḥanbalīt school as: “Homicide or bodily harm is intentional if 
both the act against the victim and its results (death or injury) were intended.”153 If this is not 
the case, and the act is assessed by the qāḍī to have been accidental or semi-accidental, the 
perpetrator must pay diya.
154
    
 Qiṣāṣ, retaliation in connection with cases of wounding means that the perpetrator will 
suffer the equivalent wound as has been inflicted on the victim according to the principle of 
“a life for a life, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth”.155 In homicide cases the murderer 
will be killed, ideally in the same way as the victim was killed. The legal schools differ in the 
question of whether the victim or his family may carry out the punishment themselves under 
supervision by the legal authority, or whether the execution must be done by an 
executioner.
156
 
 In cases of qiṣāṣ the general rules of evidence are stricter than those standard proofs 
outlined above. Neither the testimony of one witness combined with the plaintiff’s oath nor 
the defender’s refusal to swear an oath, is valid. Likewise, circumstantial evidence is not 
accepted. The required evidence is either the testimony of two witnesses that have actually 
seen the act, testimonies to the defendant’s confession of guilt outside the court, or a 
confession by the defendant in court. Moreover, a perpetrator cannot be sentenced unless he 
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knew that the act was an offence, which means that minors up to the age of puberty
157
 and the 
insane, are exempt from liability.
158
      
 Moreover, an insane person or a minor may be deemed responsible to pay diya 
because liability in such cases does not require a will or intent behind the action that resulted 
in the killing or wounding. In procedures regarding the adjudication of diya normal rules of 
evidence is followed as such cases are regarded to be of financial, not punitive nature. In court 
cases where the perpetrator kills or wounds by accident or semi-intentionally it is a question 
of how much to be compensated. In contrast to qiṣāṣ cases where the perpetrator is personally 
responsible and has to face the punishment himself, the payment of diya is, as a rule, the 
responsibility of his diya-paying group. The diya-paying group is defined by the Māikī and 
Ḥanbalī legal schools as all the agnatic relatives of the killer, including minors. How much to 
compensate in each case is related to the status of the victim. The standard sum against which 
everything is valued is 100 camels or an equivalent sum of money, which is the diya for 
killing a free Muslim man. The value, for example, for a woman is 50 camels, the half of that 
of a man. In cases of wounding, the amount of diya to be paid depends on which limbs or 
organs are damaged. If there are several injuries, the sum is accumulative, and the amount to 
compensate may be greater than the full blood price of 100 camels. Despite these standards, 
the amount of diya is, however, negotiable between the litigants.
159
 
 
6.3.1.1 Camels and homicide – compensation and retaliation in al-Shabaab courts 
When it comes to court cases of bodily harm and murder tried by the al-Shabaab courts, I 
have at hand six accounts from informants who have been directly involved in criminal cases 
of this category; three cases of bodily harm and three of murder, five thereof having been 
settled by payment of diya, and one by qiṣāṣ. In addition, I have some eyewitness accounts 
from cases of murder and bodily harm. However, it is not possible to draw any general 
conclusions on this basis, but the cases give at least an indication of some distinctive trends. 
Each of the three wounding cases, for example, have been resolved by the payment of diya, 
and court proceedings follow to a large extent the pattern of the “Ayah”case: “Ayah” was 
brought before a court in Baardheere, in the Gedo province, accused of assault and for 
wounding a man’s forehead. As evidence the Ḥisbah brought one witness, the complainant, to 
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support the accusations, while the defendant did not bring any evidence to prove his 
innocence, but admitted to the accusations brought against him. By this, the question of guilt 
was determined, and the qāḍīs then asked the offended person whether he would prefer 
compensation or retaliation, of which he chose compensation, set by the qāḍīs at 300 USD.160   
The remaining two cases of bodily harm
161
 are similar to the “Ayah” case in the sense 
that the eyewitness testimonies supporting the accusations are the only kind of evidence 
presented during the court proceedings. However, in the “Ayah” case, the prosecutor only 
brought one witness, namely the complainant himself, a fact which hardly made him an 
impartial and thus reliable witness. In the other two cases several witnesses were presented in 
addition to the complainant, and at least in the case of “Mohamed Ahmad’s” son the 
witnesses seem to be reliable, adult men. However, all three cases of bodily harm conform to 
classical doctrine with regard to proving guilt as the accused admitted to the accusations 
brought against him. Both in the “Ayah” case and the case against “Mohamed Ahmed’s” son 
the aggrieved persons were given the opportunity to choose between compensation and 
retaliation. If they had chosen retaliation it would have meant that the victim would be 
allowed to inflict the same wound to the offender as he had suffered himself. However, in 
both cases the victim chose diya, something which, according to several of the informants, is 
generally the most preferred option among Somalis. “Hassan”, usually living in Mogadishu, 
gives an explanation: 
 
 The retaliation most of the time not used by the people, they are taking money. Because, if you… go 
 2005, start Islamic court up to now. We don’t have a one case that is… we don’t have one. Never. 
 Because the people, they like to get the money. Saying, “ok, I don’t like retaliation. I need…” Because, 
 if you cut this, the Islam is condemning one camel, or two camel. That is a lot of money. But if you cut 
 you finger, what I get? Just revenge. But it’s better for me to get two camel. It’s roughly two thousand 
 dollars.
162 
 
 This inclination to prefer diya to qiṣāṣ also comes to the fore in the “Mahmod” case 
where the clan elders, who were present in the court room during the trial, asked the qāḍīs, 
after the question of guilt was established, whether they could discuss the matter outside the 
court and come up with an agreement. The elders of both parties suggested that the victim, 
whose hand had been injured by the offender, should be paid a compensation of ten camels. 
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The qāḍīs accepted this agreement and sentenced accordingly.163 “Mohamed Ahmad” claims 
that this practice is widespread both in cases involving bodily harm as well as murder. As 
long as the complainant or his family does not demand retaliation, he asserts, the matter is 
usually discussed among the parties outside the court, and when an agreement is made, they 
go to the qāḍī to have it legalized.  
 It seems that retaliation is more common in cases of murder than in cases of bodily 
harm. In local media one can read several reports about murder cases in which the accused 
has faced the death penalty due to retaliation demanded by the victim’s relatives.164 Several 
cases have also been reported in al-Shabaab’s own press releases, such as the qiṣāṣ case of 
Nasser Hussain Ali Alias (26): In Mrach 2011, in the Maslah square on the outskirts of the 
animal market in Mogadishu, Nasser was executed in front of a huge crowd after allegedly 
having admitted to the killing of several persons.
165
According to two of the informants from 
Mogadishu, the Somalis, at least in Mogadishu, perceive retaliation as the proper punishment 
for intentional homicide. “Muhtab” explains: “But normally what happens in Somalia, people 
they don’t prefer diya [in murder cases]. If somebody kills, the relatives say: ‘We are going to 
kill.’ Because he killed. He has to feel the pain in fact. So, that’s what always happens in 
Mogadishu”. To emphasize this, he gives an example of a homicide case tried in Merka, 
Lower Shabelle, in 2009: in front of the qāḍīs a man admitted to having killed another man. 
The qāḍīs gave the relatives of the victims the choice between diya and qiṣāṣ. The relatives 
chose qiṣāṣ and the offender was subsequently killed. Although the qāḍīs gave the family of 
the victim a choice between diya and qiṣāṣ in this case, “Muhtab” believes most al-Shabaab 
qāḍīs to prefer qiṣāṣ in murder cases, at least in cases that involve persons who are not 
members of al-Shabaab. If an al-Shabaab member is accused of murder, “Muhtab” asserts, he 
will only be sentenced to pay diya,
166
 a claim that is also supported by a recent report from 
Marcal.
167
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  Of course, with only three court cases of homicide at hand, it is difficult to assess 
whether such claims represent a general trend. However, I have two relevant court cases at 
hand that may throw some light on the matter. In the first court case, which was tried in 
Beledweyne, Hiiran, the al-Shabaab administration admitted that some of their militiamen had 
killed an innocent citizen. The widow, ”Shamsa”, and other relatives of the deceased, were 
summoned to discuss the matter, whereupon they accepted the compensation of 15,000 USD 
to be paid by al-Shabaab.
168
 It may appear that the victim’s family was not given any real 
choice except to agree on the amount of diya.  
 The next case, however, shows that the judicial staff of al-Shabaab, at least in 
Kismayo, is willing to retaliate against their own recruits. This becomes obvious in the case of 
“Kora”. After having lost her boyfriend whom she wanted to marry, “Kora” went straight to 
the legal administration in Kismayo and accused a Ḥisbah official of having killed her 
boyfriend because the official himself had wanted her. As evidence she brought a voice 
recording of the official threatening her boyfriend just before the killing. The judicial staff 
arrested the Ḥisbah official and executed him. The details of the trial were unknown to 
“Kora”.169       
 Although this last case shows that al-Shabaab has been willing to retaliate against their 
own, the proceedings also display several breaches with classical doctrines. Firstly, the 
relatives of the deceased were not consulted of whether they preferred diya or qiṣāṣ. 
Secondly, the evidence “Kora” presented would not have fulfilled the classical requirements, 
which should have been two eyewitnesses. However, it might be that the perpetrator admitted 
to the crime during his trial, but this information is not available.      
 The third case of homicide in my material is the case of “Shankar”, which was tried in 
Dinsor, Bay. In contrast to the “Kora” case these court proceedings were in accordance with 
classical doctrine on several points: “Shankar”, who was brought before the court accused of 
murder, withdrew his confession previously given in prison. He claimed that he had confessed 
only to escape the torture he was exposed to. “Shankar” therefore stated in the court that he 
was not guilty of the charges brought against him, and explained that he had shot the victim 
accidentally after a quarrel about an old debt. In support of his claims “Shankar” brought 
several eyewitnesses that confirmed his account of what had taken place. The prosecutor did 
not have any other evidence apart from the previous confession. What happened next was that 
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the elders on both sides, like in the above-mentioned case of “Mahmod”, requested 
permission to solve the case outside the court. The qāḍīs allowed this, and the parties came up 
with an agreement that 7000 USD should be paid to the family of the deceased, an agreement 
that the qāḍīs acknowledged.170    
 This case conforms to classical doctrines in several respects. Firstly, the confession 
which was obtained prior to the court session and under alleged torture was perceived invalid. 
Secondly, the accused was allowed to bring eyewitnesses to support his claim, and thirdly, the 
parties were allowed to decide the diya, as retaliation was now, in accordance with the 
doctrine, out of the question, since accidental homicide may only be punished by diya. 
   
6.3.2 Ḥadd crimes – violation of God’s limits 
According to Wael B Hallaq, the pre-modern Islamic jurists were motivated by the maxim 
generated from a haḍīth text of the Prophet that the fixed ḥudūd punishments had to be 
“averted at the existence of the slightest doubt”. By using this as a starting point, the jurists 
outlined strict rules of evidence in addition to a great number of requirements that had to be 
fulfilled in order to be able to enforce a ḥadd punishment. This is especially evident in cases 
regarding adultery, robbery and theft as these cases are liable to the most severe punishment 
in the sacred texts. As a consequence these harsh punishments were in practice almost 
impossible to apply, and functioned first and foremost as means to deter the public from 
committing these crimes 
171
  
 Although a court case may be initiated by any Muslim, including the qāḍī himself, the 
classical regulations related to the ḥadd crimes clearly make it difficult for the courts to obtain 
a conviction: Firstly, the rules concerning evidence are even stricter than what is the case with 
qiṣāṣ. For example, a confession has to be explicit and precise in describing the unlawful 
action and only confessions made in court are valid in order to make sure that the confession 
is made voluntarily. Secondly, the qāḍī has to inform the accused about his rights to retract 
his confession at any time during the trial, until the moment of the execution of the 
punishment. A retraction will invalidate the conviction. The case is the same when it comes to 
testimony; a retraction of a testimony by a witness will nullify a sentence in a ḥadd case. 
Thirdly, the qāḍī has to drop the fixed ḥadd punishment in cases where there is uncertainty, 
shubba, regarding the facts, for example if a women accused of adultery claims to have been 
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impregnated during her sleep. There may also be uncertainty regarding details of the law, for 
example, if one steals from his child believing that one is entitled to their property.
172
 
 As a consequence of these strict rules, the most severe punishments, like stoning and 
amputations, were rarely applied in the pre-modern qāḍī courts. Instead, ḥadd cases were 
often tried in extra-sharī’a courts, such as the court of the shurṭa or the maẓālim court, as 
these courts were not bound by the strict rules of the fiqh doctrine, and could therefore take 
into consideration circumstantial evidence and issue other penalties like imprisonment or 
fines. Another way of treating such cases, as was frequently done in the Ottoman legal 
system, was that the qāḍī either issued punishments at his own discretion, or sentenced in 
accordance to the provisions of the so-called qānūn-name, i.e. decrees issued by the sultan 
that covered the area of criminal law, and which to a great extent came to regulate the work of 
the qāḍī. In this regard, a combination of lashing and fines became predominant also in ḥadd 
cases.
173
    
 In the al-Shabaab-dominated areas it seems that the jurisdiction of ḥadd crimes, like in 
the Ottoman legal system, belongs to a great extent to the qāḍī court. But contrastingly, the al-
Shabaab qāḍīs apply the fixed punishments quite frequently and seem not to be restricted by 
secular regulations like the qānūn-name. In many respects the al-Shabaab qāḍīs resemble the 
qāḍīs of the Saudi Arabian legal system, who enjoy wider jurisdiction in criminal cases, 
including ḥadd cases, than prescribed by the classical doctrines.174 However, although Saudi 
Arabia has frequently been critisized by human rights organizations for their application of 
ḥudūd punishments,175 the number of ḥudūd executions has been relatively low. According to 
Vogel’s detailed study of the Saudi judicial system during the 1980s and early 90s, the main 
reason is the strict procedures and requirements of fiqh. During the 11 years, from May 1981 
until April 1992, Vogel points out, in total there were four executions by stoning and forty-
five amputations for theft, an average of one stoning every three years and four hand-
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amputations each year.
176
 In comparison, although it is close to impossible to find the exact 
number of convictions and punishments in ḥadd cases in the al-Shabaab dominated areas,177 it 
seems that from October 2008 until June 2011 there were at least 8 executions by stoning
178
 
23 amputations due to theft
179
 and 15 amputations due to banditry,
180
 but the number might be 
higher due to monitoring difficulties. This gives an average of 3 stoning executions per year, 
almost 9 amputations due to theft and almost 6 amputations due to banditry per year, which is 
more than 8 times higher than the Saudi average in regards to stoning, and more than the 
double average number in regards to amputations due to theft. In addition to the probability of 
the numbers being even higher, the reported cases must also be compared to the total numbers 
of cases in the respective categories. For example, in Saudi Arabia from October 1982 to 
October 1983 there were 4,925 convictions for theft, of which two hands were amputated, 
while the rest were punished by ta’zīr punishments of lashing or imprisonment. Of 659 
convictions for adultery, sodomy, and sexual assault, no stoning was inflicted.
181
 By 
comparison, I only know about one adultery case from the al-Shabaab courts where the 
convicted has faced other punishment (ta’zīr) than the prescribed ḥadd punishment (stoning 
for married persons and 100 lashes for unmarried ones). Regarding theft and banditry cases, I 
do not know about any case where the convicted has faced other punishment than the 
prescribed ḥadd punishment (amputation). This lack of information does not necessarily mean 
that such cases do not exist. One possible explanation could be that executions by stoning and 
amputations are more spectacular and hence draw media attention. Even so, it may also be, as 
my material suggests, that such practice has been limited.   
 
6.3.2.1 Theft (sariqa) 
The ḥadd punishment for theft rests primarily on the Qu’ranic verse: “The thief, male or 
female, cut off their hand in retribution for what they have done, an exemplary punishment 
from God, for God is mighty and wise.”182 According to classical fiqh, steeling, or the 
unlawful removal of property (ghasb) are to be treated as a tort with civil remedies which may 
be resolved by returning the stolen goods, often in combination with discretionary punishment 
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(ta’zīr), i.e punishment decided by the qāḍī. Only under very special circumstances do the 
classical jurists sanction the ḥadd punishment for theft which prescribes amputation of the 
right hand, and for a second offence, the left foot. Sariqa (theft) is very narrowly defined by 
the classical jurists and hence difficult to apply: the act must be done surreptitiously, for 
example, during the night, and prior to the theft the stolen goods must have been properly 
stored or guarded, for example in a locked house or shop. Therefore, to snatch goods from a 
market stall in broad daylight cannot be regarded as theft according classical Islamic 
jurisprudence. Additionally, the stolen objects must exceed a minimum value, niṣāb, set to 
one quarter of a dinar. By the Māikī, Shāfi’ī and Ḥanbalī school this is set equal to the current 
market price of 1,06 grams of gold at the time of the theft. However, if the stolen object is 
partly owned by the perpetrator, the ḥadd punishment cannot be inflicted. Consequently, a 
shop assistant who takes away goods or money from the shop in which he works, or a soldier 
who steals war booty before it is divided, cannot be punished with amputation. In addition to 
these requirements, the ḥadd penalty cannot, for example, be inflicted on people stealing out 
of hunger, a provision made by the second Caliph, Umar Ibn al-Khattab’s (d. 644) who 
ordered the suspension of the prescribed ḥadd punishment during a famine, or if a thief 
returns the stolen property before the final judgment.
183
   
 When it comes to sariqa cases which are tried in the qāḍī courts of al-Shabaab, I have 
not been able to conduct interviews with anyone who has been directly involved in such a 
case. However, several of my informants have witnessed amputations for theft. In addition, it 
is possible to draw useful information from theft cases reported by media and others.  
 Several reports describe cases where the qāḍīs or other al-Shabaab officials claim the 
convict to have “admitted to the crime in front of an Islamic court”.184 However, such claims 
have been difficult to confirm, and according to several of my informants these claimed 
admissions only serve as means to legitimize the amputation, or they may imply that the 
convict has “admitted” in order to escapte torture, in line with what happened in the 
“Shankar” case mentioned above. Such notions are supported by the “Roble” case discussed 
below, where the chief qāḍī announced that the accused had admitted to the accusations. 
                                                          
183
 Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-first 
Century, pp. 55-57; Tahir Wasti, The Application of Islamic Criminal Law in Pakistan: Sharia in Practice, 
(Leiden: Brill, 2009), p. 32; Mohamed S. El-Awa, Punishment in Islamic Law: A Comparative Study, (Plainfield: 
American Trust Publications, 2000), pp. 3-4; Ahmed ibn Naqib Al-Misri, Reliance of the Traveller, (Beltsville: 
Amana Publications, 1994), p. 614. 
184
 See for example the Murshid Ahmed Adan and Hassan Omar Mohamed case or the Abdirashid Saleban 
Hamud described in Appendix 3.   
63 
 
However, “Roble” persistently denies to have committed the accused crimes, and maintaines 
that the punishment was a revenge for his refusing to join the al-Shabaab militia.
185
 Likewise, 
the brothers Sayeed and Osman Ibrahim, who faced cross-amputation (see below) after having 
been accused of banditry make similar claims, stating that their punishment was politically 
motivated.
186
 
 
                                    
       An amputated hand in front of the Qu’rān 
 
 If these accusations of unlawful proceedings are accurate, the theft cases presented in 
the al-Shabaab courts can hardly be called a trial, but rather a show. However, there is at least 
one theft case where conformity to classical prescriptions was displayed to some extent, 
namely the court case of a young man who was tried before a court in Mogadishu in late 
2008. According to my informant “Yusuf Osman”, who spoke with the boy after the 
amputation of his right arm, the boy was accused of breaking into a shop during the night 
stealing money and some other property. The prosecutor brought four witnesses who claimed 
to have seen him together with some other boys when breaking into the shop. Although the 
boy did not admit to the crime, the qāḍīs found the testimonies sufficient, and decided to 
inflict the fixed punishment for theft, i.e. amputation of the right arm.
187
 There is no 
information about the reliability of the witnesses but at least there were the prescribed number 
and type of witnesses. In addition, the theft took place during night time, and the shop was 
locked, all requirements outlined in classical doctrines. However, a point open to discussion, 
is whether or not the perpetrators acted out of necessity or hunger. South Central Somalia in 
general and Mogadishu in particular has been devastated by civil war since the beginning of 
                                                          
185
 Inteview with “Roble” conducted by the author in Norway, April 2011. 
186
 Australian Government: Refugee Review Tribunal, Country Advice Somalia: Somalia – SOM37002 –
Amputations – Al-Shabaab – Clans – Recruitment, (9 July 2010), www.mrt-
rrt.gov.au/ArticleDocuments/177/som37002.pdf.aspx, [12.09.2011], p. 2. 
187
 Interview with “Yusuf Osman” conducted by the author in Nairobi, October 2010. 
64 
 
the 1990’s. Additionally, Al-Shabaab has banned many international humanitarian aid 
agencies from working inside their territories,
188
 and forcing collection of taxes to finance the 
group’s ongoing war,189 and as such left the population to live on the margins. Thus one could 
argue that to apply the prescribed ḥadd punishment when the offence could have been done 
out of necessity or hunger, is a breach with classical doctrines.  
 Another requirement which is outlined in classical fiqh is the minimum value, niṣāb.  
The level of niṣāb as described in classical doctrines, 1,06 grams of gold, is today equivalent 
to 61 USD.
190
 This minimum value cannot serve as a standard today, argues Mohamed S. El-
Awa, legal advisor at the Arab Bureau of Education for the Gulf States. In his opinion it is the 
duty of the lawmakers in each country to decide the minimum value.
191
 For example, the 
Pakistani Offences Against Property Ordinance of 1979 set the niṣāb to 4.457 grams of 
gold,
192
 today being equivalent to approximately 257 USD.
193
 What is the level of niṣāb in the 
courts of al-Shabaab? In the above-mentioned court case, the stolen items were money and 
some other objects which value is naturally difficult to assess. In the other reported
194
 theft 
cases the value of the stolen goods varies: 1:clothes from a laundry, 2: Three sacks containing 
fishing nets, 3: 10 pairs of trousers, 10 shirts, eight other items and a bag, estimated to be 
worth 90USD, 4: a cow 5: 100 USD, 6: 7000 USD a loan not repaid, 7: several cell phones, 8: 
matresses and some other domestic items, 9: 45 million Somali shillings, estimated to be 
worth 1400 USD, 10: two million Somali shillings, estimated to be worth 60 USD, 11: money 
estimated to be worth 30 USD. 
 While some items are quite valuable, e.g. a cow and fishing nets, others have quite low 
value, like the clothes, the mattresses and the other domestic items. Although one cannot draw 
general conclusions from this material, it shows that there have been several convictions for 
theft of objects with significantly lower value than the 4,457 grams of gold as prescribed in 
the Pakistani Ordinance, as well as the value of the niṣāb set by the classical legal schools, 
taken into consideration the current value of gold.   
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  Although the qāḍīs in the above-mentioned theft case from late 2008 seem to have 
roughly followed the regulations prescribed in classical fiqh doctrine, there are other cases 
that indicate more serious deviances from the doctrine. For example, in a case tried for the 
court at the Bakara market in Mogadishu, a man was sentenced to amputation after being 
convicted of not paying back a business loan. According to my informant “Abu Mahmod”, 
the accused had received 7000 USD from the complainant as a loan in order to start his own 
business. However, the accused spent all the money and denied having received any loan at 
all. The complainant went to court and when the trial started, she brought one witness who 
claimed to have been present and to have witnessed the transaction of the money. The qāḍīs 
found this to be sufficient evidence and hence rendered the verdict.
195
  
 When it comes to niṣāb (the minimum value of stolen goods required in ḥadd cases) 
the sum of 7000 USD is naturally far above any minimum requirement. This fact disregarded, 
the case breaches with classical doctrine: failing to pay back a loan is not regarded as proper 
theft and the case therefore falls entirely outside the classical definitions of sariqa. In a 
classical manual of the Shāfi’ī scholar Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri (d. 1368) it is explicitly 
stated that there could be no amputation in cases where the offender is “appropriating 
something by disavowal, i.e. denying that the victim loaned or entrusted him with such and 
such a thing.”196  
 
6.3.2.2 Banditry (al-ḥirāba)  
The minimum requirement for the ḥadd crime of banditry, al-ḥirāba,197 outlined by the 
classical jurists, is to show a drawn weapon in order to frighten people travelling on a public 
road and to prevent them from continuing on their journey. In addition, the offenders have to 
be superior in strength so that the victims cannot escape. If property is taken and/or the 
victims are killed, the punishments will be more serious. According to all the legal schools 
except from the Māikī school, the punishment is banishment or imprisonment until 
repentance. If the offence consists of taking away property with a minimum value, niṣāb, 
equal to the requirement for theft, the culprits will be punished by cross-amputation, right arm 
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and left foot. In cases of murder, the offenders will be killed. If both murder and plunder has 
taken place, the bandits will be killed and thereafter crucified.
198
   
 When it comes to banditry cases tried in the qāḍīs court of al-Shabaab, I am only 
aware of eight court cases, with a total number of 15 amputations between June 2009 and 
April 2011: 13 cross-amputations, one amputation of the right arm, and only one of the left 
foot.
199
 Although the information concerning the cases is limited, there seems to be some 
correspondence between the accusations and the punishment enforced: robbery in terms of 
holding-up and stealing shall, according to classical doctrine, be punished with amputation of 
the right arm and left foot. In five of the eight cases, the al-Shabaab qāḍīs are reported to have 
announced that the convicts have admitted to the crimes in front of the court.
200
 However, as 
already mentioned above, the story of “Roble”, one of four boys who were cross-amputated in 
June 2009 in Mogadishu, and likewise, the Ibrahim brothers who faced cross-amputation in 
October 2009 in Kismayo, suggest that one should not necessarily regard claimed admissions 
to be true.     
 The story of “Roble” is illustrating: he was arrested in the end of May in Mogadishu 
and imprisoned. On June 22, 2009 after more than three weeks in prison he was brought to the 
square at Maslah, an old military parade ground, on the outskirts of the animal market in 
Mogadishu, together with three other boys. Seated in front of them were several top leaders of 
al-Shabaab as well as one of the high ranking qāḍīs named Dahir Ga’may. As “evidence” this 
chief qāḍī only showed some pistols and mobile phones to the huge crowd gathered there and 
announced that all four were spies and bandits that according to sharī’a law had to be cross-
amputated. In addition, “Muhtab”, one of my other informants who was present during this 
trial claims that the qāḍī announced that the accused already had admitted to the crime.201 
Neither “Roble” nor the other alleged offenders were given the opportunity to speak. Three 
days later, at the same square, the cross-amputation of the four youngsters was executed 
without any pain relief. Then, after four nights, a leading al-Shabaab official, Fu’ad Shangole, 
came to the house where the boys were held in custody and claimed that the legs were 
amputated too low. Using a plumber’s saw he cut off their legs three fingerbreadths up from 
the stump without giving them any kind of pain relief.  
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 Besides the amount of suffering that this punishment entails, there are several striking 
features about this case which makes it seem more like a show than a proper trial. Firstly, the 
public was reportedly ordered to come and witness the punishment of the “bandits and spies” 
or else face lashing themselves.
202
 Secondly, the qāḍīs are reported to have announced that the 
four boys had admitted to the crime. However, contrary to the qāḍīs’ claim, “Roble” insists 
that he never admitted to any crime. Thirdly, the circumstantial evidence, the mobiles and 
pistols which had allegedly been stolen, would of course not, according to classical doctrine, 
have been valid in a banditry case, and, in addition, this “evidence” would anyway not have 
been necessary if the accused had actually admitted to the crime, as the qāḍīs claimed. 
Therefore, the mobiles and pistols gave a dramatic twist to the trial and helped convince the 
public, rather than serving as de facto evidence. Fourthly, the accused were not given a 
chance to defend themselves. Fifthly, since the boys were accused of both robbery and 
espionage, one would expect them to face the type of punishment corresponding to the most 
serious accusation, namely capital punishment rather than cross-amputation, as death sentence 
seems to be the normal punishment for espionage (discussed below) among the al-Shabaab 
qāḍīs as well as the prescribed punishment for espionage according to classical doctrine. 203  
 My view of this trial as a show case finds additional support in the announcement 
made by the official al-Shabaab spokesman, Ali Mohamed Rage, to the local journalists who 
were present at the square before the execution. He explained that this punishment was “a 
warning to all thieves”, and that “if they [the journalists] are caught red-handed in similar 
circumstances, they will face amputation”.204  As such, this case, and probably some or all of 
the other similar cases, could therefore give an indication of al-Shabaab’s crime policy. They 
want to use punishment as a crime preventive measure and occationally stage large public 
trials to set an example in order to deter others from committing similar crimes. However, this 
appears to be only a part of the explanation. As “Roble” points out, the court case was indeed 
set up to punish the accused, although, not for espionage and robbery. He believes that he was 
punished because he refused to join al-Shabaab and instead prefered to focuse on his school 
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work. Similarly, as already noted, the Ibrahim brothers make quite similar claims, asserting 
that they were tried and punished for political reasons.
205
   
 
6.3.2.3 Unlawful sexual intercourse (zinā) 
The ḥadd punishment for unlawful sexual intercourse, zinā, rests on the notion that sexual 
intercourse is only permitted within a marriage. However, the ḥadd penalty, i.e. 100 lashes for 
non-married individuals and death by stoning for married individuals, according to classical 
fiqh doctrines, may only be applied under special circumstances. Punishment by stoning can 
only be used when the person is free, Muslim and previously married, or is married at the time 
of the offence. In addition, there are specific requirements regarding evidence with even 
stricter rules than for the other ḥadd crimes: While two eyewitnesses are required in the other 
ḥadd crimes, four male eyewitnesses actually observing, not only the act itself, but also the 
actual penetration, are required in zinā cases. The other valid evidence is a confession by the 
accused, which according to the Ḥanaīi and Ḥanbalī school, must be repeated four times in 
court. Circumstantial evidence is generally not valid as evidence, except in cases, according to 
the Māikī school, where an unmarried woman has become pregnant. However, if the 
pregnancy is due to rape, she will not be punished, as this happened under duress (ikrāh). But, 
if she claims to have been raped, she has to produce circumstantial evidence herself in order 
to defend the claim, for example that she came back to her village screaming for help. 
However, if she claims to have been impregnated during sleep, being unaware of what 
happened to her, any corroboration is unnecessary.
206
 
 The only stoning cases in al-Shabaab controlled territories that I am aware of, are the 
ones reported by local media and NGOs/GOs. One of them is corroborated by one of my 
informants, namely the famous Aisha case, where a 13 year old girl was stoned to death in 
Kismayo, on October 27, 2008. This happened reportedly after she had gone to the local 
Ḥisbah (police) to report that she had been raped by three al-Shabaab militiamen. Instead of 
punishing them, the local officials sentenced and punished the girl with stoning, although she 
seems to have been unmarried, a victim of rape and according to some reports, mentally 
unstable, all of which would contradict stoning due to zinā if considering classical 
prescriptions. According to witnesses, she even tried to escape at the time of execution, 
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something which makes it probable that she would have wanted to retract her admission of 
zinā, i. e. rape, if she had been informed of this opportunity by the qāḍīs.207 
 Due to little information about zinā cases, as well as other stoning cases, it is difficult 
to say anything certain about how these trials are conducted and what happens inside the court 
during these trials. However, some of my informants have detailed knowledge about zinā 
cases in which the convicts have faced lashing because of their unmarried status. Five of my 
informants have themselves been directly involved in such a case, either as defendant or as 
complainant, providing me with enough information to be able to throw some light on the 
applied procedure and evidence. Especially striking in most of these cases is the fact that the 
qāḍīs have passed sentences based on circumstantial evidence, in the sense that they sanction 
witness testimonies which do not fulfill the fiqh requirements. This indicates that the al-
Shabaab qāḍīs are much more lenient to procedural fiqh prescriptions than for example qāḍīs 
in Saudi Arabia.
208
 “Fatima”, who used to live in Mogadishu, describes a case that was tried 
in the court at the animal market, Suuqa Holaha, in Mogadishu: two young unmarried cousins 
were accused of zinā by an al-Shabab militiaman. After having seen one of the accused, a 
young boy, leaving a house late at night, the militiaman soon found out that the boy had been 
staying in the house with the other accused, a young lady. The militiaman arrested them, and 
they were soon brought before the court. The only witness heard during the trial was the 
militiaman who arrested them. Neither of the accused confessed to the crime of zinā, rather, 
they explained that they were cousins and therefore innocent of the alleged crime. Despite 
this, the qāḍīs sentenced the girl to 100 lashes, the prescribed punishment for zinā, while the 
boy was imprisoned for 3 months.
209
 In view of the lack of evidence, as well as absence of 
any admission of the crime, one may wonder how the court could sentence the accused in the 
manner they did. Firstly, the girl was sentenced to ḥadd punishment for unlawful fornication 
and received 100 lashes, while the boy received a discretionary punishment: imprisonment for 
3 months. One possible explaination is that this case was rejected as a ḥadd case, and tried as 
a ta’zīr case (i.e. cases that fall outside the categories of ḥadd, qiṣāṣ and diya) where the qāḍīs 
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may choose the proper punishment, whereupon the qāḍīs sentenced the girl to similar 
punishment as the fixed ones. However, there are several other examples of similar cases 
where the qāḍīs have sentenced the accused to 100 lashes after hearing only witness 
testimonies that fail to fulfill the classical requirements. For example, in the case of “Fuad”, 
tried in one of the Mogadishu courts, both he and the woman were sentenced to 100 lashes 
after being observed in the same car at the beach by some al-Shabaab militiamen who were 
guarding the area. As witnesses the prosecutor brought two men who had been there at the 
time of the arrest. But, as in the other case, the witnesses had not seen the actual penetration, 
or even the sexual act, and as well the accused denied the accusations.
210
 Also, the “Aisha” 
case which was tried in Beledweyne, Hiiran, and the “Ayan” case tried in Mogadishu, exhibit 
similar features, the witness testimonies failing to fulfill the classical requirements.
211
  
 However, my material also contains the “Elmi” case, which is different from the other 
zinā cases, as “Elmi” and his girlfriend admitted to the crime in front of the qāḍīs after having 
heard the witness testimonies of the girl’s uncle and some neighbors (although the witnesses 
did not see the actual penetration). As such, the sentence of 100 lashes given to both was in 
accordance with the prescribed provisions. This is the only case known to me where the ḥadd 
punishment for zinā is applied on basis of sufficient evidence as prescribed in the fiqh-
doctrines.
212
  
 
6.3.2.4 Unfounded accusation of unlawful intercourse (qadhf) 
In addition to the strict requirements already mentioned in connection with zinā (adultery), 
there is another factor that could further restrict the number of ḥudūd punishments, namely the 
prescribed punishment for unfounded accusation of unlawful intercourse (qadhf) which is 80 
lashes. This means that if one accuses another person of zinā without bringing four reliable 
witnesses, the complainant will risk being punished with 80 lashes. Also, if a witness 
testimony is deemed by the qāḍī not to fulfill the fiqh requirements, for example that it is 
inconsistent with other testimonies, or fails to describe the penetrating act, the witness may 
receive the same punishment (80 lashes) and lose the right to testify again until he repents, or 
according to the Ḥanafī school, lose the right to testify for the rest of his life. As such, the 
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crime of qadhf is thus a powerful deterrent against giving false accusations or testimonies in 
court.
213
  
 As none of the witnesses in the abovementioned zinā cases actually saw the 
penetration, or even the sexual act, they would according to the fiqh provisions be guilty of 
the ḥadd crime of qadhf. The same is the case with the complainants who in none of the cases 
could present sufficient evidence to support the serious accusations. However, neither the 
complainants nor the witnesses were punished. 
  I also have another case in my material that displays the al-Shabaab qāḍīs’ reluctance 
to apply the ḥadd crime of qadhf (unfounded accusations of unlawful intercourse), namely the 
case of “Kora” which was brought before a court in Mogadishu: “Kora” was raped by a 
Ḥisbah official after having refused his advances several times. When he raped her, he 
threatened her with a pistol and said he would shoot her if she shouted. However, as soon as 
he had left, she started screaming, and the neighbors saw the official, a man they knew, 
leaving the place. But when “Kora” brought the case to the court it was dismissed due to lack 
of evidence when none of the neighbors dared to meet to witness, fearing retaliations from al-
Shabaab.
214
      
 The court’s decision to dismiss her case follows the requirements of classical doctrine, 
but at the same time, the qāḍīs diverge from classical doctrine in terms of not punishing 
“Kora” with 80 lashes for unfounded accusations of zinā (qadhf).  
 
6.3.2.5 Alcohol consumption and drug usage – the ḥadd crime of khamr? 
To drink wine, shurb al-khamr, or to consume alcoholic beverages or other forms of 
intoxicating substances is, according to classical doctrines, a ḥadd crime. The Shāfi’ī school 
holds that this violation should be punished with 40 lashes, while the other schools say 80 
lashes. The strict rules of evidence which are manifest in the other ḥadd crimes are also 
applied to cases of khamr. However, according to Ḥanbalī and Māikī doctrine two 
eyewitnesses claiming that the accused reeked of alcohol is sufficient proof.
215
   
 When it comes to cases of alcohol consumption and drug usage, I only have detailed 
knowledge of four cases which have been tried in al-Shabaab courts:  
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1. “Omar” was tried in Baidoa, Bay, for smoking hashish and sentenced to 80 lashes and 
a fine of 3 million Somali shillings.
216
 
2. “Farah” was tried in Merka, Lower Shabelle, for drinking alcohol and sentenced to 80 
lashes and a fine of 3 million Somali shillings.
217
 
3. “Abdow” was tried in Afgoye, Lower Shabelle, for smoking tobacco in his car and 
resisting his arrest. He was sentenced to 6 mounths in jail.
218
 
4. “Nadif” was tried in Bardheere, Gedo, for chewing khat in his home and for having 
stored pornographic content on his mobile phone. He was sentenced to 30 lashes and 
to swallow the memory card of his mobile phone.
219
   
 
 In seems apparent that the al-Shabaab qāḍīs have treated the above-mentioned cases of 
theft, banditry and adultery as ḥadd crimes taken into consideration the fact that they, in 
almost all cases, have applied the prescribed ḥudūd punishments corresponding with the 
crime. However, when it comes to alcohol consumption and drug usage, it is difficult to draw 
any conclutions in this regard, but it may seem that consumption of alcohol and smoking of 
hasish are conceived as ḥadd crimes (khamr) while smoking of tobacco and chewing of khat 
are perceived as an ordinary crime (ta’zīr) (discussed below). This is based on the fact that 
both “Omar” and “Farah” received a punishment of 80 lashed (and 3 million Somali shillings) 
which is the prescribed ḥadd punishment for shrub al-khamr (consumption of alcohol) by the 
Ḥanafī, Māikī and Ḥanbalī schools. In contrast, neither “Abdow” nor “Nadif” have received 
the prescribed ḥadd punishment (80 lashes, or 40 lashes according to the Shāfi’ī school). 
Also, there is another factor to this: “Abdow” was initially arrested for smoking tobacco in his 
car instead of a designated smoking zone, where one can smoke legally. Similarily, “Nadif” 
was not arrested for chewing khat per se, but for doing this at home instead of inside a 
chewing zone. As such, both tobacco and khat are legal if used according to al-Shabaab’s 
regulations. If al-Shabaab had viewed usage of these drugs as a ḥadd crime, i.e. an offence 
against the claim’s of God, it would maybe also have been difficult for them to legitimize its 
usage, even in restricted forms.  
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 However, there is no distinction between the two supposed ḥadd crimes and the two 
other crimes when it comes to evidence. In three of the four cases the evidence brought before 
the court by the Ḥisbah is of circumstantial nature. In “Omar” case, the evidence was the 
hashish smoked by “Omar” at the time of arrest; in the “Farah” case, the evidence was five 
bottles of alcohol that the Ḥisbah found when searching his house; in the “Nadif” case, the 
eveidence was the khat that the Ḥisbah found in his house. Only in the case of “Abdow”, there 
was brought witnesses who saw the incident as evidence in the court. However, only “Farah” 
persistently denied the accusations claiming that the alcohol was not his, while the three other 
men admitted to the accusations after the evidence had been brought before the court. 
   
6.3.3 Ta’zīr and siyāsa 
Ta’zīr (“prevention” or “correction”) and siyāsa (“policy” or “conduct of affairs”) are, 
according to classical legal doctrines, residual categories of criminal cases which include 
cases that fall outside the categories of qiṣāṣ, diya and ḥadd crimes, either because they do not 
fulfill the narrow legal definitions of these categories, or for procedural reasons, for example 
lack of sufficient evidence. All cases of sinful or socially and politically undesirable behavior 
are included in the broad categories of ta’zīr and siyāsa. When these cases are brought to trial 
there are fewer restrictions regarding procedures and evidence, and it is up to the court to 
decide the proper punishment. This makes ta’zīr and siyāsa cases more flexible: for example 
in a case of theft, there may be plausible reasons to believe that the accused is guilty of the 
crime. But even though the case may fail to fulfill the strict requirements of the ḥadd crime, 
the court may instead decide to try it as a ta’zīr or siyāsa case. According to classical 
doctrines, the qāḍī or other executive officials may in that case make use of circumstantial 
evidence, for example assumptions based on a person’s reputation, and thereby a person may 
be convicted because he has a reputation for keeping company with thieves. Or, when it 
comes to other types of sinful behavior, for example extramarital sex, it may be sufficient 
evidence if a man is observed entering a house of a woman of bad reputation and staying there 
for some time. Although this fails to fulfill the strict recuirements of zinā (adultery), it may 
anyway be regarded as a punishable offence. This lack of restrictions in the fiqh literature 
leaves ample room for the court to practice law but offers little legal protection to the 
accused.
220
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 Classical fiqh emphasizes that the main objective of discretionary punishment 
applicable by the court is to prevent the offender from repeating the offence. As such, 
retribution and deterrence are two principles that come into consideration when punishment is 
meted out. It may range from reprimand, flogging, public rebuke, banishment and 
imprisonment to death penalty. Except from the Māikītes which prescribe amputation of the 
right hand for the forging of documents, no corporal punishment apart from flogging is 
allowed. The jurists of the different law schools have tried to restrict the discretionary powers 
of the qāḍīs and other officials, but they have only to a small extent reached general 
consensus. The legal schools, except the Māikī school, suggest that the number of lashes 
should be less than the ḥadd punishments. However, they don’t agree on the exact number. 
There have also been controversies among the legal schools whether to allow capital 
punishment in these cases. The general accepted view is that death penalty may be given in 
serious cases, such as those of homicide (when falling outside the category of qiṣāṣ), spying 
for the enemy, spreading of heresy, repeated homosexual activity and sorcery.
221
 
 Like the category of ta’zīr, cases in the category of siyāsa, are meted out at the qāḍīs’ 
or other executing officials’ discretion on the basis of simple procedures without formal 
provisions concerning evidence. However, although ta’zīr and siyāsa sometimes is used as 
synonyms, they are different concepts. Ta’zīr cases include offences which are forbidden by 
sharī’a, while siyāsa cases involve acts which endanger public order or public interest. A 
major difference is that ta’zīr punishments are designed to reform the offender. In contrast the 
rationale behind a siyāsa punishment is to protect public interest, i. e. to protect society from 
persons whose acts constitute a danger to law and order (fitna). For example, according to 
Ḥanafī doctrine, a habitual criminal may be sentenced to death in a siyāsa crime because his 
acts may be perceived to lead to corruption of the land. However, the line between these 
concepts is blurred: on the one hand the ruler may deem any act punishable if he defines it as 
harmful to the interest of society. On the other hand the jurists may deem the same act a sin in 
the sense that it represents disobedience to the ruler’s legitimate command. As such, the 
difference between ta’zīr and siyāsa is their starting point; while ta’zīr have the sacred texts 
as starting point, siyāsa cases have a concrete and pragmatic starting point, something which 
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makes siyāsa a category suitable for the “secular” authorities, such as the maẓālim court and 
the shurṭa.222 
 
6.3.3.1 From drug dealing to speeding  
The terms “ta’zīr” and “siyāsa” may not be part of daily usage in the al-Shabaab courts as my 
informants do not refer to them. Nevertheless, I choose to apply them since they are implicitly 
in use in the al-Shabaab court system in terms of being a distinct category constituting all 
other criminal offences than murder, bodily harm and the ḥadd crimes. In contrast to these 
categories where the al-Shabaab qāḍīs to a great extent seem to apply the puishments that are 
prescribed in the doctrines of fiqh, the residual offences seem to be punished according to the 
qāḍī’s discretion, allowing him to use a wide range of puishments, such as fines, lashing, 
imprisonment or banishment. 
 Although there are several cases related to drug dealing, most of my material consists 
of one or two cases of a wide range of offences e.g. releasing sensitive information about al-
Shabaab, watching sex movies and football, speeding and accusations of espionage.
223
 Due to 
the limited number of cases, and particularly similar kind of cases, it is difficult to discover 
any general trends or consistency regarding related cases. However, the proceedings in this 
broad category of cases seem at least to follow the same pattern: the accused is arrested by the 
Ḥisbah either on suspicions stemming from the Ḥisbah themselves or by another civilian. The 
accused stays in prison for some days or weeks, often exposed to torture, mostly beating, until 
the accused is brought before the court. During the trial the prosecutor, mostly a 
representative of the Ḥisbah, presents evidence in support of the charge. After hearing what 
the accused has to say in his defense, the qāḍīs render a verdict, which in the majority of cases 
is enforced almost immediately. There are two major trends where evidence is concerned. 
Either one or several witnesses support the accusations, or the court is presented with 
circumstantial evidence, for example objects related to the alleged crime. An example of the 
first trend is the“Abu Mohamed” case, tried in the provincial court at the Bakara market, 
Mogadishu. “Abu Mohamed” was accused of speaking to foreign al-Shabaab fighters despite 
having been warned not to while giving them lessons about the Qu’rān. During the trial the 
prosecutor brought one witness, one of the foreign students of the class who testified that he 
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had heard “Abu Mohamed” trying to speak to them. He was sentenced to bring back some 
young refugee girls he had previously helped to flee in order for al-Shabaab to marry them to 
their young fighters.
224
 The other trend is illustrated by the “Ahmad” case, tried in a court in 
Bu’ale, Lower Shabelle, where “Ahmad” was accused of watching sex videos on his mobile 
phone. As evidence the Ḥisbah presented his mobile phone containing the pornographic 
materal, whereupon he was sentenced to 50 lashes and a fine of 2000 USD.
225
  
 Since classical fiqh doctrines give few restrictions when it comes to evidence in 
ta’zīr/siyāsa cases, my material show few- if any- clear breaches with classical jurisprudence 
in these cases. There are even some court cases in which the accused is released because the 
qāḍīs find the evidence insufficient. An example is the “Kadra Ahlo” case, tried in 
Mogadishu. “Kadra Ahlo” was accused of hiding and refusing to return a small bag which had 
been thrown into her shop by some Ḥisbah officials. In court the Ḥisbah officials said that 
they didn’t need any witnesses, as they were absolutely certain that they had thrown the bag 
into the shop. “Kadra Ahlo” explained that she had seen the bag, but due to ongoing fighting 
between al-Shabaab and the TFG in the area at that time, she had been afraid that it might 
contain explosives and thrown the bag away. The qāḍīs decided to release “Kadra Ahlo” 
because the Ḥisbah officials had failed to tell her that the bag was their property, a fatal 
mistake especially when taking the uncertain situation in Mogadishu into consideration.
226
    
 The punishments in ta’zīr/siyāsa cases vary from fines, lashing and imprisonment to 
banishment and expropriation of property. None of the respondents have said anything about 
corporal punishment except lashing, which seems to be the preferred form of punishment in 
casese related to drug dealing: 
1. “Ahmad”- Bu’ale, Middle Shabelle - 50 lashes and 2000 USD for selling hashish.227 
2. “Haliima” – Kismayo, Lower Jubba - 40 lashes and two weeks in jail for selling 
khat.
228
 
3.  “Yusuf” – Beledweyne; Hiiran - 80 lashes, five months in jail and expropriation of 
his shop to al-Shabaab for selling hashish.
229
 
4. “Abdullahi Ali” – Mogadishu - 40 lashes and three months in jail for selling 
hashish.
230
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5. “Ali Mohamad” – Kismayo, Lower Jubba - 40 lashes and four months in jail for 
selling hashish.
231
 
 
 According to the fiqh prescriptions of the legal schools, except the Māikī school, the 
number of lashes should not exceed the fixed number of lashes of the ḥudūd punishments. 
However, there is some disagreement concerning this: as some claims that the maximum is 10 
lashes, basing their argument on a haḍīth stating: “No one is to be flogged with more than ten 
lashes except in the case of ḥadd crimes”. According to some Shāfi’ītes, 39 is the highest 
number, i. e. one less than the number prescribed by the Shāfi’īt school for khamr, while other 
Shāfi’ītes and some Ḥanbalītes assert that the number of lashes should be relative to the 
comparable ḥadd crime which is related to the ta’azir crime, i. e. 39 for the Shāfi’ītes or 79 
for the Ḥanbalītes in khamr (alcohol/drug) related crimes. In my material there is no case 
where the punishment exceeds 100 lashes, which is the highest prescribed number for ḥadd 
cases, namely in zinā cases where the offender is unmarried. The “Yusuf” case listed above, 
where the punishment was set at 80 lashes for drug dealing equals the number of lashes 
prescribed by the Ḥanafī, the Ḥanbalī and the Māikī schools for drinking alcohol. 80 lashes 
was also the sentence in the khamr (alcohol/drug) cases of “Omar” and “Farah” which were 
discussed when treating the ḥadd crime of khamr. In contrast, in three other drug dealing 
cases, namely the “Haliima”, the “Abdullahi Ali” and the “Ali Mohamad” case, the number of 
lashes equals the prescribed number of lashes in the ḥadd crime of khamr in the Shāfi’ī 
school, i. e. 40. Whether this is a dominating trend regarding drug dealing cases, and the 
punishment of 80 lashes given in the court in Beledweyne, is an exception, is hard to assess. It 
may also be that this indicates influence from different legal schools in regards to this issue, 
as the courts in Kismayo and Mogadish have sentenced drug dealers to 40 lashes. However, 
this hypothesis does not explain the number of 50 lashes given in the “Ahmad” case, nor does 
it explain why “Laban” who was accused and tried in a court of Beledweyne, Hiiran, for 
selling alcohol was sentenced to have his vehicle confiscated instead of being lashed.
232
  
   As indicated in the list above, additional punishments such as imprisonment, fines 
and expropriation is usual. This is a result of the extensive discretionary powers of the qāḍī in 
ta’zīr/siyāsa cases. The same applies to the form and level of punishment, although there are 
different opinions within the legal schools regarding fines and expropriation, in fact only the 
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Māikī school allows it unanimously.233 As such the punishments given in the above-
mentioned cases, as well as in the additional ta’zīr cases of my informants, seem in general 
not to diverge from classical provisions regarding ta’zīr. 
 
6.3.3.2 Espionage 
Espionage for the enemy is one of the few ta’zīr crimes that according to the classical jurists 
should be punished with death, and according to my material it seems that al-Shabaab 
complies with classical doctrine in this regard. There are numerous media and NGOs/GOs’ 
reports as well as witness testimonies from my informants about executions of Somalis being 
accused of spying for the US, the Ethiopians, AMISOM or the TFG. “Adan”, who used to live 
in Mogadishu, reports, for example, that a man who was brought to a court in the Deyniile 
district of Mogadishu, was accused for helping the TFG and AMISOM to point out where to 
fire their mortars. During the trial he was sentenced to death and subsequently shot by masked 
executioners in front of a large crowd. According to “Adan”, execution by shooting, 
preferably in front of large audience, is the normal way al-Shabaabs deal with espionage 
convicts.
234
 This claim finds support in local media coverage. For example, Adil Mohamed 
Hussein (21) and Abas Mohammed Abukar (19) were reportedly shot several times in the 
head at a public execution in Deyniile, Mogadishu. The qāḍī, whose name was only referred 
to as Omar, claimed according to the report that the boys had spied for the “apostate 
government”. Consequently, they were executed by three masked men in front of hundreds of 
people.
235
 However, none of these reports on public executions say anything about what 
happened inside the court room during the trials. One obvious reason for this lack of 
information is that most of the accused are shot dead. In addition, according to “Adan”, the 
local journalists do not have access to the accused, either before or during the trial.   
 However, my material includes four interviews with informants who have been 
brought before the court accused of espionage, and may throw some light on this issue: 
“Haji”, was brought before a court in Mogadishu accused of spying and working for the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The accusations had been brought to al-Shabaab by 
his wife.  “Haji” was arrested and beaten for seven days before he was brought before the 
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court. The evidence against him consisted of the testimony of his wife, stating that he was a 
spy, a claim that was strengthen by the fact that his brother was a major in the TFG army. 
“Haji”, however, did not admit to being a spy. Instead he claimed that his wife was jealous of 
his second wife. During his testimony he also explained that his sympathies were different 
from those of his brother. Due to lack of evidence, the qāḍīs decided to postpone the case for 
two weeks. Instead of going back to custody, “Haji” was released, probably because two of 
his relatives, one of them working for al-Shabaab, guaranteed to bring him back for the trial. 
However, before the case was brought up again, “Haji” managed to flee Somalia. Although he 
was lucky and could escape, both his relatives were killed because they broke their promise 
and failed to bring “Haji” to court.236  
 
     
                 Execution of an alleged spy by shooting 
  
 In case number two, “Asad”, also tried in a court in Mogadishu, was accused of 
“working for the enemy”, more precisely that he had a contract with the TFG for renovation 
works on the parliament building. As evidence the Ḥisbah brought documents which had been 
found in “Asad’s” shop and showed details of the contract with the TFG. Although he 
recognized the contract and confirmed that it was his, “Asad” claimed that he only made the 
work for the TFG as a business man, emphasizing that he had nothing to do with them. In 
addition, he also stated that he had supported al-Shabaab economically. The qāḍīs 
acknowledged this, but reminded him that his connection with the “enemy”/the TFG also 
made him an enemy. Therefore they adjudicated that all his wealth was to be transferred to al-
Shabaab. Except from this, he was free to go.
237
  
 In the third case, “Nadifa” was brought before a court in Jowhar, Middle Shabelle, due 
to accusations of espionage. This happened at the same day as she was arrested, and neither 
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witnesses nor any other evidence was brought before the court to support the accusations. She 
told the qāḍīs that she probably was accused for this crime because her son, who had 
forcefully been recruited to al-Shabaab, had fleed. But she persistently denied having 
anything to do with this incident, and she reminded the qāḍīs that she already had lost one son 
while he was fighting for al-Shabaab. The qāḍīs then dismissed the case due to insufficient 
evidence.
238
 
 The last case at hand, the “Dalmar” case mentioned earlier, is exceptional in terms of 
being the only case in my material which has been tried by what appears to be a military 
court. Working with a Somali NGO, “Dalmar” was arrested in Merka, Lower Shabelle, by 
masked men whom he believed to be officials from the feared intelligence services, 
Amniyaat.  He was held a prisoner somewhere in the wilderness for 8 months, was 
continually tortured and interrogated, and repeatedly told that he was a spy. After eight 
months he was brought before three masked men who questioned him further, but finally 
released him, telling him that they had mistaken him for someone else.
239
    
 These four cases, even though they are different in some regards, indicate that there 
has to be at least some sort of evidence in support of the accusations before a death penalty is 
imposed. However, it is striking how easy it is to accuse someone of espionage, and how a 
single accusation may lead to imprisonment and torture. In addition, it has to be noted that, 
although a court hearing has taken place in all four cases, this does not necessarily mean that 
the executions reported in media/NGOs/GOs were preceeded by proper trials nor does it 
exclude the possibility that some executions have been carried out after a “trial” conducted 
like a public show as in the case of “Roble”. Apparently, al-Shabaab wants to give the 
impression that espionage charges are tried in court, rather than to admit extra-judicial 
killings. For instance in Mogadishu in September 28, 2009, when Hassan Mulam Abdullah 
and Mohammed Ali Salad were sentenced for espionage and executed by a firing squad in 
Mogadishu, al-Shabaab released a statement claiming that the convicts had been found guilty 
in front of a “sharī’a court”. They also claimed that both had confessed to crimes of 
espionage, respectively for the American CIA and the “apostate government”.240 
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Chapter 7: Amniyaat, Ḥisbah and low-level enforcement 
Maẓālim, the court of the sultan, could according to classical theory hear cases of any type, 
new cases as well as cases previously heard by other law courts, e.g. if someone felt badly 
treated in the qāḍī court. The maẓālim court is not bound by the same strict rules of procedure 
and evidence as prescribed by fiqh. It could render a judgment without even listening to the 
claims of both parties, nor does it need evidence before making a decision.
241
 
 Like the maẓālim, the shurṭa enjoyed few restrictions compared to the legal 
proceedings laid down by the fiqh rules. Classical fiqh recognizes that the shurṭa is 
responsible for enforcing law and order, to crush rebellions and disturbances, and may 
investigate, try and punish criminals in their own shurṭa courts. They may hear a case with 
only the accused present, in contrast to the qāḍī court where both the plaintiff and the 
defendant have to be present, and may also use physical pressure during interrogation, for 
example by beating or lashing the accused. However, in principle, only in order to make him 
“realize the need to say the truth, not to force him to confess”. If he confesses while being 
beaten, the beating must stop and his confession will only be effective if repeated a second 
time. The shurṭa may also make use of circumstantial evidence, such as physical evidence 
found at a crime scene, and may take an accused’s prior criminal record and reputation into 
consideration when meting out the punishment. Police officials may also, if they deem it 
necessary, punish the offender on the spot without any kind of trial. Another difference 
compared to the qāḍī court, is that the shurṭa, being understood by the jurists as the sultan’s 
primary tool for maintaining law and order, could start an investigation, and if necessary, 
prosecute the subject-matter on his own initiative, on basis of suspicion, or after a formal 
complaint. The shurṭa is also responsible for the practical aspects of punishments, both 
verdicts in their own courts as well as the sentences rendered in the qāḍī courts or the maẓālim 
court.
242
   
 Another legal actor recognized by classical doctrines is the muḥtasib, literally “one 
who enforces ḥisba”, a high public position that may be held by an Islamic scholar, for 
example a qāḍī or a mufti (jurisconsult). The muḥtasib is related to the theological concept of 
ḥisba (“balance” or “verification”)243, i.e. the obligation which rests on every Muslim to act 
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against illegal and immoral behavior. However, apart from the moral obligation of trying to 
talk someone right, this duty is by the classical scholars mostly perceived as a collective duty 
(farḍ kifā’ī). In practice, the collective aspect of ḥisba implies that the sultan takes the 
responsibility of enforcing this on behalf of the community, for example through the post of 
the muhasib. The muḥtasib’s main role is to supervise and control trade and the markets: to 
make sure that the correct weight, measures and coins are used, and that the traders offer the 
right prices. He is also responsible for supervising building sites, public roads and squares, 
keeping them open to traffic, and could as such be perceived as a kind of municipal 
administrator. In addition he supervises public morale, e.g. enforcing dress codes, overseeing 
that the rules regarding the interaction in public between men and women are respected, 
supervising prostitution and brothels, and enforcing public observance of religious duties, 
such as attendance of Friday prayer and fasting during Ramadan. Whenever he detects 
unlawful behavior within his jurisdiction, he may punish the violator on the spot and impose 
the punishment he sees fit (discretionary punishments), for example beating, exposure to 
public scorn or confiscation of property. However, he is not allowed to start an investigation 
or hold a formal trial, but is limited to deal with undisputed violations.
244
 
 
7.1 Amniyaat  
As mentioned above, al-Shabaab does not have an equivalent to the mazailim, i.e. the sultan’s 
court. However, there is a security agency, Amniyaat (“security”), with some legal 
jurisdictions which is closely connected to the top leadership of al-Shabaab and the leading 
amīr Abu Zubeyr. Amniyaat is greatly feared among Somalis and is believed to be 
responsible of targeted killings of opponents and dissidents. It is surrounded by a lot of 
secrecy, and information about its modus operandi is very limited. “Muhtab”, an informant 
from Mogadishu, claims that Amniyaat’s operative units consist mainly of teenagers equipped 
with pistols and mobile phones and that they dress in civilian clothes in order to blend with 
the civilian population.
245
 “Muhtar Adam”, an informant from Kismayo, adds that they also 
may wear masks.
246
 Some of my informants believe Amniyaat to be organized in cells with a 
high level of autonomy, and rumor has it that if an operative is hurt in battle, he will be killed 
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by their own agents rather than sent to hospital in order to ensure that no sensitive knowledge 
is leaked. 
 According to Hansen, Amniyaat, which is headed by Sheikh Muqhtar Abu Seyla’i, 
functioned as an important tool for the al-Shabaab leadership to create unity within the al-
Shabaab organization in the period when it started to gain wide influence in 2007-2009. The 
Amniyaat may be described as a kind of secret police responsible for internal justice and thus 
also feared inside al-Shabaab. Additionally it functions as a kind of intelligence service, 
recruiting spies in all al-Shabaab controlled areas, as well as in other countries, such as 
Kenya. Hansen points out that in 2009-2010 Amnyiaat came under direct control of the 
leading amīr, Abu Zubeyr alias Godane, and became a powerful tool for him which he used to 
centralize the power, for example by circumventing the qāḍīs courts in cases such as 
espionage. However, Amniyaat is not the only actor who could make adjudications 
independently of the qāḍīs courts, this may also be done by battle commanders. In addition, if 
high ranking commanders are suspected of espionage, the case tends to go to the top body of 
the al-Shabaab organization, nemaly the central shūrā.247  
 To what extent killing of alleged spies has taken place without any form of trial is 
difficult to say as I have little information about how Amniyaat actually operate. What I have 
at hand, are two incidents that most likely are related to Amniyaat. The first case is the 
“Dalmar” case, mentioned above where “Dalmar” was arrested and brought before what he 
perceived to be a military court. “Dalmar’s” friends told him that the men who arrested him 
belonged to Amniyaat, and therefore they believed he would be killed. “Dalmar” says that the 
men who arrested him and held him captive kept their faces covered all the time. Every week 
for eight months he was interrogated by a new person, whose face also was covered. The 
same was the case with three men who made the final interrogation in what “Dalmar” 
perceived to be a military court, before he was brought back to a small town in Southern 
Somalia and released.
248
     
 In the other case, “Aziza” tells about the incident in which her husband, a football 
coach and administrator was killed in their home in Mogadishu. One day, two men with 
covered faces appeared in their house and accused her husband of refusing to stop coaching 
and to promote football, even after they had given him several warnings. Consequently, they 
shot him in the head at close range. He died instantly. After the assassination they drove away 
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in a Land Cruiser with several other men who had also covered their faces. “Aziza” is 
convinced that all these men were from Amniyaat.
249
    
 The “Aziza” case seems to correspond with the claims that Amniyaat circumvents the 
ordinary court system and that they are assassinating dissidents. Although the assassination of 
“Aziza’s” husband seemed not to be politically motivated, he was obviously perceived as an 
ideological dissident and unwilling to follow al-Shabaab orders. In the “Dalmar” case, there 
seems at least to be some sort of trial, although the “court session” with “Dalmar” appears 
more like another interrogation than a real trial, as the prosecutors did not present any 
evidence to support the claims. This supports the claims of some of my Somali informants 
that the military courts do not follow ordinary procedure. For example, “Hassan” asserts that 
“they [al-Shabaab] take foreigners and those people whom they want to kill. In that court [the 
military court]. There is were they are taking…they listen and make the ruling. That is death. 
Capital punishment. It is just like that.”250  
 
7.2 The Ḥisbah  
The religious police, the Ḥisbah, is probably organized, at least in principle, under the 
Maktabatu Ḥisbah at the central level and under the Office of Ḥisbah at a regional level.251 
According to my informants, the Ḥisbah is responsible for internal security in the provinces 
(wilaayahs) and functions in most respects as ordinary police who enforce law and order. 
“Muhtab” from Mogadishu describes the Ḥisbah in the following manner: 
 
 [The Ḥisbah ] can be known even when they are walking, because they have dress, special dress. And 
 guns and whips. Their main job is to protect the people. They say: “We are protecting [against] 
 thieves”. They actually do. Sometimes, I have to admit, the good that they do. The good that they do is 
 that you cannot be robbed in the street in Mogadishu, actually, the part they control. (…) You can walk 
 openly with a lot of money, if you are not a target [of al-Shabaab]. So, they do policing. They protect 
 thieves, they protect property, they do guard. 
   
  The name Ḥisbah obviously, as stated in an al-Shabaab propaganda pamphlet,252 plays 
on the term “ḥisbah” which refers to the religious duty of “commanding the right and 
forbidding the wrong” (amr bi’l-ma’rūf wa-nahy ‘an al-munkar), the collective duty of all 
Muslims as a community, to act against illegal and immoral behavior. Although this, 
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according to classical doctrine, is a communal duty, it is the sultan who has the responsibility 
to enforce it.
253
 As such, the Ḥisbah is propagated by al-Shabaab to be the tool of the 
leadership/the amīr in upholding a “true” Islamic community. In an al-Shabaab affiliated 
pamphlet one can read:  
 
 Al-Ḥisbah in its broadest understanding, which is promotion of virtue if left by the people, and 
 prevention of vices when they are committed. Allāh has opened us a wide door to carry out this 
 responsibility in order to protect this society from immorality and guide it towards loftiness. For the first 
 time in contemporary Islamic History, a specific army [the Ḥisbah] has been formed, watching over 
 cities and towns (… ).254 
  
 As the amīr’s tool in “forbidding the wrong” the Ḥisbah of al-Shabaab in many 
respects hold a similar role as the pre-modern muḥtasib, recognized by classical doctrine, who 
functions as a true censor morum. According to numerous media reports, as well as 
eyewitness descriptions from my informants from throughout South Central Somalia, the 
Ḥisbah supervises the public morale, enforces the many religious-moral decrees issued by al-
Shabaab, such as making sure that women are fully covered with a thick and heavy abāyah 
(“cloak”) or niqab (“veil” or “mask”) when leaving the house.255 In addition women are not 
allowed to wear a bra, as this is perceived as a Western creation. According to “Muhtar 
Adam”, women must also wear socks in different colors according to their marriage status, at 
least in Kismayo.
256
 Moreover, the Ḥisbah also makes sure that men and women are separated 
when using public transport, and that a woman must always be accompanied by her husband, 
or brother if unmarried, when leaving the house. Furthermore, as already mentioned, music, 
watching of TV and dancing is forbidden, and men are not allowed to have a fluffy haircut, 
wear trousers, having a moustache or being clean shaven, probably because all these are 
perceived as innovations, bi’da, and automatically forbidden because it lacks a basis in the 
sacred texts (Qu’rān and Haḍīth). In addition, the Ḥisbah makes sure that religious duties are 
upheld, for example that people observe the prescribed prayers.  
 When the Ḥisbah officials become aware of someone violating any of these rules it 
seems that they, like the muḥtasib, have jurisdiction to deal with minor offences on the spot, 
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while more grave violations are treated by the qāḍī courts. According to most of my 
informants, the most applied punishment employed by the Ḥisbah is lashing. However, 
several other punishments are also enforced, for example confiscation of property, cutting of 
the hair if deviating from the norm etc. Also, fining or imprisonment is applied. It is difficult 
to get a more precise picture of the enforcement practice, but it seems that punishments are 
applied quite arbitrary, perhaps contingent on the individual official dealing with the case. 
This is seen in some cases in my material regarding women who have been punished for not 
wearing the prescribed abāyah. “Aisha”, an informant from Mogadishu, tells for example 
about one of her neighbors who went out to fetch her small child who had run out into the 
street. Unfortunately, she was seen by a Ḥisbah official when running after the boy. Because 
she was in a public place without wearing the abāyah, she was immedeatly arrested and 
imprisoned for five days. The little boy was just left alone in the house, but he was luckily 
taken care of by the neighbors.
257
 In mid-2009 a woman was also caught in Kismayo for not 
wearing the heavy abāyah. However, she was reported to “only” have been imprisoned 
overnight. But, before she was put in jail she received punishment from the al-Shabaab patrol 
that caught her and she was severly beaten with the butts of the officials’ guns.258  
 In my material there are other cases with similar traits, for example cases related to the 
commandment that everybody must perform the five daily prayers in a mosque, a prescription 
which includes everyone, even the infirm and the elderly. Thus there is no excuse for 
appearing in public or keeping a shop open during prayer time. In Kismayo, a woman of 
about the age of 70 was whipped in the street by a young al-Shabaab member,
259
 while in 
Merka, “Muhtab” asserts, a man who was sitting outside his shop was killed on the spot for 
not attending one of the prayers at the mosque.
260
 In a third case, from the Medina district of 
Mogadishu, a man was imprisoned for three days in a shipping container, had his head 
shaven, was lashed with a whip made of tire rubber and fined with 300 000 Somali shilling, 
equivalent to 10 USD, for not attending the Friday morning prayer at the mosque. In addition, 
he got his trousers cut as the al-Shabaab officials perceived them to be too long.
261
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 In addition to these seemingly arbitrary accounts of harsh enforcements, the 
jurisdiction of the Ḥisbah seems to overlap with the the qāḍīs, perhaps not in principle, but at 
least in practice. Although the trend seems to be that the Ḥisbah deals with minor ta’zīr cases, 
there are several examples indicating that a violation of the law may be treated by the Ḥisbah 
as well as in a qāḍī court. For example, while the qāḍī court in Buaale tried the above-
mentioned “Ahmad” case where “Ahmad” was convicted for watching a sex video on his 
mobile phone, some of my informants report about similar cases where the offender has been 
handled by the Ḥisbah and punished with lashing on the spot.  
 However, when it comes to more serious crimes it seems that they are primarily 
treated in qāḍī courts, while the Ḥisbah functions mere as an equivalent to the shurṭa, or a 
modern police in terms of investigating suspected crimes and by conducting initial 
interrogations, where they, as many of the described court cases show, do not hesitate to use 
torture, mostly by beating the suspects. However, the qāḍī court and Ḥisbah are closely 
interconnected and may be seen as two aspects of al-Shabaab’s legal system: the Ḥisbah do 
not only make the arrest and bring the accused to court but also functions as prosecutor in the 
qāḍī courts. There is, however, no information suggesting that the Ḥisbah possesses own 
courts of any sort.  
 
7.3 Arbitrary enforcement, many actors   
It is apparent that the rule and administartion of al-Shabaab, including the Ḥisbah and the qāḍī 
courts, has left large parts of South and Central Somalia more stable the last couple of years 
than it has experienced for the past twenty years. However, according to Hansen, the impact 
of the al-Shabaab administration may vary considerably from region to region.
262
 In 
Mogadishu, for example, al-Shabaab has never exerted total control, and the city has 
witnessed numerous clashes between al-Shabaab forces and the AMISOM (the African Union 
Mission in Somalia) and the TFG (the Transitional Federal Government) forces, sometimes 
turning the city into a combat zone. There is also a lack of internal control within al-Shabaab 
as the group has attracted a great variety of people with different ideological and personal 
trajectories. The al-Shabaab controlled areas increased rapidly in 2008-2009 and the 
expanding administration and armed forces needed fresh recruits. Many of the recuits, a 
majority being young men, joined al-Shabaab in order to have a regular income or due to 
forced recruitment. There were also recruits with a violent and bloody record, for example, 
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the former warlord Abdiraham Nuur Fiilo, from Kismayo, who changed side after the 
increasing success of al-Shabaab. Shortly after joining up, he was appointed a local deputy 
commander of the Ḥisbah, took the title of Sheikh, and started enforcing sharī’a at a low 
level.
263
 It is apparent that many figures now gained power and position and got judicial 
responsibilities despite not having any formal education or knowledge about sharī’a. 
 Another important point with regards to arbitrary judicial enforcement is that Ḥisbah is 
not the only agency which takes the responsibility of upholding law and order in al-Shabaab 
controlled territories. Although many of my informants describe the Ḥisbah units as an 
equivalent to ordinary police, several informants also claim that al-Shabaab militiamen, like 
soldiers or other affiliates, sometimes punish Somali citizens for what they see as illegal or 
un-Islamic behavior. Other informants do not separate between Ḥisbah officials and other al-
Shabaab militiamen, but perceive all low-level al-Shabaabs who carry guns as the same. 
Therefore, in my material, it may in some cases be difficult to separate between the acts of the 
Ḥisbah and residual militiamen.  
 Whether it is the Ḥisbah or other militiamen who are responsible for arbitrary violence 
and killings are not what worries most informants, but the unpredictability of the law 
enforcement of low-level al-Shabaab affiliates in general. Even in Kismayo where al-Shabaab 
has had control for quite a long period, and according to “Mohamed Ahmed” “has become 
more relaxed”, there still occurs extra-judicial and arbitrary violations against the citizens, 
such as shooting.
264
 The case of Ahmad Ali Shuuke is a characteristic incident. “Farouk”, an 
informant still living in Mogadishu, tells a story about how al-Shabaab affiliates have taken 
the law into their own hands: Ahmed Ali Shuuke’s job was to deliver goods to the businesses 
at the Bakara market. One day in August 2010 he was stopped by two young al-Shabaab 
militiamen who asked him what he thought about al-Shabaab. Ahmed Ali answered 
something like: “I don’t care about either al-Shabaab or the TFG”. But as he didn’t explicitly 
express his support, they brought him to the corner of the street and cut off his tongue. The 
case never went to court. 
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           Ahmed Ali after the incident 
 
 Several similar episodes have been reported, for instance in the town of Ras Kamboni, 
Lower Jubba, in 2008, where two brothers allegedly bled to death in the street after al-
Shabaab members had cut their throats for carrying a camera and were perceived by the al-
Shabaab affiliates as potential spies. However, according to a close relative of the brothers 
they were all fishermen who intended to take photos of their catch in order to advertise it on 
the marked.
265
 Likewise, in “Adado, in Galguduud, “Muhtab” witnessed a case where harsh 
punishment was inflicted as instant punishment for a minor violation: an al-Shabaab official 
noticed a man nearby whose mobile phone had a music ring tone. Since this is illegal, the 
official told the man that he did not want to hear that ring tone again. Unluckily for the guy 
his phone rang again before he had managed to change it. As a response, the official shot and 
wounded him.
266
  
 
7.4 Apostasy – extra-judicial enforcement 
To renounce Islam publicly by word or conduct are deemed by most legal schools as a ḥadd 
crime, termed ridda, and is to be punished by death.
267
 Ridda occurres when a Muslim 
explicitly abjures Islam or converts to another religion, or implicitly renounce Islam, for 
example by denying that Mohammed is God’s prophet, asserting that ritual prayer is not 
obligatory, or disrespects copies of the Qu’rān. In order to make sure that a convict is 
punished as an apostate, the execution must be delayed for three days,
268
 to make sure that the 
convict has been able to reflect on the matter and has been given the opportunity to repent. If 
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the convict does not return to Islam, he will be executed.  In cases where the apostate has been 
found guilty of blasphemy by insulting the Prophet, he will, according to most schools, not be 
given the opportunity to repent, but will nevertheless be executed immediately after the 
sentencing. Although the haḍīth which legitimizes punishment for apostasy269 does not 
specify how the execution shall be performed; beheading by sword is normally the prescribed 
form.
270
 
 While the other ḥadd crimes primarily seem to be tried before the al-Shabaab qāḍī 
courts, the general trend in the al-Shabaab controlled areas when it comes to ridda (the ḥadd 
crime of apostasy) seems to be that such cases are decided outside the court. It seems that 
people who are accused of apostasy are either killed immediately wherever they are found by 
al-Shabaab operatives or after a brief interrogation. However, these assumptions are entirely 
based on eyewitnesses’ stories reported by journalists reports from NGOs/GOs, which do not 
put much emphasis on the process from arrest to execution. As my information on this issue is 
quite limited, I cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that some ridda cases have also been 
tried by ordinary qāḍī courts.   
 In general there seems to be no tolerance for Muslims who have converted from Islam 
to Christianity, or for those who have uttered blasphemous statements. Reports claim that the 
Christian convert Abdirahman Hussein Roble, who was reported to have been killed by 
members of Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu on January 26, 2011, is the 24th convert killed by 
Somali Islamists since 2009.
271
 Whether this is the correct number or not, the many incidents, 
also from spring of 2011, indicate that al-Shabaab perceives the execution of converts to be an 
important task and a way to administer sharī’a. For example, in July 2009, Mohammed 
Sheikh Abdiraman was executed by al-Shabaab militiamen in Mahadaay Weyne, Middle 
Shabelle. Eyewitnesses to the execution state that the militiamen had been searching for the 
convert, and when they found him early in the morning at 7 AM, they shot him dead on the 
spot.
272
 Other reports give similar descriptions about al-Shabaab militiamen who have 
executed suspected Muslim converts shortly after their arrest. For example, Pastor Ali 
Hussein Weheliye, a leader of a Christian underground Church in Mogadishu, was on October 
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10, 2009 shot down in the street by two masked al-Shabaab members.
273
 According to several 
reports, many Christian converts go regularly to mosque just to appear to be Muslims, as al-
Shabaab reportedly is monitoring people’s attendance at the prayers in the mosques.274 
Contrary to the norms of classical fiqh, the death penalty are in these cases applied without 
any form of trial or time for the convict to reconsider his belief. 
 However, there are also examples of cases where the convert is given a chance to 
renounce Christianity. This is what happened, for example, in the case of the four Christian 
converts who were running an orphanage for a charity: Fatima Sultan, Ali Ma'ow, Sheik 
Mohammed Abdi and Maaddey Diil were beheaded by al-Shabaab in Merka, on August 11, 
2009 after having reportedly been given “(…) an opportunity to return to Islam to be released 
but they all declined the generous offer”.275 
 To my knowledge there are no reports which say anything about apostasy cases tried 
before a qāḍī court. Instead, it seems that the general trend is that converts are either hunted 
down and killed immediately, or executed by beheading after a short interrogation. Moreover, 
another characteristic feature about these cases is the fact that the execution takes place in 
front of a huge audience. For example, when Asha Mberwa (36), a Christian convert, was 
executed in Warbhigly in the outskirts of Mogadishu on January 7, 2011, her throat was cut in 
front of many of the villagers.
276
 A similar public and violent execution took place in a 
blasphemy case at a soccer stadium in the Hudur district, in Bakool on July 1, 2010. Hundreds 
of people, including school children are reported to have been forced to watch when 
Muhammad Guul Hashim Idiris was executed after allegedly, according to Sheik Adan Yare, 
the Al-Shabaab governor of the Bakol region having “(…) insulted our beloved Prophet”.277 
 One may naturally ask why al-Shabaab chooses to deal with ridda cases extra-
judicially rather than in front of the qāḍī courts when this seems to be the rule in the other 
ḥadd cases? Although it may be difficult to come up with an adequate explanation, there are 
two special aspects of the ridda cases which might suggest a clue: firstly, in several of these 
cases, the converts have also been accused of espionage. For example, in September 23, 2008, 
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Mansuur Mohammed was accused of apostasy and reportedly killed in front of terrified locals 
in Manyafulka village, Baidoa, by al-Shabaab militiamen, some hours after his arrest. 
According to reports his execution was due to accusations of being a murtadd, i.e. an apostate, 
and a spy for Ethiopia.
278
 Given that al-Shabaab perceives its enemies to be “Christians”, i. e. 
Ethiopia, US and its allies, it is possible that any Christian, a Somali convert or a foreign 
Christian could be suspected of being in liaison with the enemy. Secondly, there are also 
reports which indicate that apostasy is perceived as a source of fitna (“chaos”), in terms of 
causing havoc to the Muslim community, umma. An al-Shabaab militiaman is reported to 
have said to the families of the four executed orphanage workers, mentioned above, that the 
accused had been killed because they as Christian converts were promoting fitna.
279
 It may 
seem that an apostate is perceived as such a grave security threat to society because he/she is 
linked to the enemy, or perceived as someone causing such great havoc to the community or 
both that he/she must be eliminated at all costs.  
 
Chapter 8: The law of the land – the state, muftīs and the qāḍī court 
According to classical doctrine, lawmaking is to a great extent kept separate from the control 
of the state. In principle, legal provisions are formulated by the Islamic jurists, either as 
outlined in the fiqh-literature, particularly in the numerous legal manuals which constitute the 
mukhtaṣarāt literature, or as fatwās, i.e. the legal opinions of a muftī (jurisconsult). The fatwā 
issued by a muftī, who is ascribed to operate independently of the state, is not a legally 
binding verdict, but the muftī’s own opinion about what he perceives to be the right 
interpretation of sharī’a concerning a specific question. However, fatwās issued by renowned 
muftīs may have impact not only for ordinary Muslims, but also for qāḍīs when dealing with a 
particular difficult case and political decision makers.
280
     
 That the formulation of law (fiqh) is the prerogative of Islamic scholars, i.e. jurists and 
muftīs, implies that parts of the repressive system of the state are conditioned by non-state 
(religious) actors. However, as Vikør points out, the state authorities started in practice to 
appoint their own muftīs early on, and in course of the reign of the Ottomans, the muftī was 
reduced to a state official, as the qāḍī always had been. Thus the Ottomans introduced a 
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system whereby the muftī could be appointed and removed from his position according to the 
will of the sultan.
281
 Although the idea that the muftī should be a legal scholar who operates 
independently of the state is still prevalent within the Muslim world,
282
 close ties between the 
muftī and the state occur even today, not least in Saudi-Arabia. In Saudi Arabia there are also 
different councils of scholars, for example the Board of Senior ‘Ulamā’, which issues fatwās 
on matters submitted to it by the government. However, neither the Grand Muftī nor the 
Board of Senior ‘Ulamā’ are directly governed by the state, nor are their fatwās in principle 
binding for the qāḍīs working in the courts although they may exercise great influence on the 
qāḍīs’ interpretation of the law.283  
 Although classical fiqh ascribes Islamic jurists the authority to outline positive law, the 
state authority is also recognized as a law maker sanctioned by the classical doctrine of siyāsa 
shar’iyya (“governance in accordance with the sharī’a”). This doctrine gives the ruler the 
prerogative to apply his own provisions within areas where one finds no basis in the sacred 
texts, and as long as these rules do not contradict the letters of sharī’a.284 
 
8.1 Issuance of law – the Fatwā Council and political authority 
To outline al-Shabaab’s practice of lawmaking is no easy task as the information at hand is 
quite limited. However, my material may nevertheless give some indication of the underlying 
ideal of al-Shabaab’s religio-political regime. 
 As already mentioned, al-Shabaab has imposed numerous decrees, both prohibitions as 
well as commandments on the Somali public under their administration. For example, on 
March 24, 2009, trading and consumption of khat, mild narcotic leaves traditionally chewed 
by many Somalis, was banned in the Baidoa province,
285
 as had previously happened in 
January the same year in Kismayo.
286
 On May 18, the same year, an edict was released by the 
administration of the city of Merka and Bardhere which banned football. This prohibition 
followed an earlier edict banning movies and watching football on TV. And in June 13, 2009, 
the al-Shabaab administration in Kismayo outlawed the watching of movies on DVDs, 
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television, and to store pictures on cell phones. Al-Shabaab issued a stern warning that it 
would raid the homes of persons suspected of violating the ban.
287
  
 “Taban”, an informant from Kismayo explains that when a new edict is imposed it is 
announced through local FM radio stations,
288
 many of which, as Hansen points out, al-
Shabaab controls.
289
 Many of the Somali informants claim that these edicts, or fatwās, the 
term which is mostly used by my informants, are issued by a Fatwā Council consisting of 
religious scholars. The council decides what should and should not be legal regarding specific 
issues, especially in religious matters, and according to “Fakir”, a local sheikh, who was 
critical of the Fatwā Council’s methods:  
 
 [They] act as mujtahideen [sg. mujtahid]. They make new tafsīr [“interpretation”, i. e. Qu’rān exegesis] 
 which is not known to the community and wasn’t applicable to specific situation. For example, when 
 they are doing ijtihād, one explains some verse of the Holy Qu’rān. They prefer to apply how it is to 
 apply people who lived one thousand years ago.
290
  
  
 Several of the informants think the Fatwā Council is closely linked to the central 
decision making organs of al-Shabaab, and that it is headed by a sheikh and amīr. Fu’ad 
Shangole, one of the senior amīrs of al-Shabaab, is mentioned by some as an influential or 
even the leading member of the central Fatwā Council. In addition, there are Fatwā Councils 
on regional and local levels, according to some informants. In his newly released report 
Hansen supports the the information from my informants, asserting that the Fatwā Council is 
an integrated part of the Maktabatu Da’wah, which is headed by Fu’ad Shangole. In addition 
to political and religious issues, this department is, according to Hansen, responsible for the 
dissemination of al-Shabaab ideology and viewpoints regarding Islam, sharī’a and jihād. The 
Makatabatu Da’wah is also responsible for local justice, and is the closest al-Shabaab comes 
to a legal office. As such, according to Hansen, the Maktabatu Da’wah is superior to the qāḍīs 
courts, and if the Fatwā Council is asked for a legal opinion regarding a specific issue, the 
subsequent fatwā would overrule all other court decisions. The Fatwā Council is also, Hansen 
asserts, responsible for the implementation of justice on the military fronts, but seems to lack 
the capacity to fully do so.
291
 
                                                          
287
 U.S. Department of State, 2009 Human Rights Reports: Somalia, Human Rights Reports. 
288
 Interview with “Taban” conducted by the author in Nairobi, October 2010. 
289
 Hansen, Report for the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, p. 85. 
290
 Interview with “Fakir” conducted by the author in Nairobi, October 2010. 
291
 Ibid, pp. 77, 81. 
95 
 
The Fatwā Council of the Maktabatu Da’wah seems also to lack the capacity to control 
the issuance of fatwās/edicts locally, as several commandments are announced only in some 
of the al-Shabaab regions. For example, reports claim that the rules which order women to 
wear gloves and socks, a common supplement to the abāyah in conservative countries such as 
Saudi Arabia, were only implemented in some areas. Likewise, the ban on wearing a bra was 
reportedly announced only in Kismayo, Baardheere and some neighborhoods of 
Mogadishu.
292
 Although this could imply some degree of (intentional) local independence, it 
seems more likely to be a sign of arbitrary power and impunity of local leaders, as extensive 
local variations could undermine the legitimacy of the central leadership, who strive for 
increased centralization, as Hansen indicates.
293
     
 As the Fatwā Council seems to be an integrated part of the Maktabatu Da’wah, one of 
the ministries of the central political organ, it means that it is closely linked with the political 
leadership. That Fu’ad Shangole, one of the top amīrs of the al-Shabaab leadership and a 
leading military commander, is associated with and probably the head of the Fatwā Council, 
supports this claim. The Fatwā Council may partly be seen as al-Shabaab’s response to the 
religious attacks that became prevalent after January 2009 when the TFG got the support of 
influential religious clerics in the Arab world, such as the well-known Islamic Scholar and 
leader of the European Fatwā Council, Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, based in Qatar.294 As such the 
Fatwā Council may function as a body that seeks to increase the religious authority of the 
movement, and further support al-Shabaab’s claims of Islamic legitimacy. 
 The closeness, or supposed co-localization, of religious and political authority comes 
to the fore in regards to for example the khat issue. According to Marchal, the question of 
whether one should prohibit khat usage has divided al-Shabaab’s leadership for years. One 
faction is willing to forbid the import of khat since it is perceived as a drug (its usage will thus 
be seen as the ḥadd crime of khamr). On the other hand, Marchal points out, many 
commanders have a pragmatic approach to the issue: distribution of khat provides jobs for the 
poorest people and taxes are collected (1000 USD by plane plus landing fees).
295
 Another 
factor is the massive protests that al-Shabaab has experienced when trying to limit the trade of 
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khat.
296
 Although, as Marchal points out, there have been several attempts to limit khat trade 
over the last years, the common solution to this problem seems to be a limited prohibition, 
where the khat traders are allowed to sell khat at dedicated markets in the outskirts of the 
towns. Moreover, khat usage is prohibited in the public sphere, but allowed at certain places. 
However, there seems to be different practices to this issue. While several informants as well 
as Marchal
297
 assert khat usage to be allowed in private houses, the court ruling in the “Nadif” 
case indicates that khat, at least in Bardheere, in the Gedo province, has to be chewed at 
dedicated chewing zones, equivalent to the practice regarding smoking of tobacco as 
displayed in the “Abdow” case from Afgooye, in Lower Shabelle.298  
 A half hearted ban may seem odd. But, politically, it may be a clever decision. If they 
had totally legalized it, they may have lost legitimazy as a serious Islamic actor since it is 
quite obvious that khat could be categorized as a drug. Similarily, a total ban would have 
reduced much-needed taxes as well as considerable public dismay which would have made 
the group very unpopular.  
 
8.2 Application of law – the Fatwā Council and the qāḍī court 
The decrees or fatwās issued by al-Shabaab tend to be binding from the moment they are 
announced publicly and is rapidly enforced locally by the Ḥisbah. This could be seen for 
example on April 9 2009, a couple of weeks after the khat prohibition, when al-Shabaab 
officials are reported to have opened fire on khat traders in Dinsor town, Bakol, and killed one 
person and wounded three others. Likewise, in Merka on May 19, 2009, the day after the 
banning of football, al-Shabaab is reported to have arrested several young boys playing 
football inside the town.
299
 Also, in Merka, some time during 2009, “Muhtab” remembers that 
a man was shot dead by the Ḥisbah because he had not closed his shop during one of the 
obligatory prayers, which had been commanded by a decree some time in advance. When the 
man was asked why he did not follow the commandment, “Muhtab” claims that the shop 
                                                          
296
 Garoweonline, Somalia: Baidoa protests against Al Shabaab khat order, (25 March 2009), 
http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_Baidoa_protests_against_Al_Shabaab_s_k
hat_order.shtml, [23.09.11]. 
297
 Marchal, The Rise of a Jihadi Movement in a Country at War: Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujaheddin in 
Somalia, p. 68. 
298
 See Appendix 1. 
299
 U.S. Department of State, 2009 Human Rights Reports: Somalia, Human Rights Reports. 
97 
 
keeper said “I do praise my Allāh! I’m not doing it for you!” As a result, he was killed on the 
spot.
300
 
 It also seems that the qāḍīs are implementing the decrees issued by the Fatwā Council. 
For example, shortly after the issuance of a decree by the administration of Kismayo which 
prohibits the watching of movies on DVD and TV as well as the storing of pictures on mobile 
phones,
301
 “Ahmad” was sentenced to 50 lashes and to pay a fine of 2000 USD by a court in 
Bu’ale, a city not far from Kismayo, for watching sex videos on his mobile phone. Likewise, 
“Haliima” was sentenced to 40 lashes and two weeks in jail by the residential court in 
Kismayo for selling khat leaves inside her house, instead of going to the market outside the 
city where such trade was allowed according to the limited ban previously issued.
302
 
 Although it seems that the qāḍī courts implement decrees issued by the Fatwā Council, 
it is not clear to what extent they are regulated by the Council when it comes to actual 
application of the law. In other words, do the qāḍīs take orders directly from the Council, or 
are they to some extent able to excersice ijtihād, i.e. individual reasoning, in each case? Are 
there any difference in this regards between the provincial courts and residential courts? Some 
informants assert that the Fatwā Council controls the courts quite strictly, while others say 
that it only gives guidelines and suggests how to interpret a certain case, without being 
binding upon the qāḍī’s decision. Likewise, some respondents claim that the provincial courts 
assert control over the residential courts, while others claim that every court is independent 
and that a court case being tried in one court is final and may not be heard again in another 
court. However, contrary to this last claim, Hansen asserts that there is some opportunity to 
appeal within the qāḍī court system, although he does not elaborate on this point except from 
claiming that the Fatwā Council may issue fatwās which overrule all other court rulings.303  
 Although the available information about al-Shabaab’s relation to the court system 
does not suggest anything certain, cases like “Roble’s” mentioned above, where the trial and 
sentencing probably served as punishment for his refusal to join the ranks of al-Shabaab, 
could indicate that the central leadership may use the qāḍīs and their courts as tools in order to 
achieve certain political goals. This assertion also finds support in the fact that leading al-
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Shabaab officials like Mukhtar Robow, Fuad Shangole and Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki were 
present alongside the chief qāḍī at the “trial” of “Roble” and the following execution.  
 
Chapter 9: Sharī’a as a means or an end? 
The legal and law enforcement system of al-Shabaab is a mixed blessing. On the one hand it 
has considerably improved the general security of common citizens: it has reduced the level 
of serious crimes, and for the first time in many years Somalis have experienced a system that 
investigates, prosecutes and adjudicates violators, sometimes even state officials. On the other 
hand, the introduction of strict prescriptions regulating social conduct as well as the 
application of harsh and often seemingly arbitrary punishment has caused much fear and 
suffering, and therefore overshadowed the relative security brought by the al-Shabaab regime. 
 Indeed, the fact that infringements and extra-judicial killings are committed by state 
representatives is hardly surprising taken into consideration the anarchic situation that has 
been prevalent in South Central Somalia for the last decade, the militaristic and rough nature 
of al-Shabaab, and the lack of legal education and training of al-Shabaab’s officials. Although 
such factors may explain the legal reality on the ground in the al-Shabaab controlled areas, 
some traits displayed in the analysis deserve further explanation. For example, why do the al-
Shabaab qāḍīs in many respects seem to follow the procedure and rules of evidence as 
outlined in classical fiqh when it comes to cases of murder and bodily harm, while it seems 
that they clearly diverge from fiqh rules in ḥadd cases? Why does al-Shabaab conduct extra-
judicial executions of Muslims who have converted to Christianity while most other serious 
cases are tried by the courts? Why does al-Shabaab prescribe strict regulations of social and 
religious conduct and punish violations thereof so harshly? 
 In order to answer these questions, I shall turn to al-Shabaab ideology and its 
indebtedness to the Jihadi-Salafi discourse.      
 
9.1 The utopian society of al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ  
As already argued, al-Shabaab fits well into Wictorowicz’s Jihadi category of the Salafi trend 
both in terms of propaganda and actual practice as exemplified by the demolition of Sufi 
shrines, suicide bombers and the willingness to kill fellow Muslims deemed to be kuffār (sg. 
kāfir), i.e. unbelievers. Through the prism of the absolute unity of God (tawḥīd) al-Shabaab 
strives to ban all behavior which in their view lacks a basis in the Qu’rān or the haḍīth, 
understood to constitute the blueprint for a righteous, Muslim society. Al-Shabaab’s law 
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enforcement may therefore be viewed as a part of a strategy applied to create this pristine 
society. When “un-Islamic” practices are defined as shirk (“polytheism”), e.g. veneration of 
Sufi Sheikhs, or bid’a (“innovation”), e.g. music, dance, TV or Western clothing, they must 
be purged from the Islamic society. By making use of prevalent notions and symbols from the 
the Salafi discourse as well as classical theological-legal concepts such as ḥisbah, al-Shabaab 
seeks to construct a framework in which its actions are sanctioned and its regime is 
legitimized as a true representative of Islam. As an al-Shabaab propaganda pamphlet 
propagates: “Allāh has opened us a wide door to carry out this responsibility in order to 
protect this society from immorality and guide it towards loftiness.”304  
 As previously mentioned, Salafis maintain that God is the sole legislator and that 
God’s laws are materialized in the sharī’a. Therefore any form of human legislation which 
deviates from sharī’a is regarded as an un-Islamic innovation, and to follow such laws 
amount to unbelief. A regime like al-Shabaab which propagates Salafi ideology will 
necessarily emphasize sharī’a as one of its most important goals. It is therefore no surprise 
that Sheikh Muqtar Robow, al-Shabaab’s spokesman at that time, on January 4, 2009 stated 
that al-Shabaab “wants to implement sharī’a completely – every single element of it. That's 
what the movement stands for.”305  
 Historical and contemporary studies of Muslim majority states show that they differ 
considerably when it comes to how to organize their legal systems as well as how to apply 
and enforce the law.
306
 Nevertheless, the case of al-Shabaab is in many respects striking as 
sharī’a seems to be the only recognized source of law. In contrast, most contemporary and 
historic Muslim states recognize and have recognized additional secular constitutions or 
sultan’s (state) laws that operate outside the jurisdiction of sharī’a. As Vogel points out, even 
the traditionalistic Saudi Arabia recognizes niẓāms, i.e sultan’s decrees, within certain 
areas.
307
 However, taken into consideration the al-Shabaab’s Jihadi-Salafi appearance it may 
not be surprising to find that it emphazises sharī’a as the only law, as any non-sharī’a laws or 
regulations easily would have been understood as bid’a, and thus un-Islamic.  
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 Al-Shabaab’s Jihadi-Salafi standpoint may also explain the many strict and often 
seemingly odd prohibitions and commandments issued by al-Shabaab to regulate all sorts of 
social and religious behavior. If one is to take seriously the message displayed in an al-
Shabaab propaganda pamphlet, namely to “ achieve the Pleasure of Allah by establishing the 
Tawheed”, “demolish the framework of apostasy and topple the system of secularism”, purge 
“ the apparent symbols of polytheism and idolatry, such as tombs and domes” and advocate 
“Obedience [to God], not Innovation”,308 many of the al-Shabaab regulations may be 
understood as efforts to force the Somali society into a right track and to purify it from any 
un-Islamic elements, be it music, dancing, modern and western clothes, saint’s worship etc. 
The execution of Christian converts without trial makes sense when seen within such a 
perspective, as any apostate from Islam constitutes an obvious un-Islamic element within a 
righteous society.   
 In the al-Shabaab pamphlet cited above, the “Implementation of the Hudood, through 
which Allah granted us the ability to keep roads secure and ensure peace in a way unseen in 
Somalia for decades”,309 is listed as one of al-Shabaab’s goals. However, in addition to having 
practical effects in terms of increasing the level of security and creating law and order, 
application of Islamic criminal law, especially enforcement of the ḥudūd punishments, plays 
an important symbolic role. As Peters argues, ḥudūd punishments have in a sense been the 
litmus test to decide whether or not a Muslim governance could be termed Islamic.
310
 As 
such, public executions of alleged thieves, adulterers and robbers, apostates, murderers and 
spies are important to al-Shabaab not only as means to punish offenders and to discourage 
future violations, but as a sign that al-Shabaab is a true guardian of sharī’a and hence a 
legitimate Islamic government.  
 But there is a problem to this: when al-Shabaab or more precisely the al-Shabaab qāḍīs 
try criminal cases, they face similar problems as their predecessors have faced before them, 
namely the strict fiqh requirements of evidence and procedure, especially in ḥadd cases. 
Motivated, as previously mentioned, by a haḍīth stating that the ḥudūd punishments should be 
averted by the presence of the slightest doubt, the classical legal scholars outlined provisions 
which made it difficult to apply the ḥudūd punishments.311 Consequently, as previously noted, 
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ḥadd punishment for adultery, theft and robbery have seldom been applied throughout history. 
But as my material suggests, the qāḍīs seem to resolve this “problem” in two ways: either 
they overlook the strict rules of evidence and the requirements that have to be fulfilled, for 
example, the number of male eyewitnesses who actually saw the criminal act. Alternatively, 
the qāḍīs just announce that the accused has confessed the crime, or they display “evidence” 
that “proves” the accusations, e.g. allegedly stolen objects. Therefore, the fact that corporal 
punishments and executions are frequently enforced in public is in many respects more 
important than whether the legal proceedings are in accordance with the strict requirements 
outlined in classical fiqh. 
 
9.2 Jihadi-Salafi ideology – the pragmatic side       
As already indicated al-Shabaab’s actions have not surprisingly more to it than mere idealism. 
Al-Shabaab’s judicial practice, enforcement of law and strict social regulations, as well as 
extensive use of Jihadi-Salafi rhetoric cannot be understood properly without taking into 
consideration its pragmatic prerogatives. Firstly, there is clearly a political aspect to some of 
the court rulings and public punishments, for example in the “Roble” case and in the case of 
the Ibrahim brothers. In both cases the convicts asserted their innocence and believe they were 
punished for political reasons. If this is true, the punishment of “Roble”, for example, would 
be a serious reminder for other boys not to follow his example. The fact that Fu’ad Shangole, 
one of the leading al-Shabaab leaders came back to “Roble” and the other convicts after a few 
days and made new amputations (three more fingerbreadths up from of the stumps) could 
support such a claim.   
 Another aspect worth mentioning is al-Shabaab’s Salafi statements and flirtation with 
al-Qa’ida. Although this rethoric most likely says something about the group’s world view 
and values, it must also be seen as an attempt to draw support from other radical Islamists, 
particularily in terms of financial support and foreign recruits.
312
 However, while some al-
Shabaab statements may be directed at the Middle East and global Jihadi movements, other 
statements may, as Hansen points out, be directed at a local audience.
313
 Examples of the 
latter could be statements targeting clanism or tribalism, as the one Abu Mukhtar Robow is 
reported to have given: “’from now on it is prohibited to say that so-and-so clan cannot 
control over there, or so-and-so clan cannot govern so-and-so region’. He made it clear that 
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this land belongs to Allāh and anyone who imposes the Islamic law in it can govern it.”314 
Likewise, the senior al-Shabaab official Abu Mansoor al-Amriki emphasizes al-Shabaab’s 
pan-Islamism in opposition to the clan-backed politics of the former Islamic Court Union, 
stating that “the Courts [ICU] used to judge over each individual tribe”, whereas “Al-Shabaab 
were made up of many different tribes.”315 Such statements, which emphasize al-Shabaab’s 
Islamist nature and similarily denounce the traditional clan system, could be understood to 
constitute a strategy applied in order to depict itself as an alternative to a clan based regime 
which historically has lead to division rather than unity.  
 As the historical sketch in chapter 3 displays, the clan has played a decisive role in 
Somali politics, not least during the 1990s and early 2000s when they stemmed the tide of 
Islamic actors who strived to get political influence through the many locally based sharī’a 
courts. In many respects the real power remained with the clans and sub-clans and its 
warlords. However, the unwritten rule that Islamic identity should compliment rather than 
challenge “the primacy of clanism”,316 has been widely challenged by al-Shabaab: First, it has 
as mentioned used anti-clan rethoric and propagated Islamist and Salafi values and symbols in 
order to construct an altervative Somali identity. Secondly, al-Shabaab has been quick to 
apply sharī’a rules as soon as is has gained control over a new territories. For example in 
Baidoa, the interim al-Shabaab administration, according to Hansen, implemented the first 
death penalty only four days after the takeover. Many poor Somali girls where soon arrested 
because they could not afford the veils that al-Shabaab had ordered all females to wear.
317
 By 
stressing the application of Islamic criminal law, al-Shabaab not only managed to create fear 
and improve law and order locally, it also opposed traditional xeer and the authority of the 
elders.
318
 The Islamic inspired punishments now being inflicted radically diverges from 
traditional conflict resolution previously described where an offence would be treated 
collectively: the case will be thoroughly discussed by the elders from the sides of both parties, 
and, subsequently, they will make a decision which mostly results in payment of diya by the 
offender’s diya-paying group.  
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 In addition to the Salafi rethoric and application of sharī’a as a means of combating 
traditional clan power, al-Shabaab has also managed to establish militias with weak clan-ties. 
According to Ali, one of their strategies is to aggressively recruit very young fighters who are 
not yet too deeply involved in the clan’s practice, and to indoctrinate them with global Jihadi 
ideology. Al-Shabaab also upsets the existing clan order systematically by empowering 
persons from weak and minor clans and gives them senior positions within the organization. 
In some cases they are even encouraged to use their newfound powers against clans that have 
traditionally been superior in strength.
319
 As such, al-Shabaab clearly demonstrates that 
traditional clan logic is not longer prevalent. However, while striving to oppose and transcend 
clan structures, al-Shabaab simultaneously makes extensive use of the “clan-card” whenever 
it suits their goals. For example, it has suited them to give all the major clans positions within 
al-Shabaab’s senior leadership, and have at times chosen to support one sub-clan against 
another sub-clan in local conflicts.
320
  
 Although al-Shabaab has been relatively successful in overcoming clan boundaries, it 
has grappled with the Somali public. According to Ali, the extensive use of non-Somali, 
Jihadi symbols and identities, for example the use of a black flag with the shahāda (the 
declaration of faith) emblazoned on it (a slight variation from al-Qa’ida’s flag) instead of the 
Somali flag, and the use of propaganda videos showing al-Shabaab militia singing Arabic 
songs that glorify suicide bombings, have unnerved many Somalis and cast doubt on al-
Shabaab’s purported goal of liberating Somalia.321 Another contested issue is al-Shabaab’s 
application of sharī’a. Despite the fact that several of my informants appreciate the generally 
improved security situation in al-Shabaab dominated areas, and some of them even 
sympathetic to their aim of strengthening the Islamic public moral, almost all interviewees 
explicitly criticizised al-Shabaab’s harsh and brutal punishment of alleged offenders. Several 
informants explained to me that this brutal enforcement was not “the right” sharī’a, even 
though they recognized that corporal punishments is explicitely stated in the sacred texts and 
the Islamic scholarly tradition. These informants were well aquainted with the requirements of 
traditional fiqh and pointed out to me the many requirements that must be fulfilled and the 
strict rules of evidence that should be taken into consideration. The fact that al-Shabaab for 
example punishes theft with amputation while a high percentage of the population suffer from 
poverty, and punishes adulterers by stoning without having four witnesses to the actual 
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penetration, demonstrates, in their view, that al-Shabaab fails to apply the “proper” sharī’a. 
Nobody seemed to believe that the convicts of these cases, who often were said by al-Shabaab 
to have admitted to the accusations, actually were guilty.   
 As rulers of large parts of Somalia, al-Shabaab faces a dilemma: they have used 
Jihadi-Salafi rhetoric and symbols such as sharī’a to arrive where they are. To keep the 
political power is another matter. So far, it seems that al-Shabaab has tried to gain legitimacy 
by enforcing harsh corporal punishments and banning “un-Islamic” behavior. Their 
willingness to use violence conforms well to Jihadi-Salafi ideology, but may reduce the 
legitimacy of the regime if its judicial practice diverges too much from traditional Somali 
norms and values.   
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Appendix 1 
 
Court cases tried in al-Shabaab courts where my informants have been directly 
involved: 
 
Diya/qiṣāṣ cases: 
1. “Shankar” was brought before the regional court in Baidoa, Bay, accused of murder. 
He had admitted to the accusations during torture in prison, but retracted the 
admission in court. “Shankar” told the qāḍīs that he had shot the victim accidentally 
after a quarrel about unpaid debth. To support his claim, “Shankar” brought several 
eyewitnesses to the quarrel that confirmed this. Thereafter, the elders on both sides, 
who were present during the trial, asked the qāḍīs to solve the issue outside the court. 
They were allowed to do this, and suggested that the accused should pay a diya of 
7000 USD. The qāḍīs agreed.  
2. “Ayah” was brought to a court in Bardere, Gedo, accused of assault and of injuring the 
forehead of the complainant. The Ḥisbah brought the complainant to testify about the 
incident, and “Ayah” subsequently accepted the allegations. After a discussion 
whether to compensate or retaliate, the qāḍīs sentenced the accused to pay 300 USD as 
diya to the victim. 
3. “Mahmod” was brought before a court in Bal’ad, Middle Shabelle, accused of assault 
with a knife. The injured victim and some other witnesses who had been present 
during the assault were brought to testify. “Mahmod” claimed that he had acted in 
self-defense as the victim had turned violent after a quarrel. The elders of both parties 
were allowed to discuss the incident outside the court, and suggested ten camels, 
valued at 2000 USD, to be paid to the injured man.  
4. “Kora” went to the regional administration in Kismayo to complain about a Ḥisbah 
official who she accused of killing her boyfriend whom she had intended to marry. 
She claimed that the official had killed her boyfriend because he had wanted to have 
her. As evidence of this, “Kora” brought an audio recording with the official 
threatening her boyfriend. “Kora” was then granted protection, and the official was 
arrested and executed.  
5. “Shamsa’s” husband had been killed by al-Shabaab militia in Baldeweyne, Hiiran, due 
to suspicions of espionage. After one month of investigation, the Ḥisbah had 
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established that he had not been a spy. Therefore, the al-Shabaab administration on the 
city summoned “Shamsa” and some elderly relatives to discuss the matter. They 
agreed to al-Shabaab’s offer to pay 15000 USD as diya to “Shamsa”.   
6. “Mohamad Ahmad’s” son, an al-Shabaab militiaman, was brought before the 
provincial court in Kismayo accused of wounding an innocent man by shooting him in 
his thigh during a patrol in the city. Four of the militiamen who had been present 
during the incident were brought to testify. The accused militiaman then admitted the 
crime, and the victim was given the opportunity to choose between retaliation and 
diya. He chose diya, and the accused was sentenced to pay five camels.    
 
Ḥadd cases: 
7. “Fuad” and a woman were brought to a court in Mogadishu accused of zinā as they 
had been caught by al-Shabaab militia while sitting in the same car. Two men who had 
been present at the time of the arrest gave testimonies in the court. “Fuad” claimed 
that the woman was his relative whom he planned to marry. However, he was then 
sentenced to 100 lashes.  
8. “Aisha” was brought before a court in Baladweyne, Hiiran, accused of zinā with a 
military officer of the AMISOM forces. As evidence, the Ḥisbah presented three 
persons who had seen her go to the military camp several times. “Aisha” defended her 
actions by claiming that she did not have an affair with the officer, but rather that he 
was helping her with money to pay the medical bill for her sick father. Moreover, she 
told that she already was married to another man, and that during her initial arrest, 
lasting for one week, she had lost her unborn baby due to torture inflicted by the 
Ḥisbah officials. The qāḍīs told her that they would not sentence her as she already 
had faced serious torture and lost her baby, but warned her not to go to the military 
camp anymore. 
9. “Elmi” and his girlfriend were brought before a court in Jowhar, Middle Shabelle, 
accused of zinā. As witnesses the Ḥisbah brought “Elmi’s” uncle and some neighbors. 
The couple admitted to the crime, and the qāḍīs sentenced them to 100 lashes each as 
they were previously unmarried.  
10. “Kadra” went to a court in Mogadishu to complain about a Ḥisbah official who she 
told had raped her. This happened when she refused to accept his attempts to convince 
her to marry him. Due to his refusal, the official threatened her, beated her with his 
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pistol and raped her. When the man was leaving, she screamed, and some of the 
neighbors recognized the man. However, none of them dared to support “Kora’s” 
claims in the court as they were afraid of reprisals from al-Shabaab, and the court case 
was subsequently dismissed due to lack of evidence.   
11. “Ayan” was brought before the regional court in Mogadishu accused of 
zinā/prostitution. The only evidence presented by the prosecutor was the accusations 
of the complainant, who was a Ḥisbah official. However, “Ayan” defended herself by 
claiming that she was not a prostitute, but a wife and a mother of six children, and that 
her husband was frequently absent as he was working abroad. The most decisive fact 
was nevertheless, she claims, that the Ḥisbah official accusing her had wanted to force 
her to divorce her husband and marry him. “Ayan” told the qāḍīs that this was likely 
the explanation to the accusations brought against her. To support her claims, she 
brought some of her neighbors and relatives as witnesses and they could confirm her 
story. They also said that if “Ayan” or some of them were killed, they would hold the 
qāḍīs responsible. The qāḍīs then released her and transferred the Ḥisbah official to 
another town. 
12. “Farah” was brought before a court in Baidoa, Bay, accused by his neighbors to have 
consumed alcohol. As evidence the prosecutor presented five bottles of alcohol which 
the Ḥisbah had found in his house. However, “Farah” claimed that the bottles were not 
his, but the qāḍīs did not believe him and sentenced him to 80 lashes and to pay a fine 
of 3 million Somali shillings. 
13. “Omar” was brought before a court in Merka, Lower Shabelle, accused of smoking 
hashish on the beach. As evidence the Ḥisbah brought the hashish he had allegedly 
been smoking at the time when the Ḥisbah caught him. “Omar” then admitted to the 
crime, and the qāḍīs sentenced him to 80 lashes and to pay a fine of 3 millions Somali 
shillings. 
14. On June 22 2009 “Roble” and three other young men were brought befor an outdoor 
court in Maslaha, at the outskirts of the Animal market in the district of Huriwa, 
Mogadishu, accused of robbery and espionage. As evidence of the qāḍīs showed some 
allegedly stolen mobile phones and pistols to the huge crowd who was ordered to 
watch the session. In addition, the qāḍīs claimed the accused had confessed to their 
crimes. “Roble” however stressed that he never admitted to any crime. Anyway, the 
qāḍīs sentenced all four to cross-amputation. Three days later, on June 25, the 
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sentences were carried out at the same place, this time also in front of a huge crowd. 
Four days after the cross-amputation, Fuad Shangole, a leading al-Shabaab figure, 
visited the four boys and cut another three fingerbreadths of the stumps as he asserted 
that the first amputations had been too low. 
 
Ta’zīr/siyāsa cases: 
15. “Aisha Adan” was brought before a court in Kismayo, Lower Jubba, accused of using 
a Thuraya satellite phone which had previously been prohibited by the al-Shabaab 
administration. As evidence the prosecutor brought the phone she had allegedly been 
using. “Aisha Aden” admitted that she had been using it, but told the qāḍīs that she 
had had to use it due to poor network that day. The qāḍīs sentenced her to stop 
working for the NGO where she was an employee, and to pay a fine of 3000 USD. 
16. “Ali” was brought before a court in Kismayo, Lower Jubba, accused of assault and for 
threatening another man. As evidence the Ḥisbah brought the complainant and some 
neighbors who had witnessed the incident to testify, and they confirmed the 
accusations. “Ali” admitted to have fought and threatened the complainant, but 
defended this by referring to a dispute regarding a house which his brother had sold 
without his consent. The qāḍīs sided with the complainant and decided that the house 
rightfully belonged to the complainant, who was the buyer, and ordered “Ali” not to 
threaten the man again.  
17. “Ahmad” was brought before a court in Bu’ale, Middle Jubba, accused of watching 
sex videos on his mobile phone. As evidence the Ḥisbah presented the confiscated 
mobile which still contained the pornographic material. “Ahmad” admitted to the 
crime, and was sentenced to 50 lashes in a public place and to pay a fine of 2000 USD. 
18. “Abdow” was brought before a court in Afgoye, Lower Shabelle, accused of smoking 
tobacco in his car and resisting the arrest. The Ḥisbah brought two witnesses who were 
present at the incident to support the accusations. “Abdow” explained that he had not 
been smoking in public, which was forbidden, but in his own car, which he thought 
was legal. He explained that he had not been fighting back before the Ḥisbah officials 
had started beating him. The qāḍīs, however, told him that smoking was only allowed 
in special smoking zones, and that he had no rights to resist his arrest. For these crimes 
“Ali” was sentenced to six months in jail. 
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19. “Kadra Ahlo” was brought before a court in Mogadishu accused of hiding a small bag 
that was thrown into her shop by some al-Shabaab militiamen. The Ḥisbah did not 
bring any evidence before the qāḍīs, only claimed that they were sure that the bag had 
been thrown into her shop and that they therefore did not need any witnesses. “Kadra 
Ahlo” admitted that a bag had been thrown into the shop, but explained that since 
there was fighting in the area at the time of the incident, she was afraid that the bag 
had contained explosives, and had thrown the bag away. The qāḍīs understood “Kadra 
Ahlo’s” fears, the situation taken into consideration, and decided to release her as the 
militiamen had not told her that the bag was their property.  
20. “Haliima” was brought before the residential court in Kismayo, Lower Jubba, accused 
of selling khat inside her house. The Ḥisbah presented as evidence the khat they had 
found in her possession at the time of the arrest. “Heliima” admitted to selling khat, 
but explained that she had not been able to go to the market where this business is 
allowed as she is a widow and have five children who she has to take care of. The 
qāḍīs did not take this into consideration, and sentenced her to 40 lashes and two 
weeks in jail.  
21. “Hirsi” was brought before a court in Koryoley, Lower Shabelle, accused of watching 
a football match at his home, which had been prohibited by the al-Shabaab 
administration. As evidence the Ḥisbah brought the TV and the decoder. “Hirshi” 
admitted to the fact, but denied that this should be perceived as a crime. The qāḍī, 
stressing that it was illegal to watch football and movies, sentenced him to 40 lashes 
and to pay a fine of two million Somali shillings. 
22. “Yusuf” was brought before a court in Baladweyn, Hiiran, accused of selling hashish 
in his shop. As evidence the Ḥisbah brought the hashish that they found in a bag in his 
shop at the time of his arrest. “Yusuf” denied the accusations, claiming that the bag 
belonged to his brother-in-law, and that he did not know what it contained. The qāḍīs 
did not believe this, and sentenced him to 80 lashes, five months in jail, and to hand 
over his shop to the al-Shabaab administration. 
23. “Abdullahi Ali” was brought before a court in Mogadishu accused of selling hashish. 
As evidence the Ḥisbah brought the hashish that they found in his house. “Abdullahi 
Ali” claimed that the hashish was not his, but belonged to a friend who had previously 
visited him. The qāḍīs did not believe in this, and sentenced him to 40 lashes and three 
months in jail.  
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24. “Ali Mohamed” was brought before the residential court in Kismayo, Lower Jubba, 
accused of selling hashish. As evidence the Ḥisbah brought some witnesses who 
claimed that they had seen the accused selling hashish to youths in his house. “Ali 
Mohamed” denied the accusations, but was nevertheless sentenced by the qāḍīs to 40 
lashes and four months in jail. 
25. “Abdikarim” was brought before the residential court in Afgoye, Lower Shabelle, 
accused of speeding and careless driving. As evidence the Ḥisbah brought three 
witnesses, a Ḥisbah official and two other persons, who had been passengers in the 
car, all supporting the accusation. Although “Abdikarim” did not admit to have done 
anything unlawful, the qāḍīs sentenced him to 30 lashes and to be banned from future 
driving. 
26. “Abu Mahmod” was brought before the provincial court at the Bakara market, 
Mogadishu, accused of speaking to some of his students which were foreign al-
Shabaab fighters, even though he had been strictly ordered not to do so. As evidence 
the prosecutor brought one of the foreign fighters who had been present during the 
class as a witness. “Abu Mahmed” claimed that his intention was not to break the 
rules, but he had had to find out whether the students understood his teaching. The 
qāḍīs ordered him not to tell anybody what had taken place during the trial and to 
continue as a teacher. He was also ordered to bring back the unmarried girls of a group 
of refugees he had previously helped to escape from Mogadishu, as they were to be 
married to young al-Shabaab militiamen.  
27. “Hassan” was brought before the residential court in Kismayo, Lower Jubba, accused 
of releasing information, deemed by the al-Shabaab administration to be sensitive, and 
thus of exposing Muslims to danger. The qāḍīs presented as evidence an audio 
recording of “Hassan’s” news report. “Hassan” admitted to the accusations, but 
claimed that he had been forced to do so by some unknown militiamen. The qāḍīs 
believed him on this point and told him that they therefore would be more lenient than 
originally intended, hence “only” giving him an ultimatum leaving the region within 
36 hours or be killed. 
28. “Haji” was brought before the regional court in Mogadishu accused by his wife of 
espionage. As evidence the prosecutor brought the complainant, i.e. his wife, as a 
witness. She claimed that “Haji” was a spy due to the fact that his brother was a major 
in the TFG forces. “Haji” however denied the accusation brought against him and 
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claimed that his wife had accused him because she was jealous of his second wife. The 
qāḍīs decided to suspend the case for two weeks in order to conduct further 
investigations. Instead of being sent back to prison as intended, “Haji” was released 
when two of his relatives, one al-Shabaab member and a business man, promised to 
that he would meet before the court when the trial was to continue. However, “Haji” 
fled the country. Consequently, both his relatives were executed.  
29. “Asad” was brought before the regional court in Mogadishu accused of espionage due 
to the fact that he had made a contract with the TFG to renovate the parliament 
building. As evidence the Ḥisbah presented documents that they had found in his shop 
whith details about the contract. “Asad” confirmed these facts, but explained that it 
was only a job he did as a business man, and that he had entered into no other 
contracts with the TFG. In addition, he pointed out that he supported al-Shabaab by 
giving them money. The qāḍīs told him that everybody found dealing with the TFG 
was to be perceived as an enemy of al-Shabaab. However, as he had given them 
money, they “only” sentenced him to transfer all his wealth to the al-Shabaab 
administration. 
30. “Nadifa” was brought before the provincial court of Merka, Lower Shabelle, accused 
by her neighbor, a Ḥisbah official, of possessing illegal firearms in her house. As 
evidence the Ḥisbah brought two firearms and some bullets found in her house. 
“Nadifa” admitted that they belonged to her, but explained that the firearms had been 
used to guard her small farm during the time before the Islamic Court Union, when 
there was little control in the area. The qāḍīs, however, said that she had violated an 
official commandment, stating that any illegal weapons should have been handed over 
to the al-Shabaab administration. “Nadifa” was thus sentenced to one year in prison or 
to pay a fine of 3000 USD. After seven days her relatives raised the amount, and she 
was released.   
31. “Korfa” was brought before the lower court of Bualle, Middle Jubba, accused of not 
attending prayers at the local mosque. In order to support the accusations, the Ḥisbah 
officials who caught him staying in his shop at the time of prayer gave their witness 
testimonies. “Korfa” then admitted to the fact, but defended his act by pointing out 
that the mosque was located far away from his shop, and that he prays the five daily 
prayers at home. As is it obloigatory to attend the prayers at the mosque, the qāḍī 
sentenced him to 10 lashes.   
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32. “Nadif” was brought before the residential court of Bardheere, Gedo, accused of 
chewing khat with his wife in their house. In addition, “Nadif” was in addition 
accused of storing pornographic content on his mobile phone which the Ḥisbah 
detected after his initial arrest. As evidence the Ḥisbah presented the khat found in his 
house as well as the confiscated mobile phone with the pornographic content. “Nadif “ 
admitted to the allegations, while the wife said she had chewed khat to keep her 
husband with company. The qāḍīs released the wife, citing that “Nadif” was 
responsible for her behavior, while “Nadif” was sentenced to 30 lashes and to swallow 
the memory card of his mobile phone.  
33. “Laban” was brought before a court in Beledweyne, Hiiran, accused of selling alcohol. 
As evidence the Ḥisbah brought two crates of alcohol which were found in his vehicle. 
He defended himself by claiming that he had been asked by one of his passengers to 
keep some goods for him, and that he gladly had done so, but without knowing the 
content. The qāḍīs sentenced him to hand over his vehicle to the administration of 
Bulla Barde, Hiiran. 
34. “Nadifa” was brought before a court in Jowhar, Middle Shabelle, accused of 
espionage. However, the prosecutor didn’t bring any evidence in order to support the 
serious allegations. “Nadifa” told the qāḍīs that she believed the accusations rested at 
the fact that her youngest boy, who had been forcefully recruited to al-Shabaab, had 
managed to escape, and that some al-Shabaab members suspected her of helping him 
flee. However, she said that she didn’t have anything to do with his escape, and 
emphasized that she already had lost one son while fighting for al-Shabaab in 
Mogadishu. The qāḍī dismissed the cases due to insufficient evidence. 
35. “Amina”, an elderly woman, was brought before the residential court in Baidoa, Bay, 
accused of leaving her house without the prescribed allcovering abāyah. As evidence 
the court heared the witnesse testimonies of the members of the Hibah patrol who 
caught her three blocks away from her house. She admitted to the fact, but claimed 
that she had no intention to break the law as she was only saying goodbye to her 
cousin’s sister. The qāḍīs sentenced her to 15 lashes.  
36. “Ali Hussein” was brought before the provincial court of Merka, Lower Shabelle, 
accused of growing tobacco (which is illegal). As evidence the prosecutor displayed 
the tobacco found in his car at the time of his arrest, as well as additional tobacco 
found after a subsequent raid at his farm. “Ali Hussein” admitted to the accusations 
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and was sentenced to pay a fine of 5000 USD and that his tobacco crop would be 
burned. In addition, his farm would be supervised in the future.  
 
Espionage case tried in a military court: 
37. “Dalmar” was brought before an alleged military court somewhere in the wilderness of 
the al-Shabaab controlled area, accused of espionage. Eight months earlier he had 
been abducted and since held in arrest being frequently tortured and interrogated as he 
at that time was working for a Somali NGO, and had previously been working for 
international NGOs. The last interrogation took place in front of three officials (the 
presumed military court) who all wore masks. These men concluded that the arrest of 
“Dalmar” had been a mistake and that he had been suspected for another man. 
Therefore, he was transported back to civilization and released. It was the villagers 
that met him who told him that the persons who had abducted him were members of 
Amniyaat, and that the last interrogation had taken place in a military court. 
 
Sources: 
1. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, August 2011 
2. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, February 2011 
3. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, April 2011 
4. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, April 2011 
5. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, April 2011 
6. Interview conducted by the author in Nairobi, October 2010. 
7. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, November 2010. 
8. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, November 2010. 
9. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, April 2011. 
10. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, April 2011. 
11. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, August 2011. 
12. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, February 2011. 
13. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, February 2011. 
14. Interview conducted by the author in Norway, April 2011; BBC News. Somalis watch double amputations. 
BBC, (25 June 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8118306.stm, [14.09.2011]. 
15. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, November 2010. 
16. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, November 2010. 
17. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, November 2010. 
18. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, November 2010. 
19. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, November 2010. 
20. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, February 2011. 
21. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, February 2011. 
22. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, February 2011. 
23. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, April 2011. 
24. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, July 2011. 
25. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, August 2011. 
26. Interview conducted by the author in Nairobi, October 2010. 
27. Interview conducted by the author in Nairobi, October 2010. 
28. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, November 2010. 
29. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, November 2010. 
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30. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, September 2011. 
31. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, September 2011 
32. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, September 2011 
33. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, September 2011 
34. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, September 2011 
35. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, September 2011 
36. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, September 2011 
37. Interview conducted by Mohamed and Abdow in Nairobi, August 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
121 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Reported al-Shabaab stoning in adultery cases from October 2008 until June 2011
322
: 
 
1. October 27, 2008, Kismayo, Lower Jubba: Stoning of Aisha Ibrahim 
Duhulowfor (13), accused of adultery. She is reported to have been raped at the 
beach in Kismayo by three al-Shabaab militiamen, and then to have gone to the 
police station with her aunt to report the offence and to point out the rapists. 
However, a few days later, two of the suspects were released and Aisha was 
instead imprisoned. Three days later she was stoned in front of a crowd. The qāḍīs 
are reported to have said that Aisha had chatted up these men, and that she had 
confessed to adultery. According to her aunt, the qāḍīs did not take into 
consideration on the local radio her reported history of mental illness. 
 
2. June 28, 2009, Wanla Weyn, Lower Shabelle: Stoning of Mohammed Mahmud 
Ubeiydi (27), accused of rape and murder. The qāḍī, reported to be Abdul Basit, 
announced that the offender would face such punishment as he was already 
married.  
 
3. August, 2009, Kismayo, Lower Jubba: Stoning of a woman and a man due to 
adultery. This is said to have happened after the woman came on her own initiative 
to the court to report the offence in order to make up for her sins in this life, so that 
she could escape condemnation in the afterlife. As the woman was a widow and 
the man was married, they both were sentenced to stoning. 
 
4. November 6, 2009, Merka, Middle Shabelle: Stoning of Abas Hussein 
Abdirahman (33), accused of adultery. Abas’s alleged pregnant lover will, 
according to al-Shabaab officials, be stoned when she has given birth. The qāḍīs 
claim that Abas had admitted to the crime in front of an Islamic court. 
 
                                                          
322
 These cases are based on media reports, reports from NGOs and GOs, such as Amnesty International, 
UNHCR and The U.S. State Department as well as interviews with my own informants. Most of the cases are 
described in several sources. However, it may be that different reports are using the same source, and as such 
should be perceived as a single source. Therefore, all this information should be read with caution.     
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5. November 17, 2009, El-Bon, Bakool: Stoning of the woman Halima Ibrahim 
Abdurrahman (29), accused of adultery. Her presumed lover, Nanah Mohamed 
Maadey (20) an un-married man, got 100 lashes. 
 
6. January 17, 2010, Barawe, Lower Shabelle: Stoning of Hussein Ibrahim 
Mohamed (25), accused of adultery. He was reported as already married and to 
have committed the alleged crimes with Khadija Abu Bakr Cabdul Qaadiir, the 17-
year old daughter of his sister, who became pregnant.  According to al-Shabaab 
officials he admitted to the crime.  
 
7. June 16, 2011, Mahas, Hiiran: Stoning of Sharma’arke Abdullahi Mohamoud, 
accused of rape of Deqa Abdulle Nur. The alleged perpetrator, who was reported 
to being married, was said to have admitted to the crime. 
 
A total of 7 stoning cases and 8 executions.  
 
Sources: 
 
1.  BBC News. Somalis grow fearful of Islamists. BBC, (12 November 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7722701.stm, [14.09.2011].; Amnesty International. Somalia: Girl stoned 
was a child of 13, (31 October 2008), http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/somalia-girl-
stoned-was-child-13-20081031, [14.09.2011]. 
2. Global Islamic Media Front. Sentence of stoning against a young man who raped a girl and killed 
her in a suburb of the city of Welweyn. Sada al-Jihād Media Center, (1 July 2009), 
http://www.alqimmah.net/archive/index.php/t-6158.html, [14.09.2011]; BBC News. Somali adulterer 
stoned to death. BBC, (6 November 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8347216.stm, 
[14.09.2011]. 
3. Interview with “Mohamed Ahmed” conducted by the author in Nairobi, October 2010. 
4. BBC News. Somali adulterer stoned to death. BBC, (6 November 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8347216.stm, [14.09.2011]; YouTube, Stoning to Death by Somali Al-
Shabaab Islamists, (8 November 2009, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=88Pe00INC-M, 
[14.09.2011]. 
5. VG Nett. Somalisk kvinne steinet til døde. VG, (18 November 2009), 
http://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/artikkel.php?artid=580725, [14.09.2011];  Stone, Michael. Al-
Shabab stoning men, women, children in Somalia. Examiner.com, (21 November 2009), 
http://www.examiner.com/humanist-in-portland/al-shabab-stoning-men-women-children-somalia, 
[14.09.2011]; Zamparutti, Elisabetha (ed.), Hands Off Cain: The Death Penalty Worldwide: 2010 
REPORT. Hans Off Cain, (August 2010), http://www.eidhr.eu/files/dmfile/the-death-penalty-
worldwide-report-2010_en.pdf, [14.09.2011], p. 80. 
6. Global Islamic Media Front. 17-1 Youth Mujahiden Movement // The stoning of a formerly married 
man who committed the crime of Ziina in the Islamic State of lower Shabelle. Al-qimmah Media, (28 
April 2010), http://www.alqimmah.net/showthread.php?t=16466, [14.09.2011]; Zamparutti, Elisabetha 
(ed.), Hands Off Cain: The Death Penalty Worldwide: 2010 REPORT. Hans Off Cain, (August 2010), 
http://www.eidhr.eu/files/dmfile/the-death-penalty-worldwide-report-2010_en.pdf, [14.09.2011], p. 81. 
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7. AMISOM Daily Media Monitoring. 17 Jun 2011: Morning headlines, (17 June 2011), 
http://somaliamediamonitoring.org/?p=129, [14.09.2011]; Shabelle Media Network. Al Shabaab group 
stones man to death in central Somalia, http://www.shabelle.net/article.php?id=7667, [14.09.11]. 
 
 
 
Appendix 3 
 
Reported al-Shabaab theft cases from late 2008 until February 2011
323
 : 
 
1. Late 2008, Mogadishu, Benadiir : Amputation of the right hand of a boy (25) 
accused of stealing money and some other property in a shop.  
 
2. January 2009, Kismayo, Lower Jubba : Amputation of the right hand of Yusuf 
Dhuhulow, a laundry owner, accused of stealing clothes from a customer, an al-
Shabaab member, while he was using the laundry owner’s services. 
 
3. January 28, 2009, Kismayo, Lower Jubba: Amputation of the hand of a man 
accused of stealing three sacks containing fishing nets. 
 
4. May 8, 2009, Kismayo, Lower Jubba: Amputation of the right hand of Mohamed 
Omar Ismael, accused of stealing 10 pairs of trousers, 10 shirts, eight other items 
and a bag. The value of all the items was estimated to be worth the equivalent of 
90USD. He asserted his innocence. 
 
5. July 2, 2009, Merka, Lower Shabelle:  Amputation of the hand of Mohammed 
Soudi Siad (30), accused of stealing a cow. 
 
6. August 2009, Bu’ale, Middle Jubba: Amputation of the right hand of Mohamed 
Gelle Yusuf, accused of stealing 100USD. 
 
                                                          
323
 These cases are based on media reports, reports from NGOs and GOs, such as Amnesty International, 
UNHCR and The U.S. State Department as well as interviews with my own informants. Most of the cases are 
described in several sources. However, some cases are only based on information from a single sourc . There 
may also be that different reports stem from the same source, and should be perceived as a single source. 
Thus, all this information should be read with caution.     
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7. September 9, 2009, Mogadishu, Benadiir: Amputation of the hand of two 
teenagers accused of theft after allegedly having broken into a house. An 
eyewitness said kitchen knives were used to amputate one hand of the screaming 
men on a large table.   
 
8. September 30, 2009, Mogadishu, Benadiir: Amputation of the hand of two men 
accused of theft.  
 
9. 2009, Wanla Weyn, Lower Shabelle: Amputation inflicted on at least one alleged 
thief.  
 
10. 2009, Qansaxdhere, Bay: Amputation of the hand of at least one alleged thief. 
 
11. 2009/2010, Mogadishu, Benadiir: Amputation of the right hand of a man that 
refused to pay back the money (7000USD) which he had loaned. The case was 
tried in the Bakara Market court. 
 
12. January 2010, Mogadishu, Benadiir: Amputation of the hand of a man accused 
of stealing mobile phones. 
 
13. March 2010, Kismayo, Lower Jubba: Amputation of the right hand of three boys 
convicted of stealing mobiles from a shop. They were reported to have admitted to 
the crime in front of the public before the amputation. 
 
14. April 26, 2010, Mogadishu, Benadiir: Amputation of the hand of Shiine Abuukar 
Hersi accused of stealing mattresses and some other domestic items. According to 
the qāḍī the accused had admitted to the crime. 
 
15. June 16, 2010, Balad, Middle Shabelle: Amputation of the right hand of Murshid 
Ahmed Adan (22) and Hassan Omar Mohamed (18) accused of theft. The qāḍī 
claimed that Aden and Mohamed had confessed to stealing 45 million Somali 
shillings ($1,400) and two million Somali shillings ($60) respectively, from 
several shops. 
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16. December 12, 2010, Diinsor, Bay: Amputation of the hand of a young man due to 
accusations of theft.  
 
17. February 19, 2011, Wanla Weyn, Lower Shabelle: Amputation of the right hand 
of the teenager Abdirashid Saleban Hamud due to accusations of breaking into a 
house and stealing currency worth 30USD. He is reported to have admitted to the 
crime.   
 
18. February 19, 2011, Mogadishu, Benadiir: Amputation of the hand of Ali 
Hashim due to accusations of theft.  
 
A total of 18 cases and 23 amputations 
 
 
Sources: 
 
1. Interview with ”Yusuf Osman” conducted by the author in Nairobi, October 2010. 
2. Interview with ”Muhtar Adam”conducted by the author in Nairobi, October 2010; Hiiran Online. Al-
Shabab Militia Court in Kismayo Enforce Sharia Law By Hand Amputation of an Alleged Thief, (9 May 
2009), 
http://www.hiiraan.com/news2/2009/may/al_shabab_militia_court_in_kismayo_enforce_sharia_law_by
_hand_amputation_of_an_alleged_theif.aspx, [12.09.2011]. 
3. Interview with ”Muhtab” conducted by the author in Nairobi, October 2010;  
U.S. Department of State. 2009 Human Rights Reports: Somalia. Human Rights Reports. Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, (11 March 2010), 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135976.htm, [23.09.11].  
4. Amnesty International. Somalia: Amputations and public killings must stop, (14 May 2009), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/for-media/press-releases/somalia-amputations-and-public-killings-must-
stop-20090514, [13.09.2011]; Mohamed, Mohamed, Somali justice: Islamist-style. BBC News, (20 
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Appendix 4 
 
Reported al-Shabaab robbery cases from June 2009 until April 2011
324
 : 
 
1. June 25, 2009, Mogadishu, Benadiir: Cross amputation (right hand and left leg) 
of four teenagers, Aden Mohamud, Ismail Khalif Abdulle,  Jeylani Mohamed and 
Abdulkadir Adow, due to accusations of robbery and espionage. They had 
allegedly stolen mobile phones and pistols. According to the chief qāḍī, they had 
admitted to the crimes.    
 
2. October 15, 2009, Mogadishu (Karan district), Benadiir: Cross amputation of 
Nur Hassan Hussein due to accusations of blocking the way of Muslims and 
robbing them of their money and intimidating them. He is said to have confessed 
to the court, and reported to have died of the wounds some days after the 
amputation, according to Amnesty International. 
 
3. October 9, 2009, Kismayo, Lower Jubba: Cross amputation of the brothers 
Sayeed and Osman Ibrahim, as well as another man in his early 20s. All were 
accused of robbing passengers on a truck. Osman only faced amputation of his left 
leg as he already had reduced mobility in one hand. The qāḍīs claimed that the 
accused had admitted to the crime.  
 
4. October 16, 2009, Jowhar, Middle Shabelle: Cross amputation of Nur Hasan 
Huseyn, accused of robbery.  
 
5. October 4, 2010, Buulo Berde, Hiiran: Cross amputation of a man accused of 
robbing passengers on mini busses which were traveling in the area. The accused 
is reported to have stolen several valuable objects, including mobile phones.   
 
                                                          
324
 These cases are based on media reports, reports from NGOs and GOs, such as Amnesty International, 
UNHCR and The U.S. State Department as well as interviews with own informants. Most of the cases are 
described in several sources. However, it may be that different reports are using the same source and as such 
should be perceived as a single source. Thus, all this information should be read with caution.    
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6. December 21, 2010, Buulo Berde, Hiiran: Amputation of the hand (not leg) of a 
man accused of robbing cars and busses along the road, stealing money from the 
passengers.  
 
7. January 4, 2011, Baidoa, Bay: Cross amputation of Nor Ahmed Noor (19) 
accused of robbery, allegedly having stolen money. According to the qāḍīs he had 
admitted to the crime.  
 
8. April 12, 2011, Jowhar, Middle Shabelle:  Cross amputation of three juveniles, 
Hassan Siyaad Mohamed (22), Abdullah Farah Barqad (31) and Hassan Mowlem 
Farey (18),  accused of robbing a bus, allegedly stealing 3400 Somali Shilling and 
two cellphones. The qāḍī said they had admitted to the crime. 
 
A total of 9 cases and 15 (13) cross amputations. 
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